THE INTEGRATION OF RETURNEES FROM THE COLONIES INTO PORTUGAL'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE

By

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KEY TO SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIFRE	Comissão Interministerial de Financiamento a Retornados (Interministerial Commission for Financing Retornados)
FFH	Fundo de Fomento de Habitação (Fund for the Fomentation of Housing)
IARN	Instituto de Apoio ao Retorno de Nacionais (Institue to Aid the Return of Nationals)
QGA	Quadro Geral de Adidos (General Staff Attached to the Government)
*	Signifies significance level of .05
**	Signifies significance level of .01

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE INTEGRATION OF RETURNEES FROM THE COLONIES INTO PORTUGAL'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE

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This dissertation concerns the integration of nearly a million returnees from Portugal's former colonies into its own social and economic life after the metropole's 1974 revolution and the subsequent independence of the colonies. I define returnees as integrated when they come to approximate their nonreturnee neighbors in their personal economic circumstances and their evaluations of them. The main hypothesis is that key premigration characteristics of the returnees--their education, their income in the colonies, their race, their marital status, whether or not they had nonreturnee family in Portugal, and whether or not they had worked for the government in the colonies--influenced their subsequent level of integration. The main alternative hypothesis is that government policy toward returnees counteracted the tendency for those with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others.

A secondary aim of this dissertation is to show how the settlement patterns of and economic activities undertaken by returnees were conditioned by several economic and demographic trends inherited from the Salazar-Caetano regime: the favoring of services and industry over agriculture, the favoring of urban over rural growth and development, government involvement in emigration, and a special relationship between colonists and the state.

The data derive from ethnographic work in a small neighborhood outside of Lisbon that is heavily populated with returnees, a sample survey of 249 returnees and non-returnees conducted in the same neighborhood, government documents and interviews with government officials, a random sample of 500 out of 187,000 government files on individual returnee families, newspaper accounts of the return of former colonists, and a study of returnee integration in rural northern Portugal conducted by the Regional Planning Commission of the North (Os Retornados da Area do Alto Tâmega e a Sua Reintegração Social, by José Maria Cabral Ferreira, 1977. Porto: Comissão de Planeamento da Região do Norte).

The findings warrant rejection of the null hypothesis that the integration of returnees was not influenced by their premigration characteristics. Government policy seems not to have significantly counteracted the tendency for returnees with these characteristics to be less

integrated than others. Moreover, the evidence shows that government policy toward returnees continued the historical and demographic trends begun under Salazar and Caetano.

CHAPTER I
"O RETORNO"

Portugal's colonial empire began to collapse soon after the onset of the 1974 revolution. The military had been waging wars against liberation fronts in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, but had found the charge increasingly difficult to fulfill with the half-hearted support it received from the metropole. It was, in fact, disgruntled officers from the overseas campaigns who, influenced by their opponents' leftist politics, overthrew the Caetano regime on April 25, 1974. The military in the colonies soon became inactive, hastening independence and leaving the colonists unprotected.

When Portugal's military refused to fight, tales of white arrests and massacres began to circulate, and people began to flee the colonies in a panic. Portugal assured the transitional African governments--still nominally under its control--that it would encourage whites to stay, and authorities publicly declared that "there [was] no reason for the population to abandon" the colonies. Despite these statements, airline flights to Portugal were arriving full of passengers and going back to Africa empty (Moçambique: Caldeirão em Efervescência 1974, p. 6). But that was only the beginning.

By the time "O Retorno" ("the return") was over, between eight hundred thousand and one million former colonists had arrived in Portugal, a country with a prerevolution population of less than nine million (Comissão Liquidatária do IARN 1982, p. 1).

This dissertation is concerned with the integration of these former colonists into Portuguese social and economic life. The main hypothesis is that individuals with certain premigration characteristics were more likely than others to be well integrated. Specifically, those with better-than-average chances for effective integration were whites, people with relatively good educations and high incomes before coming to Portugal, those who were living with spouses in the colonies, people who had worked for the government, and colonists who had relatives in Portugal. I also show how the incorporation of former colonists into Portuguese society followed several historical and demographic trends inherited from Salazar and Caetano. These trends are the growth and development of urban areas at the expense of rural areas, the concomitant growth of services and industry at the expense of agriculture, state involvement in emigration, and a special relationship between colonists and the government.

Of the two colonies with the largest white populations--Angola and Mozambique--the latter began to empty out first. Its one liberation front, FRELIMO (Frente de

Libertação de Moçambique), was in greater control of the country, leading to earlier independence. Before its new government was sworn in, people went from Mozambique to Portugal in a hurry, but not so fast as to leave all their goods behind. Many arranged shipment of cars, furniture, and appliances, although most were not compensated for land and buildings and came to Portugal without knowing how they would be living.

Those coming back from Angola suffered greater uncertainty. Because Portugal maintained neutrality, the fighting between MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola), and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) escalated unabated, especially after Angola's transitional government was sworn in in February of 1975. The violence and perceived threat of violence led people to leave Angola in any way they could. Many drove their cars, loaded with possessions, to Southwest Africa and Zaire. Most people went by air, arranging separate shipment of goods whenever possible. In the summer and fall of 1975, the Portuguese government used TAP (Transportes Aéreos Portugueses) and U.S. planes to form an "air bridge" that took nearly two hundred thousand people out of Angola (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979b, p. 14).

By the end of 1976, most of the whites in Mozambique had left. They claimed they had been harassed by soldiers

and FRELIMO members and that the Mozambiquan government had confiscated their property. By the end of 1976, almost all whites had also left the smaller colonies of Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Principé, and Timor.

The retornados[1] faced an economy in a shambles. Traditionally, Portugal had relied on four principal sources of foreign exchange: the sale of raw materials and labor from the colonies, tourism, remittances from Portuguese living abroad, and agricultural exports from the metropole. The first of these sources dried up almost completely by the time the colonies became independent. Tourism fell off because of the revolution. Even remittances declined in 1975-1976 because of the worldwide recession and the drop in the northern European demand for imported Portuguese labor. Moreover, the nation's agricultural output fell after the latifúndios in the Alentejo (a region in southern Portugal) were taken over by workers and reorganized into cooperatives (Keefe et al. 1977, pp. 326, 321).

Other parts of the economy were also unstable after the revolution. Strikes plagued the industrial sector, and workers' committees purged numerous managers identified with the old regime. The result was a decline in

1 "Returnees." The official term for the former colonists was at first "retornados;" it later became "desalojados" ("the dislodged"). However, as the former term remained in colloquial usage, I will use it throughout this dissertation.

production and a loss of managerial and technical expertise. These and other factors contributed to a ten to fifteen percent drop in the GDP (gross domestic product) in 1975. Inflation was running at twenty-five to thirty percent, and the unemployment rate was about fifteen percent among nonretornados. There was a negative balance of payments of about U.S. $1 billion, depleting the considerable gold reserves built up under Salazar (Keefe et al. 1977, pp. 326, 327, 224).

Besides economic trouble, Portugal was also undergoing considerable political turmoil when the retornados arrived. Some have said, in fact, that what happened on the 25th of April, 1974, was a military coup, but that what happened afterward--people taking to the streets and becoming openly politicized after decades of repression--was a true revolution. The first two years after "25 de Abril" saw six provisional governments and two attempted coups. Each of the major parties vying for power had its own military and regional basis of support (Mailer 1977, p. 299).

In late 1975 and early 1976, the more moderate political parties gained power. It appears that their ascension may have been due at least in part to pressure exerted by other Western nations, which demanded a stable environment for investment in exchange for about U.S. $1 billion in loans, granted by the European Investment Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Bundesbank, and the EFTA (Keefe et al. 1977, pp. 325-326).

The retornados also played a part in the reshuffling of power after 25 de Abril. For the most part, they were not enamored of the leftist provisional governments that they blamed for "losing the colonies" and did their best to bring to power someone further to the right. Retornados were responsible for many of the right-wing demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto that counterbalanced the strikes and marches of the left. When elections were held, the ten percent of the electorate made up by the retornados may have been a crucial element, especially since they tended to vote in a bloc in an election with the vote split between thirteen major parties.[2]

The Government's Response

Beginning in the colonies, the retornados had enjoyed a special relationship with the Portuguese government, which had lured many of them there with land grants, stipends, and free passages. The government's Cabora Bassa and Cunene Dam projects in Mozambique and Angola, respectively, were meant to draw five hundred thousand and one million European settlers (Ferreira 1974, p. 51). The government itself employed over fifty thousand people in the two colonies. Even those with no direct government connections had been dependent on it for their continued

2 Gallagher, however, states that the retornado community "failed to fulfill its militant right-wing potential," and was "extraordinarily passive" (1983, p. 93).

life in the colonies; by 1974, 140,000 troops, or sixty-four percent of Portugal's total armed forces, were engaged in Africa to fight liberation fronts (Keefe et al. 1977, p. 55).

After their return, too, the retornados' special relationship with the government continued, through little choice on either's part. Since they arrived in such vast numbers with so few possessions at a time when the Portuguese economy could not readily absorb them, the government was obliged to help them out. Within the Ministry of Interterritorial Coordination, which had succeeded the Ministry of Overseas Territories, there were only two agencies equipped to deal with aiding people arriving from the colonies: the Comissão Administrativa e de Assistência aos Desalojados (CAAD), which had been organized to aid people coming back from Goa (taken from Portugal by India in 1964), and the Centro de Apoio aos Trabalhadores Ultramarinos (CATU), set up to aid Cape Verdeans going to Portugal in search of work.

Because these were obviously inadequate to deal with the problem, in August of 1974 the Ministry of Interterritorial Coordination created the Grupo de Apoio aos Desalojados do Ultramar (GADU), which was soon engaged in conceding emergency subsidies, providing food and housing, and arranging transportation. This, too, was soon outmoded, and the government decided that the scope of the

problem demanded not an agency within a single ministry, but one directly under the President of the Council of Ministers.

Thus, the Council of Ministers created the Instituto de Apoio ao Retorno de Nacionais (Institute to Aid the Return of Nationals), known as IARN, on March 31, 1975. Its principal aim was to study, propose, and implement means to achieve integration of all retornados into Portuguese national life. IARN was to help them obtain social security benefits, jobs, credit, legal aid, job training, health care, and housing. However, the government did not initially recognize the size of its task and later admitted that IARN had lacked the structure and personnel necessary to carry out its charge. The agency's ranks grew from sixty in the beginning to nearly three thousand by the end of 1975, necessitating constant reorganization.

In October of 1975, the government created the Secretária de Estado dos Retornados to take over IARN, under the Ministério dos Assuntos Sociais. Thus the Minister of Social Affairs assumed the duties that had been the Prime Minister's with respect to IARN. The objectives of the Secretária de Estado dos Retornados were "the study and analysis of the situation, as well as the planning of actions and the creation of measures of immediate policy for the short- and medium-term, and their execution" (Diário do Governo 1975).

The definitive delineation of IARN's tasks came with a series of resolutions by the Council of Ministers on May 5, 1976. One of these resolutions defined the term "retornado" so as to limit the number of people who were eligible for aid and to curtail the fraud that had been on the increase. "Retornados" had to be Portuguese citizens, had to have lived in one of the ex-colonies before coming to Portugal, had to have arrived after September 1, 1974, and had to be in need of some form of government aid (Diário do Governo 1976a).

Another resolution by the Council of Ministers outlined the amounts and type of aid that retornados were eligible to receive. These included emergency subsidies given upon retornados' arrival in Portugal, medical treatment by the Serviços da Previdência, and subsidies for unemployment, marriage, birth, bottle feeding, funerals, illness, pregnancy, old age, handicaps, rent, house repairs, furniture and utensil purchases, scholarships, passages overseas for emigration, food, and temporary housing (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979b, pp. 1-11).

Other IARN services included providing room and board, helping people find jobs, helping them emigrate, giving out loans for small businesses, and paying advances on the salaries of "adidos"--those who had worked for the government in the colonies, and who therefore were entitled to government jobs in Portugal on their return.

For all of IARN's duties, however, the government soon came to consider it inadequate, and in 1976 put it under the direction of the Comissariado para os Desalojados (Diário do Governo 1976b). The Comissariado planned to achieve integration through four main programs: credit, permanent housing, temporary lodging, and "social action." Everything that IARN had done was in time to be turned over to permanent government departments--e.g., unemployment subsidies were to be taken over by the Secretária de Estado da Populaçao e Emprego (Secretary of Population and Employment) and the Secretária de Estado de Segurança Social (Secretary of Social Security), and medical assistance was to be taken over by the Secretária de Estado de Saúde (Secretary of Health).

The Comissariado's first task was to conduct a census of all retornados. Its aim was not only to determine their numbers, but also to find out how many were in need of aid and what its priorities should be. IARN already had files on all families who had registered with it (about 187,000), but kept its records in such a way that computerization was difficult, and much of the information was either missing or outdated.

The Comissariado defined as "desalojados" those Portuguese citizens (citizens were defined as those who had some great-grandparent born in Portugal or Goa) who had lived in the colonies and had arrived in Portugal between September

1, 1974, and November 30, 1976. If they had proof that they had been kept from leaving the colonies or that they were forced to leave after November 30, 1976, the Comissariado extended the final date for arrival July 31, 1977. Further, the Comissariado also considered the following as desalojados: those retornados who had been in Portugal before September 1, 1974, for vacation or illness; and those who were over 50 years of age, had lived in the colonies for at least 20 years and were dependent on income from the colonies for their livelihood (Diário do Governo 1976b, 1977a, 1977b).

Under these guidelines, the census had found 463,315 desalojados by June 30, 1979 (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979a, pp. 156-160). However, these numbers did not include many thousands of retornados who were relatively well-situated and had no need to comply with the census. Also, about eighty thousand African citizens who had come with the retornados were not counted. This is why the Comissariado's total number differs from the estimate made by the Comissão Liquidatária do IARN, which put the number of people who had come back from the colonies at about eight hundred thousand to one million. The Comissariado made it clear, though, that anyone not counted would not qualify for any type of government aid.

The Comissariado's credit division was the Comissão Interministerial de Financiamento a Retornados (CIFRE).

Its aim was to create one hundred thousand jobs through loans to retornados for small and medium businesses, under the assumption that the retornados with the loans would hire mostly other retornados to fill available positions. By October 28, 1981, CIFRE had lent nearly eighteen billion escudos at three percent interest for 8,350 projects, thus directly benefiting about five percent of the families who had been reached by the census. According to CIFRE's estimates, these loans created about sixty-four thousand jobs. About sixty percent of the money came directly from the government, and about forty percent from banks. By 1992, CIFRE expected to recoup all of the money from about eighty-two percent of the loans, meaning that it considered that many to be successes (Direcção do Crédito CIFRE 1981).

Another aspect of the Comissariado's credit program was credit to retornados for the purchase of homes. It paid the difference between the estimate made by various credit institutions (Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Crédito Predial Português, Montepio Geral) for the cost of a house and the amount they made available. It also lent money for up to eighty percent of the difference between the actual amount paid and the estimate. It made this money available to families with incomes of up to 120,000 escudos per year, at zero to ten percent interest and eight- to ten-year mortgages, depending on income. By June

of 1974, the Comissariado had lent about 138,000,000 escudos to complement the 534,000,000 escudos lent by the banks to pay for 749 houses--about forty percent of the requests (Diário do Governo 1977c, 1977d; Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979a, pp. 82-89).

The Comissiarado's housing program included loans for the purchase of 231 house trailers. More substantial was the program undertaken by the Comissão de Alojamentos de Refugiados (CAR), which the Fundo de Fomento de Habitação (FFH) later took over. It set out to build and distribute 11,700 prefabricated houses--sixty percent of them to retornados--that foreign governments had donated. However, it ran into various problems, such as lack of available land, water, electricity, sewers, and streets. In some cases it built the houses but did not hook them up to utilities, so that they were left unoccupied. Some contractors building the houses failed to fulfill their obligations and left the houses incompleted. In the less developed areas of the country, some houses were completed but left unoccupied because restrictions on rent and age requirements left no eligible applicants. CAR later lifted the restriction of not allowing those over the age of forty-five to apply (Commissariado para os Desalojados 1979a, pp. 90-97). However, by the end of 1982, it had

completed and found occupants for only 5,349 of the 11,700 prefabs, with another 1,726 "em curso" (being completed).[3]

Finding temporary lodging for the retornados was one of the government's biggest problems. During August and September of 1975, the time of the "air bridge," they arrived at the rate of six thousand people per day. The government had assumed, moreover, that every one of them had a family and house waiting for him or her in Portugal. It put thousands of them up for what it said would be one to four days, until they were able to find their way "home." However, the stay often turned out to be longer. By the end of 1976, IARN was still housing 71,658 people at an annual cost of 9,800,000,000 escudos--more than half as much in a single year as CIFRE lent retornados for businesses during its entire existence.

IARN put up many of these people in hotels, including four- and five-star hotels, putting others in pensões and residenciais (boarding houses) and still others in its own collective housing. In November of 1976, under a Resolution of the Council of Ministers, IARN started to move retornados out of the hotels, beginning with the four- and five-star hotels, and put them all in its own collective housing. In May of 1977 it was housing 41,000 retornados, and 32,584 in December, paying "integration subsidies" to those who had left. IARN had reduced the number of

3 Fundo de Fomento de Habitação, personal communication.

retornados housed at its expense to about eighteen thousand by the end of 1978, and to nine thousand by the end of 1982 (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979a, pp. 31-44, 124-129, 190-198).

The "Social Action" program included giving money for subsistence, housing, and materials necessary for work; making loans for business ventures; helping retornados find work and housing; helping them emigrate; providing aid to the elderly, handicapped, and children; paying advances to government functionaries; and giving out "integration subsidies." This program began under IARN before the Comissariado came into existence and continued under IARN thereafter (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979, pp. 16-31).

The aim of all these activities was eventually to "mainstream" retornados, or treat them like other Portuguese. Thus IARN's tasks slowly devolved upon other government departments. In May of 1981, the government created the Comissão Liquidatária do IARN (Commission to Liquidate IARN), in order to end all of ex-IARN's activities by the end of 1982.

So much money was spent so fast in the process of the return and integration of retornados that the government was unsure of the amount. However, not including the loans made by CIFRE, the Comissão Liquidatária do IARN estimated it to come to 24,306,000,000 escudos by the end of

1980. Including CIFRE's money, eighty percent of which the agency expected to be paid back, albeit at low interest, the known total comes to over forty-two billion escudos (Comissão Liquidatária do IARN 1982, p. 5).

There was another side entirely to the integration process that was nearly as important as IARN's. That was the employment and concessions given to those who had been government employees in the colonies. At first, the government allowed anyone with two years' service to enter the Quadro Geral de Adidos, which guaranteed them either a new job with the government, or retirement with incentives. Later, it allowed into the QGA anyone at all who had been a government employee immediately before their return, even temporarily, as long as he or she had proof of this employment. As a result, forty-seven thousand retornados either got jobs with the government in Portugal or received pensions. The newly nationalized banks back in Portugal also guaranteed employment to several thousand retornados who had been bank workers in the colonies.[4]

In this dissertation I will attempt to determine the role and importance of these various forms of government aid in achieving integration for retornados.

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4 Quadro Geral de Adidos, Sector de Estatística, personal communication

Methodology

Essential to the discussion of integration, of course, is to decide just what "integration" is. Officially, IARN considered retornados integrated "once they were in situations comparable to what existed for the general Portuguese population, and with access to all legally established benefits, including the possibility of emigration" (Comissão Liquidatária do IARN 1982, p. 1). In practice, according to what I heard from more than one official, IARN used the criterion of whether retornados were employed or not. If they were employed, they were integrated; if not, they were not. In this discussion, I will use something closer to the government's official definition; I will consider retornados "integrated" when they come to approximate their nonretornado neighbors in income, housing situation, material possessions, and in their evaluations of these circumstances. In turn, because of their theoretical relation to integration, I will use willingness to remain in Portugal on a permanent basis and degree of interaction between retornados and nonretornados to establish the criterion validity of these measures. In this way I construct an index of integration that serves as the main dependent variable.

In this dissertation I will present evidence for one central hypothesis: that certain personal characteristics that were in effect before the retornados ever left Africa

influenced their subsequent level of integration. The most important premigration characteristics, moreover, are economic and demographic. People who worked for the government, those with nonretornado relatives in Portugal, whites, the better educated, people with higher incomes in the colonies, and those living with their spouses before leaving Africa were from the start more likely than other retornados to be successfully integrated once in Portugal. The null hypothesis is that people with these characteristics were not any more likely than their counterparts to be well integrated. The main alternative hypothesis is that government aid counteracted the tendency for retornados with these key premigration characteristics to be better integrated than others. Thus, I use two main sets of independent variables: one set includes the above premigration characteristics, and the other encompasses the aid the retornados received from the government and from other Portuguese.

I also show in this dissertation how patterns of retornado settlement and economic activity at a national level followed several demographic and historical trends carried over from the time of Salazar and Caetano. These trends are the favoring of services and industry over agriculture, the favoring of urban growth and development over rural, government involvement in emigration, and a special relationship between colonists and the government.

The sources of information I have used are principally six: Portuguese government documents and conversations with government officials, the IARN archives containing the records of every individual family that registered with it, newspaper accounts of "O Retorno" and retornado integration, ethnographic work in a small neighborhood outside of Lisbon that is heavily populated with retornados, a survey conducted in this same neighborhood, and a study conducted in rural northern Portugal by Dr. José Maria Cabral Ferreira of the Regional Planning Commission of the North.

There is a notable lack of academic treatments of retornados, a lack that knowledgeable government officials verified. In order to gain the historical perspective on "O Retorno" that was lacking in academic sources, then, the newspaper search was one of the first phases of this project I carried out. It consisted of searching through every issue of major Lisbon newspapers--O Jornal, O Expresso, and O Diário de Notícias--from April 25, 1974 through the end of 1981.

Also beginning early in the study was the phase of intensive interviewing and ethnographic work, which continued until the end. This allowed me to become familiar with a number of individual retornados and retornado families in a variety of economic circumstances. Firsthand exposure to the conditions in which they lived six to seven years after their arrival from Africa gave me my best ideas about what

"integration" really was, and how it occurred. Furthermore, retornados' ideas were invaluable, and their descriptions of their experiences as retornados added vital depth to my understanding of the phenomenon. Selection of informants, however, depended to a great extent on luck, and on whatever unrecognized propensities I had for talking with certain kinds of people more than others. This necessitated more random selection of respondents in a later phase.

Early on, these first two sources, along with official government information, served to generate ideas and then provide feedback about them. Later, they confirmed and added credence to my quantitative findings. The government sources especially helped establish that national patterns of retornado settlement and economic activity followed several demographic and historical trends.

Later in the study, too, I drew on the information in IARN's archives, which contain its records on each of the 187,000 retornado families that registered with it. I drew a random sample of five hundred of these families and, with the permission of the director of the archives, systematically recorded as much of the information as possible on every member of each family. For many families, much important information was missing, limiting the kinds of analysis I could perform.

The last phase of the study I began was a survey conducted among the residents of the neighborhood where the observation and intensive interviews had been carried out. This survey was the central means of testing the hypothesis that retornados with certain premigration characteristics were more likely than other retornados to be successfully integrated into Portuguese society. Its design depended on the information gained from government sources, and especially on my ethnographic work.

In this survey, I set out to interview all the adult residents in 150 households. I did so because, if only one adult per household were interviewed, Portuguese typically would have directed me to the "chefe da família" (head of family), who was nearly always a man, and usually the oldest man. More importantly, I needed information about the entire household. I stratified these 150 households into three groups: 50 households of retornados living in IARN collective housing, 50 households of retornados living on their own, and 50 households of nonretornados. I selected the households randomly on the basis of a census conducted earlier. I replaced households when I could find no one to be interviewed after a minimum of six attempts at different times of the day, week, month, and year. I did not replace them, however, when respondents refused to be interviewed. In the end, I had interviewed 249 individuals, including 102 retornados in 48 IARN households, 90 retornados in 43 non-IARN households, and 57 nonretornados in 31 households.

The results of this survey, of course, may be generalized only to the population of the neighborhood in which it was carried out. However, the results from the sample of IARN's archives on retornados, and from Cabral Ferreira's study of retornados in rural northern Portugal, show similar findings. Thus, this study helps clarify what has contributed to the integration of retornados in Portugal, and may also inform an understanding of related events in other places.

The Organization of This Dissertation

The discussion of the integration of retornados in this work proceeds as follows.

Chapter II describes the neighborhood of Serra do Mouro, where I carried out the ethnographic work. I describe the neighborhood physically, both on the inside and outside of homes and businesses, and examine everyday relations among retornados living in IARN's collective housing, retornados living on their own, and nonretornados.

In Chapter III, I present some case histories of individual retornados in Serra do Mouro, including those living on their own as well as those living in IARN's collective housing. In particular, I tell how they came to their present circumstances, how they feel about the way they are now living, and their hopes and plans for the future. I intend this chapter, along with Chapter II, to illustrate "life on the ground" and to show how intensive interviewing and observation informed later phases of the research.

In Chapter IV I deal first with the concept of integration as discussed in previous literature. Then I examine the Serra do Mouro survey data, comparing the circumstances and attitudes of retornados living on their own, retornados living in IARN housing, and nonretornados. On the basis of theoretical notions of the concept, I then construct from the survey data an operationalized definition of integration that allows it to be quantified for subsequent analysis.

After discussing in Chapter V the variables found in previous studies to be important predictors of the integration of outside groups, I carry the analysis of the Serra do Mouro survey data further. This entails an examination of the premigration characteristics that best predict the level of retornados' integration in Portugal.

Chapter VI moves to an analysis of integration at the national level. First, I further examine the central hypothesis that the premigration characteristics of certain retornados allowed them to be better integrated than others. In doing so, I compare the Serra do Mouro survey data with data from my sample of IARN's archives on individual retornado household and with data from Cabral Ferreira's study of retornado integration in rural northern Portugal. The second part of the chapter traces the continuation of certain demographic and historical trends from the Salazar/Caetano era to after the revolution, these trends

sometimes being encouraged and at the very least not discouraged by the government's policies toward retornados.

The conclusion of this dissertation, Chapter VII, begins with an evaluation of the central hypothesis. I determine whether the data warrant rejection of the null hypothesis, and whether the main alternative hypothesis, that government policy counteracted the tendency for retornados with certain premigration characteristics to be better integrated than others, provides a better explanation of the data. I also reexamine the demographic and historical trends that shaped national patterns of retornado settlement and economic activity, again determining whether government policy attempted to counteract these trends. I then evaluate the success of the government's policies toward retornados. Finally, I outline the possible implications of this study for future research and for future government policy.

CHAPTER II
LIFE IN SERRA DO MOURO

About twenty miles northwest of Lisbon lies Serra do Mouro, a neighborhood in the freguesia[1] of Rio das Mercês. Across a small river is a larger neighborhood, also called Rio das Mercês, and a railway station on the commuter line that links Lisbon and Sintra. Every day residents of Serra do Mouro walk over the bridge to Rio das Mercês to catch a train to the nation's capital, the hub of the region, where many of them work, and where nearly all go for entertainment.

Moving counterclockwise, the next neighborhood bordering on Serra do Mouro is Xerez, where there is another train station, only slightly farther away than the one in Rio das Mercês. A modern-looking public grammar school lies between Serra do Mouro and Xerez.

Directly behind Serra do Mouro as one comes from Rio das Mercês are some rocky hills and fields. Farther away, the Sintra mountain range with a nineteenth-century royal summer palace perched on top forms a backdrop for the bairro.

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1 The smallest administrative unit in Portugal.

The other side of Serra do Mouro, still moving counterclockwise, is delimited by the Sintra highway, another commuter artery to Lisbon, and one that the more affluent residents of the neighborhood--those with cars--are inclined to use.

The buildings in Serra do Mouro, which are nearly all primarily residential, are typical of the new construction in the Lisbon area, except that elsewhere many of the buildings are taller. In Serra do Mouro they are four- to seven-story structures, four or five of them joined one to another, with eight to fourteen apartments apiece. Their style is distinctively box-like, with little architectural variation. Like nearly all new buildings in Portugal, they are constructed of red bricks made from indigenous clay, and are painted in white or pastel hues.

Inside, the entrances to the buildings are lined with marble, also indigenous to Portugal. These entryways are usually spotless, either because the residents hire someone to clean them every day, or because they themselves rotate the task. Many of the buildings have decorative plants by the door, and all have mailboxes inside. Only the seven-story buildings have elevators.

Outside, while the buildings themselves are well-maintained, there is an apparent lack of concern about landscaping. This lack of concern is not unique to Serra do Mouro; even in Lisbon's upper-middle class suburbs,

aside from a few trees, the only landscaping is often dirt, rocks, sidewalks, and parking lots, with a smattering of garbage strewn beneath apartment windows. It is only in neighborhoods with single-family housing units, or where the government maintains the grounds, that grass forms part of the surroundings. I repeatedly noticed the marked contrast between the immaculate housekeeping inside and the bareness outside of the houses.

Retornados in Serra do Mouro

Serra do Mouro has about four thousand people in about one thousand households. At the time of the study, the population included about six hundred living in IARN's collective housing, and about one thousand retornados living on their own.[2] The proportion of retornados in the bairro--forty percent--is so high because nearly half its housing units were built after 25 de Abril. During 1975 and 1976, most of the people looking for housing in the Lisbon area were retornados, so that they came to occupy a lot of new buildings. Thus, despite IARN's stated goal of avoiding the creation of bairros of retornados, the retornados' demand for housing and the location of the available supply made such bairros inevitable.

2 This estimate of the retornado population came from the president of the frequesia, who based it on the pattern of votes from Serra do Mouro in the election; he believed that nearly all retornados voted for the CDS (Partido do Centro Democratico Social, or Social Democratic Center Party), or one of its center-right affiliates.

Greatly adding to the concentration of retornados in Serra do Mouro's case was IARN's collective housing. Calling it "IARN's" is perhaps incorrect, because this housing was actually privately owned; IARN simply paid the owners a certain amount per person per day for room and board. This provided one of the two owners with enough money to live in a fashionable area on the Costa da Caparica.

The five IARN buildings are four- or seven-story multi-unit dwellings, just like the other buildings in Serra do Mouro. However, one can easily distinguish them from the other buildings: all buildings in the neighborhood have laundry hanging from clotheslines in the back, but only the IARN buildings also have laundry hanging from the front. That is because the apartments in the IARN buildings are split up among several households; some people have access to windows only in the front.

Upon entering the two types of buildings, too, the differences are obvious. The glass in the doors of the IARN buildings is broken out, as are the mailboxes. There is a notable absence of decorative plants, and--in the one seven-story building--the elevators are not functioning. One must walk up the stairs in the dark unless one of the apartment doors happens to be open to let some light into the hallway. Often, though, they are open, for there are no keys to the apartments themselves, only to the individual rooms. Thus anyone can walk in whenever they want.

Many of the retornados in these buildings complain of a lack of privacy, of parents having to share rooms with their adult children of the opposite sex, or of having to share a bathroom with ten or fifteen other people. Despite the best efforts of some people, the crowding often makes it difficult to keep things clean, making the conditions in these buildings a marked contrast to those in the other buildings.

Other than the IARN buildings, another distinguishing physical mark of Serra do Mouro are about 150 incomplete prefabricated apartments, which are between the neighborhood and the Sintra Highway. Part of the FFH's program of housing, sixty percent of these apartments were earmarked for retornados. Some people in the IARN buildings even bought furniture in anticipation of moving in. However, the Concelho[3] of Sintra, which was administering the projects, ran out of funds before the apartments were finished. A representative of FFH told me they were to be finished and occupied in December of 1982. But as of that time the only people to be seen near the apartments were shepherds with their flocks.

About fifty of these apartments are very near completion, with carpeting, bathroom fixtures, washbasins, and

3 The second-largest administrative unit in Portugal. The Concelho of Sintra is in the District of Lisbon, which also contains the Concelho of Lisbon (the city proper), among others.

electricical hookups. Only roads and water and sewer hookups are lacking. But these apartments have been this way for nearly five years.

In December of 1981, a few dozen retornados from Serra do Mouro, along with a few ciganos (gypsies) from the area occupied these nearly-completed apartments. Remembering the old days of retornado activism, they thought that if they acted in numbers the newspapers would cover the story, and that it would be politically disadvantageous for the government to intervene. But the press paid no attention to the occupation, and after a few days the Guarda Republicana and the Polícia de Choque (riot police) forced them out, with some instances of violence.

Between Serra do Mouro and the river is a new development that will add to the bairro's population by about a third, and will also include a new Catholic church. The construction displaced only one house--a barraca, or shanty. Barracas are common all over the Lisbon area, but nowhere else in the country, because of the capital's disproportionate share of Portugal's jobs and industry, its consequent magnetism for the population, and the high cost of housing. Even so, Serra do Mouro is relatively far out from the city and had only one barraca at the time of this study. The builder tore down this one barraca--made of discarded building materials from nearby construction sites--to make way for the new development. Rumor had it

that a law held over from the more radical postrevolutionary era guaranteed the barraca's occupants a house in one of the new buildings free of charge.

Walking around Serra do Mouro, one observes a lot of new construction. In the new development one sees the Caterpillars and hears the blasting that are used to level the rocky ground. Buildings are also continually going up in the more established part of the neighborhood. It was my unverified impression, however, that the work was more extensive than intensive; often five or six crews would be working in the bairro, but they usually consisted of only two or three people. They were working on many buildings simultaneously, giving the impression of great activity, but because they were so thinly spread, each building took a long time to complete. They would have accomplished no less had they worked on one building at a time, completing it in one-fifth the time. But it would not look as if the neighborhood were growing so much.

On the streets of Serra do Mouro, one can see dismembered cars parked in front of the two automobile repair shops, with people working on one or two of them. One can also see an occasional truck being loaded or unloaded up next to one of the two clothing warehouses, one of the several grocery stores, or one of the two kitchens for IARN building residents ("refeitórios").

At the edges of the neighborhood, where there is grass, one may often see sheep grazing. Again, this is not unique to Serra do Mouro; I often saw the same thing on the outskirts of upper-middle-class neighborhoods, and once in Campo Grande, a park right in downtown Lisbon. There seems to be a tacit belief in the right of shepherds to take advantage of any otherwise unproductive land.

Behind many of the buildings in Serra do Mouro are "hortas" or vegetable gardens raised by some of the residents. With Lisbon's climate they can produce certain crops year round, and provide a much-needed supplement to the diet. Many of the people who raise these hortas are first-generation migrants from the countryside; in wealthier neighborhoods it is usually only the "porteira" or "porteiro" (concierge) who will have one.

One may see children of all ages in Serra do Mouro playing on the streets and between the buildings. Boys may initiate a soccer game or simply begin kicking the ball around, sometimes in the street or sometimes in one of the fields above the bairro. One difference between Serra do Mouro and upper-middle-class neighborhoods is that in the latter only boys play in the streets, while girls do not venture out of the house; in the former, girls are also allowed outside. In Serra do Mouro there is also a noticeably greater concentration of children in and around the IARN buildings.

There is, in fact, a noticeably greater concentration of people in general around the IARN buildings than elsewhere in the bairro. Often they hang out in doorways, or talk to each other from street to window. Compared to the rest of the neighborhood, a disproportionate number of these people are nonwhites.

Other activities taking place out in the open include people waiting for buses, and people going to and from the various stores and cafes. Most commercial businesses are concentrated in one part of the bairro.

Businesses in Serra do Mouro

Commercially, retornados dominate Serra do Mouro more than their share of the population would dictate. Retornados' explanation would have it that they are more industrious and adept at business. In any case, they own twenty-one of the forty-two businesses in town. Retornados had once owned two of the other businesses, moreover, before they sold them and retired. Three of the retornado businesses had been aided by CIFRE loans; a fourth business had also received one, but subsequently defaulted. Nevertheless, the owner soon started another business, leading to charges of corruption from some of the other people in the neighborhood.

Table 2.1 Businesses in Serra do Mouro

Cafes, etc.	Type	Ownership
A Francesa	cafe	Nonretornado (sold by retornado)
O Salão de Jogos	game room	Nonretornado (sold by retornado)
A Pastelaria	pastry shop	Retornado
O Angolano	cafe	Retornado
A Floresta	cafe	Retornado
Pub-bar	bar	Retornado
O Continental	cafe	Retornado
A Minhota	cafe	Nonretornado
Stores	**Type**	**Ownership**
O Mini-mercado	grocery store	Nonretornado
A Churrasqueira	carry out and groceries	Nonretornado
Máquinas de Cozer	sewing machines	Nonretornado (closed)
Loja de Móveis e Electrodomésticos	furniture and appliances	Nonretornado
Bazar	clothing	Retornado
Pronto-a-vestir	clothing	Retornado
Supermercado	grocery store	Nonretornado
Padaria	bakery	Nonretornado
Papelaria	Paper and tobacco	Nonretornado
Loja de Electrónicas	appliances	Nonretornado
Mini-mercado	grocery store	Nonretornado
Supermercado	grocery store	Retornado
Talho	butcher shop	Nonretornado
Retrosaria	clothing	Retornado
Padaria	bakery	Nonretornado
Tabacaria	paper and tobacco	Nonretornado
Adega de Vinho	wine and groceries	Retornado

Table 2.1--continued

Industry and repairs	Type	Ownership
Oficina de Alumínio	aluminum shop	Retornado
Oficina de Carros	car repair shop	Retornado
Oficina de Tractores	tractor repair shop	Nonretornado
Armazéns de Confecções	clothing warehouse	Retornado
Oficina de Televisões	television repair	Retornado
Sapateiro	cobbler	Retornado
Fabrica de Pastelaria	commercial bakery	Nonretornado
Armazéns de Calças	pants warehouse	Retornado
Marcenaria	cabinetmaker	Retornado
Canalizações	plumbing	Nonretornado
Oficina de Carros	car repair	Retornado
Oficina de Móveis	furniture factory	Retornado

Other	Type	Ownership
Escritório de Prédios	housing office	Retornado
Escritório de Prédios	housing office	Retornado
Cabeleireira	hairdresser	Nonretornado
Cabeleireira	hairdresser	Nonretornado
Cabeleireira	hairdresser	Nonretornado

Of the local businesses, the ones that perhaps best capture the flavor of life in Serra do Mouro are the cafes. Cafe life is an institution in Portugal. Even the smallest town in the most remote part of the country has at least one cafe where people gather and pass hours together. In the cities cafes seem to appear on every corner. Yet they are remarkably similar in their appearance and their fare. Almost invariably, rows of full wine, brandy, and ginjas (a cherry-flavored liqueur) bottles make up a principal element of the decor. Even more consistent are the

assortments of pastries displayed under glass cases, the sandwiches that every Portuguese knows he or she can order without recourse to a menu, and the ubiquitous Italian expresso coffee machines. A waiter on a typical day in a typical cafe must hear the request for "uma bica" (as a cup of expresso coffee is called in the Lisbon area) hundreds of times.

Despite their similarities, though, cafes tend to have their own established clientele. Often this is because of relations between the workers and the customers. Other times the workers have little to do with it; the customers themselves simply take over the cafe as a meeting place. Also important is location, as most of the retornados live toward one end of the neighborhood.

Examining the makeup of the clientele of the various cafes, game rooms, bars, and pastry shops in Serra do Mouro, then, is instructive for understanding the relations between the three main groups in the neighborhood as defined in this study: nonretornados, the retornados living on their own, and the retornados living in the IARN buildings.

"A Francesa" is located at what is now the edge of Serra do Mouro, although when a new area being developed is finished the cafe will be near the center of the neighborhood. About half the people living nearby are retornados, and about half are nonretornados, more or less

corresponding to the proportion of retornados and nonretornados who regularly patronize the cafe. There is also an IARN building not very far away, but its residents tend not to frequent the Francesa. This is partly because the former owner had discouraged them from doing so; it is also because they prefer going to the cafes where the other IARN building residents go. The Francesa is one of three cafes in Serra do Mouro serving full meals. It is the quietest of the three; in the evening diners more than drinkers tend to occupy it. The retornado who once owned it sold it in July of 1982 to a nonretornado.

The Salão de Jogos is a game room, not a cafe, but shares the decor and basic menu of the cafes: bottles on the wall, pastries in the glass case, and an Italian coffee machine on the counter. In addition, it has eight chess tables, four pool tables, and a few video games with names and instructions in English. The two current owners are nonretornados, but they bought it from a retornado in 1980, reputedly for two thousand contos.[4] The former owner employed an occasional IARN building resident at below minimum wage. The current owners, though, have no employees. Most of the customers of the Salão de Jogos are young men, and a preponderance of them are retornados from the IARN buildings. A few older men--very few of whom are nonretornados--also go there regularly, mostly to play chess or checkers.

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4 One conto equals one thousand escudos.

The Pastelaria is another place where "certain types" of clients are not encouraged. Both retornados and nonretornados go there, but rowdiness is frowned on, and virtually no one goes there for the purpose of drinking, but rather for a cup of coffee and a pastry, or maybe one bagaço (distilled grape skins) or brandy. As a result, it is really no one's hangout. It, too, is decorated with the ever-present liquor bottles. Its owner is nonretornado, and its employees are both retornado and nonretornado.

The Angolano is the center of the retornado world in Serra do Mouro. It is owned by a retornado, four of its staff members are retornados, and it is located next to the largest of the IARN buildings. On leaving that IARN building one has to walk literally only two feet to be at the door of the Angolano. With some exceptions, most of this cafe's clients are retornados, especially at night and on weekends, when it becomes crowded with young retornado males from the IARN buildings. During the day certain men and a few women from the IARN buildings wander in and out, or may stay for an hour drinking one cup of coffee. They are joined by independent retornados, or those who live on their own. The Angolano has such a reputation as a center for retornado activity that retornados who live elsewhere regularly make the trip to enjoy conversation with people who remember the colonies. It was a group coming out of the Angolano that chased a Portuguese Communist Party

member out of the neighborhood, in what is remembered as the only incursion of the PCP into the area. (Most retornados, it should be remembered, are known as vehement anti-Communists).

The Floresta is essentially the same type of cafe as the Angolano; it is retornado-owned and -staffed, and most of its clients are retornados. Many of them hang out there for hours at a time. The main difference between the Floresta and the Angolano is degree; the former simply does not have as many regular customers, and at night it is not much busier than during the day. Although part of the difference might be due to the influence of the owners (the Angolano is owned by a middle-aged man and the Floresta by a middle-aged woman), the proximity of the Angolano to the largest of the IARN buildings must also be considered a factor.

"A place with a certain reputation" is what the pub-bar could be called. Many "upstanding citizens"--retornados living outside the IARN buildings as well as nonretornados--express their indignation about certain IARN retornados by referring to the pub-bar. "The things that go on there . . ." they would say. The pub-bar--owned by a retornado--is the main place in the neighborhood where women and men "mix." The sight of a woman customer by herself or with other women in one of the other cafes at night is a rarity; in the pub-bar it is fairly common.

To many residents of Serra do Mouro, the pub-bar represents the changes in moral standards from the time of Salazar. Some of the changes are due to the influence of retornados, along with that of returned migrants from northern European countries, especially France. Both groups are in many ways more modern than other Portuguese. Those coming back from France have brought some of the mores of the wealthier country, though most of them held menial jobs and lived as poor people while there. In the colonies, in contrast, virtually all the whites lived the life of the middle class, being the upper stratum of a few hundred thousand among a population of millions. Meanwhile, the metropole remained a poor peasant country. The retornados brought their modern, middle-class expectations and habits back to Portugal, and fueled many of the postrevolution changes in attitudes and lifestyle. The pub-bar is one place where these changes are manifest.

A retornado owns the Continental cafe, but his clients are almost exclusively nonretornados. As his end of the neighborhood is also mostly nonretornado, this testifies to the importance of proximity in cafe patronage. The atmosphere of the Continental is always subdued. In the daytime a few adult men and women go there to drink coffee and talk, and an occasional boy goes to play the video game. At night a few young men--the owner is not much older--gather to drink and talk quietly.

The Minhota--the smallest cafe in the neighborhood--is located even further into the nonretornado section, and its customers as well as its two owners are all nonretornados. It has the least business of all of Serra do Mouro's cafes--often only one or two customers at a time, or none at all--and is often not even open at night.

Cafe life, then, demonstrates the differentiation between nonretornados, IARN retornados, and independent retornados. The last group is somewhere between the other two in its allegiances--or rather, it splits its affiliation between other former colonists and those who have always lived in Portugal. In contrast, IARN retornados spend almost all their time with other people from the colonies.

Cafe life, however, is mostly for males; it is the grocery store that is the woman's public domain. In Portugal, as in most Western societies, women do most of the shopping. Moreover, the neighborhood store, as opposed to the area supermarket, is still the rule rather than the exception. Thus Serra do Mouro, with about four thousand people, has four grocery stores and two specialty stores (the carry-out and the wine store) that also sell groceries. The two larger stores, called supermarkets, are about the size of American Seven-Elevens; the smaller ones could be converted into one-car garages. In these circumstances grocers know their customers, and service is very personal. In contrast to its importance in the cafes, retornado

status appears to have little to do with grocery store patronage; rather it is due almost entirely to proximity.

Shopping, of course, with the practical purpose of acquiring food, is fundamentally different from hanging out in a cafe for pleasure, and the socializing that goes on in grocery stores is more limited. Public socializing, in fact, is generally reserved for men. A large proportion of the men, however, spend little time in cafes. As a consequence, much of the life in Serra do Mouro goes on "behind closed doors" and is difficult to observe directly.

The Future of the Serra

What does go on in public is heavily influenced, if not dominated, by retornados. Talk of the colonies and of Portugal's shortcomings--based on what people know about the rest of the world--permeates many conversations. The people who spend more time in public than any others--the IARN building residents--are a constant reminder of the colonies and decolonization. But it may well be that the particularly retornado character of Serra do Mouro will change in the coming years. The new housing development, along with continued construction in the more established part of the neighborhood, will increase the bairro's size by about a third, thus diluting the retornados' share of the population. Independent retornados are gradually coming to identify more with nonretornados, and in some cases do not even think of themselves as a special group.

Moreover, when the IARN buildings are closed down, no buildings will be identifiable as retornado-only, and the apartments will be refurbished and sold or rented to others.

If the prefabricated buildings are ever finished and occupied, some of Serra do Mouro's retornado flavor will be preserved, as sixty percent of those apartments will go to retornados. Even then, however, the retornados in the neighborhood are likely to blend in more and more with non-retornados as their personal economic circumstances become more similar.

CHAPTER III
SOME CASE HISTORIES OF RETORNADOS IN SERRA DO MOURO

This chapter of case histories is to serve two purposes. One is to illustrate the way retornados live now and how they arrived at their present circumstances after their return from the colonies. I intend this to add some depth and life to the reader's understanding of "O Retorno." The second purpose is to show how the ethnographic phase of the research informed the formation of hypotheses.

I came to know people in Serra do Mouro through being their neighbor and through introducing myself to them in public places. However, a good part of people's lives in the neighborhood goes on "behind closed doors," and some are less likely than others to frequent cafes or the Pastelaria. Hence, while an anthropologist working in a small village can get to know everyone, I cannot assume that the people I reached through intensive interviewing in Serra do Mouro are representative of the population. But in this case I never intended them to be; rather, this phase of research allowed me to examine neighborhood life in detail, to question people intensively about their past and present circumstances, and thus--along with other

sources of information--to hypothesize about the reasons for people's differing levels of integration. Further, along with other sources of information, this ethnographic work permitted "triangulation," or an indication of the convergent validity of the data.

Independent Retornados

The following, then, are some illustrative examples of the lives, past and present, of retornados in Serra do Mouro now living on their own--that is, not in the IARN buildings.

Roberto Figueira

Roberto Figueira, thirty-three, is married and has one child. He belongs to the richest circle in Serra do Mouro; he and five other men--four of whom are retornados, and live in the neighborhood--own a clothing warehouse, and a chain of five clothing stores, including one in Serra do Mouro. In the warehouse and the five stores are nineteen employees, all but two of whom are retornados (Roberto says they consciously hire retornados because they are better workers, and are less likely to strike, an extremely common occurrence after 25 de Abril). Roberto and his four partners living in Serra do Mouro split the management tasks of the stores and the warehouse.

The sixth partner--the only one who is not a retornado--is a nonworking partner; he put up part of the money for the business. His contribution, along with loans from

the associates' nonretornado family--gave CIFRE enough confidence in the group to give it an additional loan, in this case around fourteen hundred contos. They have already paid back the bank's part of the CIFRE loan; only the government's share remains.

Before "O Retorno," Roberto owned his own store in Luanda. Through some connections, he was able to arrange shipment of his car, refrigerator, washer, and dryer. He did not bring back a lot of money, but a nonretornado relative lent him the money to buy a house.

The only cafe Roberto ever goes to is the Pastelaria, because it is quiet, and the management keeps away undesirable types. One he especially avoids is the Angolano, because it is usually full of boisterous crowds from the IARN buildings.

Roberto associates primarily with other retornados, but not with those who live in the IARN buildings. He believes that at this point, all retornados are well integrated, except those who do not want to be. Anyone still living in the IARN buildings simply wants to collect subsidies and not work. After all, he never received any aid from IARN--no subsidies, housing, or food.

By now, Roberto considers himself well integrated, too. He and his family live in a well furnished three-bedroom house. Because things are going well, they have no plans to leave the country. But they do manage to visit some friends in Brazil every year or two.

João Almeida

Another recipient of a CIFRE loan is João Almeida's father, who used it to buy the Angolano cafe. In his case, his collateral was his job with the Air Force, which he had served for nineteen years in Angola. He still works for the Air Force during the day and then works in the cafe in the evening and on weekends. His only chance to rest comes in the month of August, when he is on vacation from his job and closes down his cafe to go to the Algarve (the southernmost part of Portugal, with a thriving tourist industry). Nevertheless, in a few years--when he will still be in his fifties--he plans to retire from both jobs and move to his "terra," or birthplace, which is in the district of Castelo Branco. That will leave his son João--now only nineteen--with the cafe and the family's three-bedroom house.

Like other government employees in the colonies, João's father was alloted a certain amount of space to ship goods back to Portugal. He chose to send back his car and furniture.

When they arrived in Portugal, João's family stayed for a while with nonretornado relatives in Coimbra. His father soon began working for the Air Force in Lisbon, while the rest of the family stayed behind. He then arranged the CIFRE loan, plus another loan to buy a house, at which time his family followed him to Serra do Mouro.

João himself works in the cafe six days a week, and manages it in his father's absence. He quit high school to take the job. At present, João receives ten contos per month plus room and board to work at the cafe. He lives with his parents, his grandmother, and his younger sister. His sister, still in high school, plans to attend college. His grandmother cooks at the cafe.

Because of his job in the Angolano, João has contacts with many people in the neighborhood. He has friendly relations with the many IARN retornados who frequent the cafe and believes that many of them cannot help their living situations. Like Roberto Figueira, though, he says in private that many of them continue to live there simply to avoid work and collect subsidies. His girlfriend--sixteen--and his best male friend--nineteen--are both non-retornados.

João's dream is to emigrate to America. This desire appears to be more related to his and his girlfriend's living situations (she is a live-in maid in a Serra do Mouro household) than to any dislike for Portugal. Though he says life in the colonies was better--as does almost every white retornado--he has many good things to say about Portugal, and likes its scenery, its wine, and its Fado (traditional Portuguese music).

Fátima Ribeiro

Fátima Ribeiro is an older woman, in her early seventies, living with her daughter, her son-in-law, and two grandchildren. All of them were born in Angola and thus had few family connections in Portugal when they arrived. In Africa her daughter had been a government functionary, and her son-in-law a banker. Even though they lacked family to help them, their jobs--more precisely, their employer--served them well when they got back to Portugal.

Because Fátima's daughter worked for the government, she was able to bring back a car and furniture, and was adida--that is, guaranteed a government job in the metropole. It was, however, two years before she got a job.

Fátima's son-in-law, as a banker, had not worked for the government in Angola. The banking industry, however, was nationalized shortly after 25 de Abril. Under a separate arrangement from that of adidos, all bankers from the colonies were also guaranteed jobs in Portugal. After one year, he got a job with the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (the government's central bank). Initially he got only an entry-level job, but after intensive lobbying by a retornado bankers' organization, he and many others were accorded jobs at their level of expertise.

This family's first year--before Fátima's son-in-law got a job--was difficult. Fátima's daughter and son-in-law each received a subsidy of about two contos per month,

and Fátima herself received an old-age subsidy of about one and a half contos, for a total of about five and a half contos per month. Their rent alone at the time was five contos. Without a loan of ten contos from IARN that Fátima's daughter received because she was a former government worker, they would not have been able to make it.

Now, though, as a household with the income from two jobs plus Fátima's old age subsidy, they live fairly well. The two children--nine and eleven--both attend private schools, which costs the family nine contos per month. They jokingly tell the children they must give up beef to be able to afford it. The family also owns its own house, thanks to a loan from the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, where Fátima's son-in-law works.

Fátima's son-in-law says he does not plan to emigrate, and hopes his children do not, either. He believes they can live better in Portugal than in Europe or America, where Portuguese tend to hold only menial jobs. He, his wife, and his children all feel fairly satisfied living in Portugal. It is Fátima who feels displaced.

Fátima lived all of her life in Angola before 25 de Abril and the subsequent independence of the colony and says she will always consider herself Angolan. Whenever she talks very extensively about life in the colonies, she begins to weep.

Ricardo Oliveira

Ricardo Oliveira owns a small furniture factory in Serra do Mouro. He works there with his wife, his seventeen-year old son, and three employees. Ricardo, his wife, and his son live in their three-bedroom apartment with his twenty-four-year old daughter and his wife's mother.

In the backwoods of Angola, Ricardo had owned a lumbering operation big enough to require five trucks and five tractors. He says he made several times more money there--about two hundred contos--than he does in Portugal. The only thing he brought back was the car they drove to Luanda.

Ricardo was born in Portugal and had worked there as a hotel clerk before going to Angola to make his fortune. His wife, too, was born in Portugal. They lived with her cousin when they first got back from Africa. The same cousin, who owns a furniture-making business, also taught Ricardo and his son the trade. Using the cousin's know-how, they made and sold a few pieces at a time until they had saved up a fair amount of money.

Then they asked CIFRE for a loan of forty-five hundred contos to set up their furniture factory, but the request was denied. They did get a bank loan, however, of seven hundred contos. Along with the money they had saved, this gave them enough to rent a space in Serra do Mouro, and buy

all the necessary equipment to get started. At first business was slow, but it picked up; now they are asking for a loan from the Caixa Geral de Depósitos to buy a bigger shop outside of Serra do Mouro.

Ricardo and his family also own their house, for which they received a loan from the Caixa Geral de Depósitos. It is filled with furniture they have made.

Compared with other people in Portugal they think they live fairly well now. In any case, they have no intentions of leaving. But the good life for them will always be what they had in Angola, which they believe is unattainable for them in Portugal.

Isabel Carvão

Isabel Carvão, fifty, works in one of the clothing stores owned by Roberto Figueira and his associates; her daughter, twenty, works in one of the other stores. They live with Isabel's husband, fifty-two, who is unemployed. Her son, eighteen, lives with his wife's parents in a nearby town, and works as a solderer.

In Mozambique they had all lived in Maputo, or Lourenço Marques, the city's colonial name, as they persist in calling it. Isabel's husband had been an office manager for a Dutch company for thirty-one years, and Isabel had worked in a factory. After 25 de Abril, she was fired after being denounced as a fascist and a racist by a fellow worker, also a white. According to her, she had heard him

say more than once, "Eu não sou desta terra de macacos; nasci em Portugal" ("I'm not from this land of monkeys; I was born in Portugal"). The experience made her quite bitter, and she soon left with her children, then both in their early teens, while her husband stayed behind.

Once back in Portugal, they stayed for three months with a childhood friend in the Algarve, the southernmost part of the country. (They still spend their vacation with this family, the only way they can afford one.) After three months, she arranged her job and apartment, the latter of which was a real sacrifice at the time. Now, however, because of the combination of Portugal's strict rent control and high inflation, it is a bargain. She had arranged shipment of their car, furniture, and clothes from Mozambique, which was not hard to do from Maputo. It did, however, cost her sixty contos.

After another year the company for whom Isabel's husband had worked pulled up stakes, and he left too. Despite being based in Europe, the company did not pay him any retirement benefits. He says he cannot find a job in Portugal. Now he drives off early every day to see his retornado friends, and comes back in time for dinner.

Isabel, too, associates only with retornados. In her building there are eight apartments, two of which belong to retornados. Her family and the other retornado family, from Angola, are "like sisters and brothers." She says

they eat in each others' houses whenever they like, and share everything. With the nonretornados in the building, however, her interaction consists only of "bom dia" and "boa tarde" ("good morning" and "good afternoon").

Isabel does not think much of IARN retornados, either. There is only one she regularly associates with. Most of them, she believes, continue to stay in the IARN buildings only because they do not want to work. They could find work if they really wanted to. How they could be expected to find work when her husband cannot is a question I never asked her.

Every member of Isabel's family wants to emigrate, especially her children. Her daughter--earning only eight contos per month, wants to go to Switzerland where she could earn thirty contos a month doing cleaning--as much, she points out, as a new doctor earns in Portugal. Isabel's son wants to go to Canada or Australia, but he cannot leave until he finds out if he has to serve in the military.

Emília Teixeira

Emília Teixeira--a mista (mulatta)--is only nineteen years old, but she is the head of her household, being responsible for her four younger sisters. The younger ones, from five to seventeen years old, still attend school, but Emília has had to quit to take care of the others.

For income, they depend mostly on what their mother and aunt--also mistas--send back from France--about ten contos per month between them. Like a million other Portuguese, they are guestworkers in France--in their case, maids. Whenever they have the time and money, they visit their daughters and nieces in Serra do Mouro, but that is only about twice a year.

Other sources of income for Emília and her sisters are a government subsidy for an accident her mother was involved in, amounting to about two and a half contos per month, and about three contos from Apoio Cristão para as Crianças (Christian Aid for Children), a German-based protestant organization. On request, Apoio Cristão gives eight hundred escudos per month for every minor in a household below a certain income level. Because of the large number of eligible recipients in the IARN buildings, it maintains an office in Serra do Mouro staffed on a part-time basis by a minister from another town. The price recipients pay for the aid is low-key proselytizing; as a consequence, for such a Catholic country, a surprising proportion of the poorer people in the neighborhood consider themselves protestant. What is in the deal for the minister, apparently, is nearly as much money on a part-time basis as he makes as a full-time minister in one of the largest protestant churches in Portugal.

Apoio Cristão, incidentally, is rumored to be primarily an anti-Communist organization with CIA connections, using unknowing but anti-Communist protestant ministers to influence poor families that might otherwise turn toward the Portuguese Communist Party. If this is indeed the organization's intent, its efforts may well be wasted in Serra do Mouro; largely because of their experience with communistic independence movements in Africa, and the blame they place on Portuguese leftists for "losing the colonies," virtually all retornados in the neighborhood--no matter how poor--are vehemently anti-communist. They are, after all, the ones who left Angola and Mozambique rather than staying behind and trying to make it under the new regimes. When I began talking with them, dozens of retornados wanted to know whether I was a Communist before they would continue.

In Beira, Mozambique's second-largest city, Emília's mother and aunt had owned a small shop and had done modestly well. They were unable to arrange shipment of any of their possessions, however. After their arrival in Portugal, they lived first in a hotel and then in an IARN building like those in Serra do Mouro. In 1979, with the money from an "integration subsidy" from IARN and the two women's work in France, they moved into their present home, which they rent.

Emília sees no change in her family's circumstances in the near future. Her mother and aunt must continue to work in France for the rest of them to be able to live. Emília herself would like to be able to emigrate, but has no plans to do so.

IARN Retornados

The following are some typical cases of retornados living in the IARN buildings, whom I will call IARN retornados.

José Costa

José Costa, thirty-four, lives with his wife and three young children in one of the IARN buildings, but under a special arrangement with the owner rather than under IARN's auspices. The five of them share one room with a hanging sheet dividing the sleeping area from the eating area. Because they have nothing to do with IARN, they have to do their own cooking and have a stove in their room to do so.

When they first arrived in Portugal, José and his family had received aid from IARN. In 1976, though, they went with his in-laws, also retornados, to the Azores, where they had some nonretornado relatives. There he worked as a teacher until his in-laws arranged emigration to the United States, which they were able to do because two of their children were already there. When his in-laws left, José and his wife and children went back to the

Lisbon area. Because they had already given up IARN's services, however, they were not allowed to begin receiving them again.

José's wife's parents give him and his family a link to the U.S. and hopes for emigration within a year or two. Because of their plans to leave, they have not really attempted to become well established in Portugal. Both José and his wife have made separate trips to the U.S. at her parents' expense. While there, he made preliminary inquiries about employment. As he has incomplete training in veterinary school, he hopes to get a job in that field when he arrives.

Meanwhile, in Portugal, José has worked a number of temporary jobs, including one stint at a cafe and one at a gasoline station. His in-laws pay their rent and buy clothes for them. José and his family also receive aid for three children from Apoio Cristão.

A major part of José's activities while I was in Serra do Mouro was heading up a commission of IARN building residents. The commission was elected in April of 1982, when IARN began saying it would shut down all its buildings by the end of the next month, paying fifty-four contos for each adult and twenty-seven for each child. It gave people eight days to "arrange their situations," after which it would meet with people one by one. José himself was ineligible for the program, but his mother and sister lived in the building, and were to be directly affected.

The commission arranged a meeting with the president of the freguesia (the smallest political division in Portugal) and tried to get the press to come. Press coverage had been a major tool of retornados in the years immediately following "O Retorno." However, as with the occupation of the prefabricated houses in Serra do Mouro, no representatives from newspapers showed up.

The president of the freguesia said that most of their problems were out of his domain, but promised legal aid. José, speaking afterward, recommended that no one sign anything in their meetings with IARN.

When the meetings with IARN personnel began the next day, the first woman said she had been told to put her children in an orphanage. For fear they would be intimidated and lied to, José then demanded that people be allowed to have a commission member present with them. When the IARN representative refused, only one couple went ahead with their scheduled meeting.

At the end of the week, when food was to be cut off, workers were unloading a truckload of potatoes and onions at the doors of one of the IARN kitchens. The commission's ploy had worked, at least temporarily.

António Gomes

António Gomes is an Angolan-born white with a black born in Angola. In Africa, he had been a mechanic, and

they also sold some produce from their small farm. All they were able to take to Portugal were their car, which they drove to South Africa, and their refrigerator, which they loaded on top.

Having no family in Portugal, António and his family relied on IARN from the start. Now the ten of them live in two rooms in one of the IARN buildings, and--unlike José--also receive food from IARN. Unbekownst to IARN, which considers anyone working to be integrated and will not provide them housing, António finds periodic work in construction, and his oldest daughter does cleaning. Between the two of them, they average about nine contos per month.

After IARN's initial offer of integration payments failed to induce many people to move from its Serra do Mouro housing, IARN made a new offer to help provide the down payment for people wanting to buy a house and able to provide the rest of the payment themselves. António arranged to buy a barraca (or shanty, which are all over the Lisbon area) for 550 contos. As part of the arrangement, IARN agreed to provide five hundred contos. Allegedly because of its own fiscal problems, however, it failed to provide the money by the agreed on date, so that António lost the barraca, and he and his family remained in the IARN building.

Maria Gonçalves

Maria Gonçalves is a middle-aged mista living with her seven children in one room of the IARN buildings. Beside the food and housing she gets from IARN, she depends on aid from Apoio Cristão, and the six contos a month she gets for working in one of the IARN refeitórios. Apparently, the rule against building residents working is waived for those working in the refeitórios. She has distant relatives on her father's side who are nonretornados, but they never knew her, and never offered her any aid.

In Angola, Maria and her family had lived modestly. She had been a cleaning woman, and her husband a laborer. As an indication of their standing, they had neither a car nor a refrigerator.

Being outside of Luanda, they had not been able to arrange shipment of any of their possessions. They went immediately into a hotel IARN had taken over when they arrived in Portugal, and then into collective housing. Soon thereafter her husband left her.

Maria's oldest son, eighteen, recently quit high school to look for a job, but has been unable to find one. They did not have enough money or resources of their own to qualify for IARN's program to help buy a house, even if the program had gone through. Neither did they want to take the "integration subsidy" for fear that it would last only

a few months, and that they would then end up in the streets. They have no plans for the future, other than vague hopes that they will be able to emigrate.

Rui Carvalho

Rui Carvalho and his wife are both in their seventies, and live with their thirty-five-year old son in one of the IARN buildings.

They were both born in the Alentejo (a region in southern Portugal) where they were rather poor. In the 1950's, he was a bricklayer earning fifty escudos per day, and she had no paying work at all. At that time was the height of a government program to populate the interiors of Angola and Mozambique with whites so that the metropole would have a greater hold and a more legitimate claim on the colonies. Part of the program involved paying people's way to the colonies, and giving them four hectares of land to work for five years. If after that time they wanted to leave, the government would pay their way back.

Rui and his wife decided to take part in the program, and so sold their house and left for Mozambique. After five years they wanted to go back because the land was not good and there was not enough of it. Instead, the government persuaded them to take eight hectares elsewhere. It gave them a paper to sign, saying it was simply to acknowledge receiving a different and larger piece of land. But they were illiterate, and only later found that they had signed a permanent contract to stay and work the land.

Because of this involvement with the government, they thought they should be adidos and receive the aid earmarked for government employees. But this was not the government's policy.

When they got to Portugal, their family did not take them in, either, but it was a very poor family. One niece, however, did give them twenty contos. So they ended up in the IARN buildings. Meanwhile, Rui became blind in one eye, and surgery on the other made it blind, too. Now they consider themselves too old to leave the country again, and the only money they get is about five contos each from the government as old age subsidies.

They had made plans with a son who has a job to use IARN's offer to make a down payment on a house, and the son's income to make the monthly payments. Just as for António Gomes, though, IARN failed to provide the payment, and the arrangement for the house fell through. Now they expect that they will soon end up in an old-age home.

Overview

Cases such as the above indicated to me that certain characteristics of retornados before they ever left the colonies may have preselected them for integration or the lack of it in Portugal. Race, for one, seemed to be quite important, as a high proportion of IARN residents were blacks or mistos, and the few misto independent retornados in Serra do Mouro were not well established. Employment

sector--in particular, working for the government--also seemed important, largely because of the government's special program to help all former colonists who had worked for it. Having nonretornado family to come back to often helped, too, whether to live with for a while, to get a loan from, or to train one for a new trade. Finally, social class, as indicated by such things as education and profession, appeared to have affected people's level of integration. These variables, of course, were often interrelated; most blacks, for example, were less educated than most whites, and were much less likely to have nonretornado family in Portugal.

The only important factor in integration immediately apparent to me that was not necessarily in effect when people left Africa was marital status; nearly all of the single women with children appeared to be less fully integrated than other people. This, however, was often an indirect effect of decolonization; the stress of the change caused many families to break up.

Thus, the most important factors influencing whether or not former colonists would be well integrated when they got back to Portugal were economic and demographic. Retornados who are now well established tend to claim that what was important were personality characteristics such as initiative or laziness. However, as this chapter suggests and later chapters confirm, integration appears to be much more

clearly related to people's "lot in life," over which they had virtually no control: their race, their family connections in Portugal, their education and former income, their former employer, their age, their marital status, and their sex.

CHAPTER IV
COMPARING LEVELS OF INTEGRATION

In this chapter, I compare the current circumstances and attitudes of IARN retornados, independent retornados, and nonretornados in Serra do Mouro to see how well the first two groups are integrated into Portuguese society. First, though, I discuss the concept of integration as treated in previous literature, and then operationalize it for purposes of this study.

The Concept of Integration

To deal with the phenomenon of immigrant or migrant groups becoming part of the host population--or not becoming part of it, as the case may be--researchers have formulated various concepts. These include absorption, acculturation, adjustment, assimilation, adaptation, and, of course, integration (see Baglioni 1964). Of these, assimilation implies complete conformity. As Goldlust and Richmond (1974, p. 195) point out, it is associated with ideological overtones and value judgments about desirable outcomes. Goldlust and Richmond themselves use the term adaptation, at first rather broadly taking it to mean "the

mutual interaction of individuals and collectivities and their responses to particular physical and social environments," and then later effectively operationalizing it for their own research. Adaptation, admittedly, implies no end result other than survival, but that is exactly why it is less accurate than the term integration.

One common thread in recent treatments of the interaction and responses of immigrants and hosts has been to evaluate the new population with reference to the original population. Hence, some sort of end result, or at least a directional tendency, is assumed, though it need not lead to a complete merging of the two groups. Certainly a situation can be imagined--in fact, numerous ones can be cited--in which an ethnic or cultural group, over many years, has reached equilibrium in its relations with the broader society. It can become an integral part of this broader society without losing its own identity. Nevertheless, the best yardstick for measuring the degree to which it has become a part of the larger society remains the host population. This is the approach taken by Maykovich among Asian Americans (1976), by Macisco among Puerto Ricans on the mainland (1968), by Bernard and Comitas among returned migrants in Greece (1976, 1978), and by Goldlust and Richmond among a variety of immigrant groups in Canada (1974).

Research on the few outside groups in Portugal has generally been limited to returned migrants from northern European countries, who, like most retornados, are not really outsiders at all. The foci of these studies have been on the development implications of return migration for the local economy (Wojno 1982), the socioeconomic reasons for the return of emigrants who have left Portugal (Brettell 1979), migration as a successful strategy for coping with a restrictive local opportunity structure (Mendosa 1982), the place of return migration in Portugal's political economy (Leeds 1979), and recommendations for a government policy of involvement in the emigration process from departure to return (Trinidade 1979). Some of these studies deal with the demographic and historical trends, outlined in Chapter I, that were continued by patterns of retornado settlement and economic activity; I will therefore discuss them in later chapters. None of them, however, has addressed the question of what constitutes socioeconomic integration.

To know what influences migrants' adaptation or integration, of course, one has to be able to measure it. Martinez (1982), in a study of returned migrants in Puerto Rico, uses an additive index of occupation, property, and education to classify respondents into high, middle, or low socioeconomic status. She then determines the effects of background characteristics and migratory experiences on the

socioeconomic status of returned migrants. Unlike some of the other studies mentioned above, hers does not use the nonmigrant population as a basis of comparison for establishing degree of reintegration. She simply compares returned migrants with each other. A problem with this approach is that the migrant population could conceivably form a group apart and not really be integrated at all, which this measure would not indicate. Another problem is that migrants' feelings about their lives after their return are left out of the index. One effect of leaving and then coming back is that returned migrants' standards for evaluating their old way of life change (see Bernard and Ashton-Vouyoukalos 1976). Surely the possibility that some returned migrants do not feel reintegrated must count for something, even if they have jobs and money. Finally, Martinez considers education to be one aspect of her main dependent variables, but because it is a premigration characteristic, I think it is better conceptualized as an independent variable.

Goldlust and Richmond (1974) classify measures of immigrant integration (which they call adaptation) into two broad categories: "objective" and "subjective" aspects. The objective aspects are political, meaning participation in politics; social, which means the formation of primary relationships with individuals, both migrants and nonmigrants, and secondary relationships through

organizations; cultural, involving the establishment of channels of communication through adoption of a common language, and interchange of cultural artifacts and symbols; and economic, meaning occupation and income. The subjective aspects are identification with the host country, internalization of the new society's values, and satisfaction with new circumstances.

Goldlust and Richmond did not include the "political" and "internalization of values" aspects in their analysis. They left the first out because they felt the voting preferences elicited from respondents were insufficient to operationalize the concept. They eliminated the second because they considered the establishment of standard pan-Canadian values to exceed the scope of the study. In my study of retornados in Serra do Mouro, I asked about membership in political parties, which is also insufficient to constitute a measure of political adaptation, and which in any case received far too few positive responses to be useful. Neither did I have a set of well-researched and accepted Portuguese values to measure.[1] In addition, the uniqueness of the situation of retornados in Portugal made

1 Bestor (1970) is a study of Portuguese values, but only among people in a village Bestor says showed "very little adjustment to industrialization, urbanization, mass communication, twentieth century technology and other factors transforming folk cultures in the rest of the world" (p. 88). Moreover, Bestor conducted the study before 25 de Abril, which has undeniably affected value orientations even in the most remote parts of the country.

questions about language usage superfluous, since nearly all of them are native speakers of Portuguese. Also, because of hundreds of years of association between Portugal and its colonies, the degree of interchange of artifacts and symbols due solely to the influx of retornados would have been difficult to assess. Finally, a practical consideration limited the inclusion of these aspects in my study: even without some of these items, the questionnaire used in Serra do Mouro required interviews that were about as long as some people--especially nonretornados--were willing to submit to.

Eliminating the political, cultural, and internalization of values aspects, then, leaves the identification, satisfaction, social, and economic aspects. I measured identification by willingness to remain in Portugal permanently and by whether or not retornados assumed Portuguese citizenship; I had found that some people, though having a right to Portuguese citizenship, rejected it as a repudiation of the country and instead retained their citizenship in Angola or Mozambique. The number of people refusing Portuguese citizenship, however, also proved too few to be significant. For the satisfaction aspect, I asked respondents in the Serra do Mouro survey to rate the quality of their lives in general, their houses, and their employment situations. With regard to the social aspect, I measured primary relationships between retornados and

nonretornados by asking respondents how many of their three closest friends were retornados, and secondary relationships through asking about membership in organizations (the latter of which resulted in very few positive responses). Goldlust and Richmond also include proximity to and frequency of interaction with close kin as a measure of primary social integration. However, because of the importance of nonretornado kin in many retornados' initial arrangements for housing, food, jobs, and money, I consider proximity of kin (specifically, proximity of nonretornado kin at the time of arrival) to be an independent rather than a dependent variable. Goldlust and Richmond measure economic adaptation through occupation and income. Not having a valid ranking of the prestige of occupations in Portugal, nor the time and resources to produce one, I eliminated occupation from the analysis (though not from the questionnaire), and added number of occupants per room and number of a predefined set of material possessions.

One problem with Goldlust's and Richmond's model, as I see it, is that these separate aspects of immigrant adaptation remain separate throughout their analysis. If the various aspects are in fact subsets of a single concept, then there should be a way of unifying them in a single measure. The benefits of so doing would be to better identify the independent variables that influence overall integration rather than specific aspects of it, and to

provide policymakers with an easily understood single measure. Moreover, in the process of constructing an index of integration, redundancy among variables could be eliminated, and the question of whether they are related enough to the other variables to be considered part of the same phenomenon could be tested.

Comparing Circumstances and Evaluations of Them

The survey conducted in Serra do Mouro shows substantial differences in the variables discussed above among nonretornados, independent retornados, and IARN retornados. In examining the responses of the two retornado groups, I take the responses of nonretornados--as the host population--as the basis for comparison. Table 4.1 shows mean responses to a number of questions. (The numbers in the right-hand column refer to the number of the question in Appendix A, where the full question wording appears.) The first thing to note is that, by all measures, those retornados living under IARN's auspices are significantly worse off than nonretornados; they also think of themselves as worse off. Of more significance, perhaps, is the pattern of differences between independent retornados and nonretornados. The former differ significantly from the latter on all of the "subjective" measures, including evaluations of the quality of their lives, work, and housing; their willingness to leave Portugal permanently and plans to emigrate; and the number of their three closest friends who

are retornados. They also differ significantly on the separation index (a PZ index), which is made up of a number of common statements stereotyping either retornados or non-retornados. On the "objective" measures, however, the two groups are virtually the same, except for the number of people living per room.

Table 4.1 Personal circumstances and evaluations

	Total (249)[a]	Non-retor-nados (57)	Ind. retor-nados (90)	IARN retor-nados (102)	Q. nos. in App. A
Persons per room	1.45	1.07	1.20*	3.50**	93, 94, 44
Material possessions					
Car	0.63	0.70	0.78	0.09**	70
Washing machine	0.77	0.89	0.83	0.15**	71
Refriger-ator	0.92	1.00	0.97	0.49**	72
Stove	0.93	1.00	0.97	0.57**	73
Sofa	0.78	0.91	0.86	0.09**	75
Chair	1.60	1.81	1.87	0.26**	76
Table	0.73	0.84	0.80	0.17**	77
Possession[b] index	50.33	57.12	55.73	13.23**	
Income per person (contos/mo.)	8.92	9.65	10.64	2.86**	86, 93, 94
Quality of life	4.04	4.71	4.09**	1.25**	4
Quality of housing	3.96	4.61	3.88**	1.47**	46
Quality of employment	3.61	4.23	3.03**	2.06**	39

Note: Above figures are means.

* Significance of difference (if negative) from unweighted Nonretornado mean = .05.

** Significance of difference (if negative) from unweighted Nonretornado mean = .01.

a Weighted by retornado status according to share of population.

b Cronbach's Alpha = .864.

Table 4.1--continued

	Total (249)[a]	Non-retor-nados (57)	Ind. retor-nados (90)	IARN retor-nados (102)	Q. nos. in App. A
Willingness to leave (1-5)	3.70	4.42	2.76**	2.41**	11
Plans to emi-grate (1-5)	4.74	4.89	4.50**	4.53**	12
Number of retor-nado friends	1.19	0.38	2.26**	2.63**	15
Separa-tion index[c]	50.05	59.40	41.01**	27.42**	18-22, 25, 27, 28

c Cronbach's Alpha = .579.

One aspect of Goldlust's and Richmond's model of the immigrant adaptation process--one that they postulate to be neither a premigration characteristic nor a situational determinant--is length of residence; the longer an immigrant remains in the host society, the more integrated he or she is likely to become. This importance of this variable is not testable among retornados, because they all arrived at virtually the same time. Nevertheless, the point that integration increases over time is theoretically important to the differences between nonretornados and independent retornados.

The variables on which independent retornados and nonretornados do not differ significantly (except for persons per room, for which the difference is less significant than

the differences on the subjective variables) are "objective," or economic. The variables on which they do differ are "subjective," or evaluative. In terms of cultural materialism, the two sets of variables, respectively, are structural and superstructural; the former should be causally--and therefore temporally--primary. In other words, immigrants and retornados should adjust economically, or "objectively," before they adjust "subjectively," or before they think they have adjusted. The retornados in Serra do Mouro had been in Portugal for about five to six years at the time of this study; should this causal sequence be correct, then within a few more years we would expect independent retornados, who have already adjusted economically, to become more like nonretornados in their subjective evaluations of their circumstances.

This is also what one would expect based on Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. The cognitive dissonance for independent retornados is between their standards for evaluating life in Portugal and the way they are actually living. According to the "objective" measures I have used, they lived better in colonies than they do in Portugal. At this point, as would follow from Festinger's theory, their standards for evaluating their current circumstances derive from their past circumstances in Mozambique and Angola. As more time passes, though, if they are unable to raise their standard of living to its former

level, the conflict between expectations and outcome will lead them to change their standards of evaluation. Thus they will come to rate their living situations in essentially the same way as do nonretornados.

Indicating the extent to which nonretornados, independent retornados, and IARN retornados differ on the above variables, a stepwise discriminant analysis allows correct classification of individuals into the three groups ninety-three percent of the time (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Discriminant analysis of circumstances and evaluations

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients			
	Function 1	Function 2	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Possession index	-.476	-.503	733.82	733.82**
Persons per room	.245	.290	1030.57	296.75**
Number of retornado friends	.179	-.871	1263.51	232.94**
House rating	-.214	.171	1510.59	247.08**
Life rating	-.108	-.207	1560.54	49.95**
Willingness to leave	-.004	.387	1601.25	40.72**
Work rating	.017	.141	1607.54	6.29*

Centroids of groups in reduced space

	Function 1	Function 2
Independent retornados:	-.592	-.083
IARN retornados:	1.095	.146
Nonretornados:	-1.035	1.005

Functions Derived	Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
0	.070	567.244**	14	.931 (func. 1)
1	.526	136.924**	6	.689 (func. 2)

Note: unweighted.

Table 4.2--continued

Prediction Results

Actual Group	No. of Cases	Predicted Group Membership: Indep. Ret.	IARN Ret.	Non-Ret.
Independent Retornados	79	70 88.6%	1 1.3%	8 10.1%
IARN Retornados	90	1 1.1%	87 96.7%	2 2.2%
Non-Retornados	50	3 6.0%	0 0.0%	47 94.0%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 93.15%

Constructing an Index of Integration

At this point we are ready to begin constructing an index of integration based on the above variables. Following Bohrnstedt's (1983, p. 102) recommended steps for construct validation, I conducted the two factor analyses represented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The first is an exploratory factor analysis; it suggests the existence of an "objective" factor--made up primarily of persons per room and the possession index--and of a "subjective" factor, made up primarily of life rating and work rating. It also shows that house rating, willingness for children to leave Portugal permanently, plans to emigrate, and number of retornado friends are poorly related to all factors; I therefore removed them before the next step.

The second factor analysis is confirmatory; refactoring the remaining items, it shows persons per room, the possession index, and income to form the stronger factor, and life rating and work rating to form the second factor. Because willingness to leave Portugal permanently was not strongly associated with either factor, I left it out of the subsequent stages of analysis. In terms of Goldlust's and Richmond's model, that leaves only the economic among the objective aspects, and satisfaction among the subjective. Because of their theoretical association with the two remaining aspects, however, I use the other aspects to establish criterion validity.

The confirmatory factor analysis shows that the items I initially considered to make up each of the two aspects--economic and satisfaction--are in fact congeneric. It is worth noting the greater strength of the "objective" or economic factor in the confirmatory factor analysis, and especially the exploratory, where I entered equal numbers of economic and satisfaction variables. This suggests that the economic variables are more important indicators of integration.

Table 4.3 Rao Factor Score Coefficients

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Persons/room	0.49	-0.25	-0.08
Possession index	0.46	0.07	-0.21
Income/person	0.14	-0.08	-0.01
House rating	0.07	0.07	0.00
Life rating	-0.10	0.62	-0.05
Work rating	-0.17	0.42	0.00
Leave Portugal	0.00	-0.19	0.93
Children leave	-0.02	0.01	0.04
Plans to emigrate	0.00	0.00	0.07
Retornado friends	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04

Note: Minimum eigenvalue of 1.0; With 3 factors x^2 = 57.68** with 19 degrees of freedom; weighted.

Table 4.4 Principal Factor Score Coefficients

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Persons/room	0.49	-0.13
Possession Index	0.36	-0.02
Income/person	0.25	-0.07
Life rating	-0.11	0.65
Work rating	-0.14	0.35
Leave Portugal	0.03	0.07

Note: Minimum eigenvalue = 0.9; weighted.

I next combined persons per room, the possession index, income per person, life rating, and work rating into a single index of integration (a PZ index). Item analysis of the variables in the index (see Table 4.5) shows all of them to be highly related to each other. The Alpha of .813, moreover, indicates that the integration index is highly reliable.

Because of their initially postulated theoretical relationships with integration, I then used the items not in the index as external validators. The house rating, willingness to leave Portugal permanently, plans for emigration, and the separation index all correlate fairly highly with the integration index and with the individual items that make it up. Number of retornado friends, however, does not. Judging from the strength and the pattern of the other relationships, I think it makes more sense to say that number of retornado friends, in this case, does not adequately measure integration, and therefore provides an insufficient test of the index, rather than to say that the index itself does not adequately measure integration.

Table 4.5 Correlation matrix of standardized variables

	Per-sons/ room[a]	Pos. index[a]	In-come/ person[a]	Life rating[a]	House rating	Work rating[a]	Leave Port.	Emi-grate	Retorn. friends	Separ-ation index
Possess. index[a]	.698**									
Income/ person[a]	.576**	.538**								
Life rating[a]	.500**	.602**	.343**							
House rating	.538**	.569**	.339**	.566**						
Work rating[a]	.289**	.379**	.207**	.590**	.415**					
Leave Port.	.360**	.307**	.284**	.402**	.380**	.311**				
Emi-grate	.154**	.163**	.188**	.176**	.131**	.174**	.373**			
Retornado friends	.047	-.037	-.166**	.061	-.041	-.001	.129*	.072		
Separation index	.379**	.428**	.162**	.325**	.372**	.357**	.344**	.184**	.087	
Integra. index[b]	.786**	.846**	.669**	.821**	.647**	.680**	.433**	.264**	-.033	.436**

Note: weighted.

a Forms part of the integration index.

b Cronbach's Alhpa = .819.

As shown in Table 4.6, IARN retornados score much lower on the integration index than do nonretornados; the mean IARN retornado score is more than four standard deviations away from the mean nonretornado score. The mean score of independent retornados is much closer to, but still significantly lower than, that of nonretornados. As I pointed out earlier, this difference is largely due to subjective or evaluative variables rather than objective or economic ones. Over time, I would expect the scores of independent retornados to come ever closer to those of nonretornados.

Table 4.6 Integration Index broken down by Retornado status

	Overall[a]	Non-[b] retor-nados	Inde-[c] pendent retor-nados	IARN[d] retor-ados
N	(249)	(57)	(90)	(102)
Mean	50.09	58.83	51.72**	11.55**
Standard deviation	19.91	10.73	14.09	9.69

** Significance of difference from unweighted Nonretornado score = .01.

a Weighted by retornado status according to share of population of Serra do Mouro.

b Cronbach's Alpha = .596.

c Cronbach's Alpha = .584.

d Cronbach's Alpha = .476.

In the survey in Serra do Mouro, I interviewed as many adult residents of each household as possible, because I needed information about the entire household. Because retornados tended to have lived in the colonies and come to Portugal in groups, however, this means that the observations are not entirely independent. To check out this possibility, I computed the Alpha coefficient of reliability among retornado heads of household only, thus assuring only one respondent per household. This Alpha turned out to be .833, slightly higher than among the retornado sample as a whole, indicating similar relationships between the components of the index with or without additional household members.

One weakness in the above data resides in the population of Serra do Mouro itself: because the neighborhood is relatively uniform in the type of housing available, independent retornados and nonretornados who live there may have been preselected to be more similar than the two groups are in the nation as a whole. That is, people with a certain level of income may have been more likely than others to move to Serra do Mouro, whether they were retornados or not. A national sample survey, for this reason, would have been preferable, but also beyond my resources in time and money.

Summary

Of the aspects of integration or immigrant adaptation postulated by Goldlust and Richmond (1974), the ones that are relevant and useable in my Serra do Mouro survey data reduce to the economic and satisfaction aspects. These two, moreover, form separate factors. They also form the basis for an index of integration that is based on a factor analysis. Other variables judged to be theoretically related serve as criterion validators.

Independent retornados are virtually the same as non-retornados on economic measures, while they are significantly more negative in their evaluations of these circumstances. IARN retornados are worse off economically than the other two groups and evaluate their circumstances more negatively.

CHAPTER V
INFLUENCES ON INTEGRATION

After defining and operationalizing the concept of integration in the last chapter, in this chapter I address the factors that influence degree of integration. First, I discuss the influencing factors presented in other literature, and then I analyze their relevance to the situation of retornados. I also compare retornados with returned migrants and refugees to see what characteristics might differentially affect their integration. After defining expected relationships, then I present the Serra do Mouro survey data that bear on these expectations.

The Literature on Factors Influencing Integration

A literature review article by Price (1969) asserts that there is general agreement on the three types of influences on immigrant adjustment: characteristics of the individual immigrant and the immigrant group, the number of immigrants involved, and the nature of the receiving society. A fourth influence, not mentioned by Price but generally accepted by others, is length of residence in the receiving society.

Researchers focusing on characteristics of the individual immigrant and the immigrant group include Szapocznik et al. (1978), who stress the difference between the behavior and the values of minorities. Behavior, they say, will adjust as necessary for survival, while values will change more slowly. Thus length of residence in the receiving society is a key independent variable, along with age and sex.

Using measures of mental health as dependent variables, Stopes-Roe and Cochrane (1980) show that sex, age, and family contacts are important independent variables among Indian, Pakistani, and Irish immigrants in England.

In his "cultural awareness/ethnic loyalty" model, Padilla (1980) says that the immigrant's acculturation is influenced partly by factors such as generation, education, income, and ethnic density of the neighborhood, and also by language familiarity, cultural heritage, ethnic pride and identity, interethnic interaction, and interethnic distance. In my study, I should point out, I consider interethnic interaction and distance measures rather than causes.

Goldlust and Richmond (1974), who conducted a survey among a full range of ethnic and cultural groups in Toronto, postulate a model in which premigration characteristics and conditions of immigrants form one set of factors influencing their adaptation. These premigration

characteristics include education and technical training, prior urbanization, demographic characteristics, auspices or sponsors, and motivation.

Looking at rural-to-urban migrants within Yugoslavia, Denich (1970) examines "the utilization by migrants of their ego-centered social networks as bases of orientation as they move from rural to urban environments." She views networks as resources that migrants use to gain employment and advance in social status. Chapter III of this dissertation illustrates examples of such use of networks among Serra do Mouro's retornados.

In many ways, retornados are more similar to emigrants returning to their country of origin than they are to immigrants in a foreign country or migrants within a country. Rhoades (1978, p. 139), in a study of returned migrants in Spain, has summarized the factors influencing migration strategy as follows: (1) age and year of first migration, (2) number of years abroad and saving success, (3) marital status and position in family cycle, (4) type of home community, and (5) pre-emigration social position in village. Although in Rhoades's study these variables are related to migration patterns--that is, whether or not emigrants permanently return to their starting point--they can easily be tested for their influence on degree of integration, assuming such a return. Examining the attitudes toward key elements of Greek culture, Bernard and Comitas (1976, 1978)

find that returned migrants' education, sex, and having daughters as opposed to sons are influential factors. Krane (1973) shows that occupation in Germany--mostly because of opportunity for capital accumulation--leads to improved living standards and better jobs for returned Turkish emigrants. Returned migrants in Puerto Rico are the focus of Martinez's study (1982), which establishes that the returnee's socioeconomic status is influenced by length of time abroad, longest job held in US, rural versus urban residence in Puerto Rico before migration, family background, education, and work experience before leaving Puerto Rico.

Retornados are also somewhat similar to refugees. In their study of Indochinese refugees in America, Starr's and Roberts's (1982) dependent variable is a personal adjustment scale, constructed from items on the Langner scale and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Contrary to most of the other studies, their results show that occupation and relative social status in Vietnam have no significant relationship with refugees' subsequent adjustment in America. Education has a negative relationship with adjustment, although they explain this by characteristics of the receiving community. Two of the variables shown to have positive relationships with adjustment are occupational status in America and monthly income in America. My position, as outlined in the previous chapter, is that the

probable reason for this positive relationship is that these economic indicators are part of the same general phenomenon--integration--as is personal adjustment. In fact, the former are more basic to integration than the latter, as shown by their temporal primacy. Should these economic indicators have been taken as dependent rather than independent variables, I would be surprised if education, former occupation, and relative social status in Viet Nam were not positively correlated with them, as is the case with Martinez's (1982) study of returned migrants in Puerto Rico. If, as Szapocknik, et al. (1978) suggest, behavior changes precede changes in values in the process of adaptation (to which I would add that economic integration precedes satisfaction with circumstances), then the former are a necessary precondition for the latter, and are part of the same sequence.

The above studies tend to give causal primacy to economic, demographic, social-interactional, and ethnic ideological factors in influencing degree of integration, largely in that order. Another school of thought is that personality factors are more important. This school is perhaps best represented by Smither (1982; Smither and Rodriguez-Giegling 1982), who derives a "socioanalytic" model from psychological role theory, in which he gives emphasis to meeting the expectations of others; he views acculturation as "the process by which minorities learn to perform

those roles valued by the majority" (Smither 1982, p. 64). He considers the seven personality factors of intellect, adjustment, prudence, assertiveness, likeability, sociability, and ego control as keys to successful role performance in American culture. Other qualities of character structure may be more important to interpersonal competency in other societies. A major difference of Smither's work from this study is that, rather than integration per se, he uses willingness to acculturate as the main dependent variable. Given this, Smither says that

> the closer the character structure and role structure of the minority to the majority, the easier the process of acculturation. Further, the similarity of character structure will probably override the effects of demographic variables (1982, p. 65).

The case of retornados presents an opportunity to assess the importance of demographic variables in integration where cultural differences between minority and majority are relatively small.

Considering personality "the most basic part of the [acculturation] process" (Smither and Rodriguez-Giegling 1982, p. 24) presents some theoretical problems if the idea is to be carried over to the process of integration. Food in one's belly and a place to sleep, followed by more extensive access to resources, are surely more important than likeability (how easy others find it to like a person) in one's initial adjustment to new surroundings. Not that personality is irrelevant; as part of the superstructure it

is probably less important than infrastructural and structural factors. As Harris says, "to make personality the dominant factor or even to assign it equal weight is to abandon the quest for nomothetic causal theories of sociocultural evolution" (1979, p. 260).

In the study of migrants, making personality an independent variable presents special methodological problems. One hurdle, which can be overcome only by extensive time and resources, is being able to define the essential personality characteristics of the host society. Another is separating cause from effect: is the immigrant personality's initial proximity to the pervasive personality of the host society the determining factor in how well the immigrant adjusts, as Smither suggests? Or are economically well-adjusted immigrants in better positions to take on the personality characteristics of their hosts? One could begin to answer these questions through longitudinal studies, tracking individual migrants from before emigration to five or ten years after resettlement. This is not the tack taken by Smither and Rodriquez-Giegling in their study of Vietnamese and Nicaraguan refugees in the United States (1982), as theirs is a one-shot survey. Neither is it within the scope of this study.

The second commonly accepted influence on immigrant assimilation mentioned by Price (1969) is the number of immigrants involved in a movement from one place to

another. Generally, the more immigrants there are, the slower the process of assimilation. Related to this factor is Padilla's (1980) concept of ethnic density of the neighborhood, which he says is negatively correlated with acculturation.

The third general type of influence on immigrant assimilation is the nature of the receiving society (Price 1969). Goldlust and Richmond (1974) perhaps best sum up these situational determinants as the host society's demography, urbanization, industrialization, government policies, pluralism, and stratification. Logan (1979) shows that the lack of public housing and squatter settlements, the role of private enterprise in developing housing subdivisions, and policies of the local government and the Roman Catholic church, along with characteristics of the migrants themselves, help explain Guadalajara's greater success than other Mexican cities in housing rural migrants and integrating them into the urban context. Starr and Roberts (1982) demonstrate that high levels of education and unemployment in the host community, along with ethnic homogeneity, are associated with low levels of personal adjustment of immigrants.

Finally, a fourth type of influence on integration is length of residence in the host society (Goldlust and Richmond 1974; Szapocznik et al. 1978). The longer immigrants are around, the better adjusted or integrated they become.

I do not address all of these influences on integration in this study. I eliminate some by virtue of the limited scope of my project or the late date I became aware of them; I eliminate or modify others to fit the unique situation of retornados. I treat interethnic interaction and interethnic distance as dependent rather than independent variables. Judging language familiarity among native speakers of Portuguese would have been an empty exercise. Ethnographic work showed motivation for flight among retornados to be so uniform and taken for granted that I did not include it in the questionnaire. Finally, Smither published his work treating the personality of the migrant as an independent variable (1982; Smither and Rodriguez-Giegling 1982) after I had begun this study; in any case, the methodological obstacles that such an approach would have presented were insurmountable with the resources I could draw on. I have modified the other variables discussed above to suit the situation of retornados.

In general, the first set of influences defined by Price (1969) corresponds to my main hypothesis that certain characteristics of retornados before they ever left Africa influenced their subsequent level of integration in Portugal.

The second type of independent variable influencing assimilation mentioned by Price--number of immigrants involved--is undoubtedly pertinent to the case of

retornados, whose arrival added about ten percent to Portugal's population. I will discuss this variable in the next chapter. However, to assess its importance for the integration of individual retornados--which could be done to a certain extent with a measure such as retornado density in a neighborhood--is not possible with the survey I conducted in one neighborhood.

The third set of factors mentioned by Price (1969) comprises the situational determinants of the receiving society (demography, urbanization, industrialization, government policy, pluralism, and stratification). I will deal with some of these in my next chapter. This set is related to the pre-existent demographic and economic patterns that conditioned retornado settlement and economic activities. In the meantime I will deal with the effect of government policy on the integration of individual retornados in Serra do Mouro.

Finally, the fourth type of influence on integration--length of residence in the host society--is not measureable in this one-shot survey among retornados, whose arrival times were all about the same. The effect of length of residence would have to be measured through longitudinal studies.

Comparing Retornados with Returned Migrants and Refugees

As suggested above, retornados are in many ways more similar to returned migrants than to immigrants from other countries, and in other ways are more similar to refugees. Language familiarity, for example, is rarely a problem for either returned migrants or retornados. There are some Africans in Portugal who are not native speakers of Portuguese; however, most of them are not considered Portuguese, and hence not retornados, by the government. Like returned migrants, retornados share much of the cultural heritage of nonmigrants, but also have an additional cultural heritage shaped by their experience outside the country. This outside experience may also affect both retornados' and returned migrants' ethnic identity, but in profoundly different ways, owing in part to the generally high status of retornados in the colonies and the low status of peasant immigrants in industrialized countries. Moreover, some retornados are also misto (mulatto) or black, and are therefore likely to differ from nonmigrants in their ethnic identities in ways that would not be true of returned migrants. Like returned migrants, many retornados have family and friendship connections among the host population which they can draw on as a resource for integration; many of them have left Portugal only to come back. There is greater variation in number of connections for retornados than for returned migrants, however, because many of the

former were in the colonies long enough--even several generations--to have lost all contact with people in the home country.

With regard to their motivations for coming to a new country, retornados are more like certain types of refugees than they are like returned migrants. Specifically, in Kunz's terms, retornados are "events-alienated"--"because of events immediately preceding the refugee situation . . . [they] are ambivalent or embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots" (1981, p. 43). They can also be termed a "reactive-fate group" rather than a "purpose group" in their attitudes toward displacement, meaning that they left what they perceived to be an intolerable situation rather than creating the situation themselves (Kunz 1981, pp. 44-45).

Retornados differ from both returned migrants and refugees in their auspices or sponsors. Many retornados had relations with the Portuguese state during their time in the colonies; they may have worked for it the whole time, or the state may have placed them there initially to work the land or serve in the military. This special relationship with the state continued--especially for government functionaries--after their arrival in Portugal.

The differences between retornados and southern European migrants who have returned from northern Europe can be illustrated by some data. Table 5.1 shows the jobs held by

returned migrants from Athens, Greece while they were in Germany, those held by retornados while in the colonies, and those held by returned migrants from Vila Real in northern Portugal while they were abroad, primarily in France. The Greek data come from Bernard's and Comitas's study of returned migrants (1976), and the data from northern Portugal come from Wojno's work among returned migrants there (1982). I have eliminated the housewife category, because my data on retornados from the IARN files are for heads of household only, thus underrepresenting housewives. Large majorities of returned migrants in both Greece and northern Portugal worked as unskilled laborers while abroad, while only about one-third of retornados in the colonies did so. The major difference is that more retornados were self-employed or worked in white-collar or civil service jobs. The comparability of these data is limited, because on one hand I am comparing returned migrants in Greece's capital city with retornados all over Portugal, and on the other I am comparing returned migrants in a small area of rural northern Portugal with retornados all over the country. Nevertheless, these data do suggest that retornados probably enjoyed a higher status in the colonies than do southern European migrants in northern Europe, and that this higher status is not only in comparison with the native population.

Table 5.1 Migrants' occupations while abroad

	Athens, Greece[a]		Retornados[b]		Returned[c] migrants in northern Portugal	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Unskilled labor	125	73.0[d]	150	33.1	48	76.2[e]
Skilled labor	27	13.5	50	11.0	8	12.7
Self-employed or service workers	27	13.5	92	20.3 } 34.9	1	1.6 } 11.1
			66	14.6	6	9.5
White collar/ civil servant	0	0.0	75	16.6	0	0.0
Scientist/ technical	0	0.0	20	4.4	0	0.0
Total	200	100.0	453	100.0	63	100.0

a Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, p. 9.

b National sample.

c Source: Mark Gregory Wojno, Countrymen Return: Colonial Migration and Rural Economy in Northern Portugal (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1982) p. 275.

d Compared to retornado data, 95% confidence interval = +/- 8.3%.

e Compared to retornado data, 95% confidence interval = +/- 13.2%.

Compared to the nonmigrant population of Athens, returned migrants in Greece are less educated, as shown in Table 5.2. In Serra do Mouro, however, the educational

levels of independent retornados (those not living in IARN housing) and nonretornados are about the same. This comparison is between an entire city and a single neighborhood, but Bernard and Comitas tried to control for educational disparity by sampling from neighborhoods. Thus their data do, in a sense, compare migrants and nonmigrants within neighborhoods, making them somewhat parallel to the Serra do Mouro data.

The fact that Serra do Mouro is within metropolitan Lisbon masks the fact that, on a national level, retornados are in general more educated than nonretornados. In Vila Real, for example, 35.7% of the nonretornado population is illiterate, compared to 2.3% among retornados in the Alto Tâmega area. In continental Portugal as a whole, 31.1% of nonretornados are illiterate, compared to 3.9% among retornados listed in IARN's files (Cabral Ferreira 1977a: p. 71). The difference might be more pronounced if retornados not listed with IARN were also included, for they probably tended to be the better off. While Greek returned migrants within Athens tend to be less educated than nonmigrants, then, Portuguese retornados tend to be more educated than nonretornados. Within the Lisbon area, they seem to be about as well educated as the rest of the population.

Table 5.2 Education by migration status

	Athens, Greece[a] [b]				Serra do Mouro[c]			
	Migrants		Non-migrants		Independent retornados		Non-retornados	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Illiterate	11	5.5	3	1.5	1	1.1	0	0.0
Read and write	1	0.5	0	0.0	2	2.2	1	1.8
Primary	134	67.0	71	35.3	31	34.4	26	45.6
First 3 years of high school	22	11.0	22	10.9	12	13.3	4	7.0
Second 3 years of high school	15	7.5	63	31.3	32	35.6	12	21.1
Technical	16	8.0	17	8.5	9	10.0	8	14.0
University	1	0.5	25	12.4	3	3.3	6	10.5
Total	200	100.0	201	99.9	90	99.9	57	100.0

a Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 7.

b $t = -7.90^{**}$.

c $t = -.36$ NS.

There are, however, some similarities between Greek returned migrants and Portuguese retornados when they are compared to nonmigrants and nonretornados, respectively. As Table 5.3 shows, Greek migrants are much more likely than nonmigrants to say they would migrate if they had the opportunity. Likewise, as shown in Table 5.4, retornados are more likely than nonretornados to consider the idea of permanent emigration attractive. While these questions are not really comparable, the migrant/nonmigrant pattern and

the retornado/nonretornado pattern are comparable. Both Greek migrants and Portuguese retornados, with their experiences outside their own countries, appear to be more marginal than those who have never left.

Table 5.3 Willingness to leave by migration status in Athens, Greece

	Would migrate if had a chance			
	Migrant		Nonmigrant	
	#	%	#	%
Yes	53	30.3	21	10.4
Don't know	44	25.1	42	20.8
No	78	44.6	139	68.8
Total	175	100.0	202	100.0

x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = -.19

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 12.

Table 5.4 Willingness to leave by migration status in Serra do Mouro

	Idea of leaving Portugal permanently			
	Independent retornados		Non-retornados	
	#	%	#	%
Very attractive	36	40.0	4	7.0
Attractive	14	15.6	1	1.8
Don't know	1	1.1	2	3.5
Unattractive	14	15.6	10	17.5
Very unattractive	25	27.8	40	70.2
Total	90	100.1	57	100.0

x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .71

In willingness to migrate, education makes a difference for both migrants and nonmigrants in Athens, as shown in Table 5.5. Both migrants with a primary school education or less, as well as those with more than a secondary school education, are more likely than those with only a secondary school education to say they would migrate. Most of the difference, however, is due to the greater number of people in the last group who are ambivalent. Among nonmigrants, those with a secondary school education are also more likely than others to be ambivalent, and along with people with primary school educations are more likely than the best educated to say they would migrate.

In contrast, education makes a difference for independent retornados in Serra do Mouro, but not for nonretornados, in their attitudes toward migration (Table 5.6).

Retornados with only a primary school education are less likely than other retornados to find the idea of leaving Portugal permanently to be attractive. Part of the difference between the Greek and Portuguese data might be due to question wording. However, with the possible exception of Greeks with only a secondary school education, larger proportions of all migrant and retornado educational groups say they like the idea of migrating than is the case among their nonmigrant and nonretornado counterparts.

Table 5.5 Willingness to leave by education by migration status in Athens, Greece

Would migrate if had a chance

	Migrants						Non-migrants					
	Primary		Secondary		More than secondary		Primary		Secondary		More than secondary	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	42	33.6	4	12.1	7	41.2	12	16.0	9	10.6	0	0.0
Don't know	28	22.4	14	42.4	2	11.8	8	10.7	27	31.8	7	16.7
No	55	44.0	15	45.5	8	47.1	55	73.3	49	57.6	35	83.3
Total	125	100.0	33	100.0	17	100.1	75	100.0	85	100.0	42	100.0

Migrants: x^2 significance = .05 Gamma = .10

Non-migrants: x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .10

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 16.

Table 5.6 Willingness to leave by education by migration status in Serra do Mouro

Idea of leaving Portugal permanently

	Retornados						Non-retornados					
	Primary		Secondary		More than secondary		Primary		Secondary		More than secondary	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Attractive	12	35.3	30	68.2	8	66.7	2	7.4	1	6.3	2	14.3
Don't know	1	2.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	7.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
Unattractive	21	61.8	14	31.8	4	33.3	23	85.2	15	93.8	12	85.7
Total	34	100.0	44	100.0	12	100.0	27	100.0	16	100.1	14	100.0

Retornados: x^2 significance = .05 Gamma = -.46

Non-retornados: x^2 significance = NS Gamma = .07

Bernard and Comitas (1976) found gender to be an important factor in both migrant and nonmigrant Greeks' attitudes toward migration. As shown in Table 5.7, women are more likely than men to want to migrate among both migrants and nonmigrants. Also, among both women and men, migrants are more likely than nonmigrants to want to migrate or migrate again. In Serra do Mouro, too, retornados--both women and men--are more likely than nonretornados to like the idea of migrating. However, a greater proportion of men than women retornados say they like the idea, and the same is true of nonretornados. It may be that the difference between the Greek and Portuguese data with regard to sex is due to the reference to leaving permanently in the Serra do Mouro questionnaire. If there is not some more fundamental difference between Greek and Portuguese women in their attitudes toward migration, it may be that women like the idea of leaving for gains in freedom and status, but do not like the idea of never coming back.

Table 5.7 Willingness to leave by migration status by sex in Athens, Greece

	Would migrate if had a chance							
	Women				Men			
	Migrants		Nonmigrants		Migrants		Nonmigrants	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	38	38.4	14	13.6	23	23.2	7	7.1
Don't know	25	25.3	19	18.4	24	24.2	23	23.2
No	36	36.4	70	68.0	52	52.5	69	69.7
Total	99	100.1	103	100.0	99	99.9	99	100.0

Migrants: x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .54

Nonmigrants: x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .37

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 15.

Table 5.8 Willingness to leave by migration status by sex in Serra do Mouro

	Idea of leaving Portugal permanently							
	Women				Men			
	Retornados		Non-retornados		Retornados		Non-retornados	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Very attractive	16	33.3	0	0.0	20	47.6	4	14.8
Attractive	10	20.8	0	0.0	4	9.5	1	3.7
Don't know	1	2.1	2	6.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Unattractive	5	10.4	5	16.7	9	21.4	5	18.5
Very unattractive	16	33.3	23	76.7	9	21.4	17	63.0
Total	48	99.9	30	100.1	42	99.9	27	100.0

Retornados: x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .79

Nonretornados: x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = .65

Another difference between the way Greek migrants compare to nonmigrants and the way Portuguese retornados compare to nonretornados is in their attitudes toward life in Germany and the colonies, respectively. As Table 5.9 shows, Greek migrants are in general less positive than nonmigrants toward the lives led by Greeks at home compared to their lives in Germany. Nonretornados in Serra do Mouro, in contrast (see Table 5.10), are not significantly less likely than retornados to say that life for retornados in the colonies was better than their current lives in Portugal or that it was better than the concurrent lives of nonretornados in Portugal. While Greeks acknowledge life

in Germany to be better only if they have been there--and even then not by a majority--Portuguese tend to think life in the colonies was better whether they ever lived there or not.

Table 5.9 Comparative ratings of life overall in Athens, Greece

	Negative toward Greece		Neutral		Positive toward Greece		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
The life of[a] Greek migrants in Germany is much more pleasant than their life in Greece								
Migrants	76	43.2	5	2.8	95	54.0	176	100.0
Nonmigrants	44	21.8	35	17.3	123	60.9	202	100.0
Greek migrants[b] in Germany live a hard life, worse than life in Greece								
Migrants	77	43.8	7	4.0	92	52.3	176	100.1
Nonmigrants	33	16.3	39	19.3	130	64.4	202	100.0

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 12.

a x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = -.24.

b x^2 significance = .01 Gamma = -.34.

Table 5.10 Comparative ratings of life overall in Serra do Mouro

	Colonies better		Same		Portugal beter		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Life of retornados in colonies vs. now in Portugal[a]								
Retornados	70	77.8	18	20.0	2	2.2	90	100.0
Nonretornados	36	63.2	18	31.6	3	5.3	57	100.1
Life of retornados in colonies vs. past life of nonretornados in Portugal[b]								
Retornados	66	73.3	21	23.3	3	3.3	90	99.9
Nonretornados	42	73.7	12	21.1	3	5.3	57	100.1
Respondent's personal life in colonies vs. personal life now in Portugal								
Retornados	72	80.0	15	16.7	3	13.0	90	100.0

a x^2 significance = NS Gamma = .34.

b x^2 significance = NS Gamma = .00.

Finally, there seem to be some differences between Greek migrants and Portuguese retornados in their attitudes toward employment and housing in Germany and the colonies, respectively (Tables 5.11 and 5.12). Majorities of both groups rate employment in the foreign countries as better than in their native countries. The questions asked of Greeks compare Greece overall to Germany overall, and those

asked of Portuguese compare their personal work situations in the colonies to their current situations in Portugal. Given this difference in question wording, retornados seem to be more likely to rate employment in the colonies as better than employment in Portugal than do Greek migrants to rate employment in Germany as better than employment in Greece. In rating housing conditions (Table 5.13 and Table 5.14), only about one-third of Greeks say Germany is better than Greece, while about two-thirds of the independent retornados in Serra do Mouro say their own personal housing situations in the colonies were better than their current situations in Portugal. There is still the same difference in question wording, but the difference in responses is even more pronounced.

Table 5.11 Comparative ratings of employment among migrants in Athens, Greece

	Greece falls short of Germany		Neutral		Greece does not fall short of Germany		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Stable employment	113	63.8[a]	9	5.1	55	31.1	177	100.0
Opportunities for acquiring skills	94	53.4[b]	13	7.4	69	39.2	176	100.0

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 12.

a Compared to retornado data in Table 5.12, 95% confidence interval = +/- 11.7%.

b Compared to retornado data in Table 5.12, 95% confidence interval = +/- 12.2%.

Table 5.12 Comparative ratings of employment among Independent Retornados in Serra do Mouro

	Colonies better		Same		Portugal better		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Personal work situation	72	80.0	13	14.4	5	5.6	90	100.0

Table 5.13 Comparative ratings of housing among migrants in Athens, Greece

	Greece falls short of Germany		Neutral		Greece does not fall short of Germany		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Housing conditions	52	29.5[a]	5	2.8	119	67.6	176	99.9

Source: H. Russell Bernard and Lambros Comitas, Greek Return Migration. Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1976, Table 12.

a Compared to retornado data in Table 5.14, 95% confidence interval = +/- 12.7%.

Table 5.14 Comparative ratings of housing among Independent Retornados in Serra do Mouro

	Colonies better		Same		Portugal better		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Personal housing situation	57	63.3	24	26.7	9	10.0	90	100.0

Retornados, then, when they were in the colonies, seem to have enjoyed a higher status than southern European migrants do when they are in northern Europe. This difference in status probably helps explain the more positive attitudes of retornados toward life in the colonies than of Greek returned migrants toward life in Germany. Apparently, too, knowledge of the relatively high status of the

former colonists has affected the attitudes of nonretornados, who view life in the colonies almost as favorably as do retornados. In contrast, Greek migrants are much more likely than nonmigrants to view life in Germany as better than life in Greece. Both returned migrants in Greece and retornados in Serra do Mouro, however, are more likely than nonmigrants and nonretornados to want to leave the country. Both groups, with an outside frame of reference, appear to be more marginal than those who have never left.

Influences on Retornado Integration in Serra do Mouro

Comparing the premigration characteristics of independent retornados and IARN retornados, as shown in Table 5.15, offers an understanding of the reasons for their different levels of integration. Before coming to Portugal, independent retornados tended to live in the cities, such as Luanda, Nova Lisboa, Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques), or Beira, whereas IARN retornados were more likely to live in rural areas. Over forty percent of independent retornado households had at least one member who worked for the government, compared to fewer than ten percent among IARN retornado households. Nearly all independent retornados are white, while more than half of the IARN retornados are nonwhite (mainly mistos, with some blacks and Indians). In the colonies, significantly greater numbers of independent retornados were living with their spouses, a difference that cannot be accounted for solely

by age. Independent retornados are also more educated than IARN retornados and are more likely to have been born in Portugal. Largely because of the latter fact, a larger proportion of them had nonretornado kin in Portugal. The past circumstances that parallel the "objective" elements of the integration index--income per person, number of persons living per room, and number of possessions--show independent retornados to have been living better, in terms of their material circumstances, than IARN retornados. The past equivalents of the "subjective" elements of the integration index, of course, are not really indicative of how satisfied people were with their circumstances in the colonies. It is worth noting, though, that IARN retornados, who did not live as well, tend to look back on their lives in the colonies more favorably than do independent retornados.

The variables shown in the lower half of Table 5.15 reflect government policy to aid retornados in integration. The amount of savings brought back, for example, does not mean the amount of cash carried in suitcases to Portugal; the government would exchange only very small amounts (for the colonies used different currencies than that of Portugal). It means the amount of money the government would exchange, plus whatever money people already had in Portugal or elsewhere other than the colonies. Similarly, the amount of possessions brought back was related in part

to the government's policy of allowing its own functionaries a certain cubic footage of shipping space. I have already mentioned the policy of guaranteeing employment or retirement with incentives for government employees. Retornados were eligible for special loans for housing, in addition to the loans available to other Portuguese. I count both types of loan as aid, since it was also the government's policy to gradually incorporate retornados into regular government programs, and cease considering them as a special case. Employment subsidies and housing through IARN differ from the other types of aid in that they were intended not to achieve integration, but simply to serve as a "safety net" for those unable to live by any other means. As the name implies, IARN intended its integration subsidies to help integrate retornados, paying them a lump sum upon leaving IARN housing. Commercial loans from CIFRE have already been described; these loans for starting businesses came in larger amounts than did any other form of aid. Finally, I included living with non-retornado family with the other forms of aid; I could even have considered it government policy, since the government told people they were expected to go live with their families upon arrival, and bused many retornados to their "terras" (birthplaces or native areas), even if they had not communicated with their relatives there for years. Independent retornados are more likely than IARN retornados

to have received all of these types of aid, except "safety net" aid. Although other forms of aid--such as access to the thousands of prefabricated housing units--were available to retornados elsewhere in Portugal, these were the forms of aid affecting the residents of Serra do Mouro.

Table 5.15 Past circumstances and aid in integration

	Nonretornados (N=57)	All retornados[a] (N=192)	Indep. ret. (N=90)	IARN ret. (N=102)	Q. # in App. A
Rural/urban residence in colonies (0=rural; 1=urban)	NA	0.50	0.60**	0.32**	53
Household member employed by government (0=nongovernment; 1=government)	0.37	0.30	0.44**	0.06**	38
Sex (0=male; 1=female)	0.53	0.56	0.53	0.61	115
Race (0=non-white; 1=white)	0.98	0.74	0.93**	0.41**	116
Living with spouse (0=no; 1=yes)	0.70	0.60	0.70*	0.42*	105,3
Education (1=none; 7=college)	4.32	4.07	4.23**	3.69**	102
Rural/urban birthplace if in Portugal (0=rural; 1=urban)	0.37	0.42	0.42 (N=53)	0.44 (N=23)	98
Birthplace (0=colonies; 1=Portugal)	1.00	0.46	0.60**	0.23**	98
Age	28.21	33.08	34.63	30.43	99
Years since went to colonies (if (not born there)	NA	16.34	17.33 (N=51)	11.82 (N=22)	50
Nonretornado family in Portugal (0=no;1=yes)	NA	0.68	0.82**	0.44**	89
Income/person (contos/month)	5.16	10.39	12.36*	5.81*	88

Note: figures shown are means.

a Weighted to represent the proportions of independent and IARN retornados in Serra do Mouro.

* Significance of difference between unweighted independent retornado and IARN retornado means = .05.

** Significance of difference between unweighted independent retornado and IARN retornado means = .01.

Table 5.15--continued

	Nonretornados (N=57)	All retornados[a] (N=192)	Indep. ret. (N=90)	IARN ret. (N=102)	Q. # in App. A
Persons per room	1.28	1.14	0.95**	1.47**	96,97, 46
Possession index[b]	31.44	57.47	60.61**	51.97**	63-66, 68-70
Life rating (0-10)	4.25	7.85	7.56**	8.35**	6
Work rating (1-7)	3.74	5.57	5.38**	5.91**	41
House rating (1-7)	3.66	5.71	5.56	5.98	48
Savings brought[c]	14.11	41.32	62.49**	6.96**	111, 112,113
Possessions[b] brought	NA	11.78	17.68**	1.64**	54-57, 59-61
Family member[d] adido (0=no; 1=yes)	NA	0.30	0.44**	0.06**	39
Loan to buy house in Portugal (0=no;1=yes)	0.46	0.23	0.37**	0.00**	43
IARN employment subsidy (no. of years)	NA	2.74	1.97**	4.06**	79
IARN housing (no. of years)	NA	3.53	0.49**	8.77**	82
IARN integration subsidy (0=no; 1=yes)	NA	0.04	0.06**	0.00**	83
CIFRE commercial loan (0=no; 1=yes)	NA	0.04	0.06**	0.00**	86
Living with nonretornado family (0=no;1=yes)	NA	0.32	0.47**	0.08**	90

b Calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the current possession index.

c Includes only the savings that could be converted into Portuguese escudos, including savings in Portugal and in other countries besides the colonies; for nonretornados includes savings in Portugal on 25 de Abril. All are in contos (1000 escudos).

d Member of current household was employed by the government in the colonies, and therefore received employment or retirement with incentives in Portugal; also included are insurance or bank workers, whose industries were nationalized and who were also guaranteed employment.

We saw in the previous chapter that the current circumstances of independent retornados and IARN retornados make them two very distinct groups. The above data suggest that they were already distinct groups before they left the colonies. This is further suggested by the discriminant analysis in Table 5.16, which shows that, eighty percent of the time, whether a retornado in Serra do Mouro is living on his or her own or under IARN's auspices can be predicted by seven premigration characteristics. These characteristics are listed in order of discriminating power. Together, they account for about forty-eight percent of the variance between independent and IARN retornados.

Table 5.16 Discriminant Analysis of Retornado Status

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Race (1=white; 2=nonwhite)	-.465	79.284	79.284**
Government employment (1=yes; 2=no)	-.378	120.154	40.870**
Nonretornado family in Portugal (1=yes; 2=no)	-.271	137.581	17.427**
Possessions in colonies	-.200	157.473	19.891**
Living with spouse (1=yes; 2=no)	-.167	162.778	5.306*
Education	-.146	170.128	7.350**
Urban/rural residence (1=urban; 2=rural)	-.089	172.375	2.247

Centroids of groups in reduced space

IARN retornados: .641
Independent retornados: -.743

Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
.522	120.055**	7	.692

Prediction results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership: IARN retornado	Predicted group membership: Independent retornado
IARN retornados	102	79 77.5%	23 22.5%
Independent retornados	88	15 17.0%	73 83.0%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 80.00%

Note: weighted.

Tables 5.17 through 5.21 show correlations of the integration index, premigration characteristics, and aid, grouped by category to make them easier to read. Of all the premigration characteristics, only age is not significantly correlated with integration. All of the forms of aid, too, save the IARN integration subsidy, are significantly correlated with integration. I should point out, though, that the number of people in this sample receiving IARN integration subsidies and CIFRE commercial loans are few enough that I will drop these variables from further analysis. Also, the fact that IARN integration subsidies and IARN housing are negatively correlated with integration is not surprising; these forms of aid were precisely for those who were unable to live by any other means. For this reason, I will also drop these variables from a regression analysis of integration, since they can only legitimately be viewed as consequences rather than causes of a lack of integration.

Before going on to the regression analysis, it is worth examining the correlations of the aid variables with each other (Table 5.21). With the exception of the "safety net" aid and the two that are based on very few cases (IARN integration subsidy and CIFRE loan), the various forms of aid are for the most part fairly highly correlated with each other. This suggests some degree of "double dipping"; those who got aid from one source tended also to get it from another.

Table 5.17 Correlations of integration index and its components with premigration characteristics among retornados

	Int. index	Persons/ room	Possess. index	Income/ person	Life rating	Work rating
Education	.314**	.145*	.220**	.296**	.260**	.298**
Rural/urban residence in colonies	.269**	.250**	.151*	.174**	.255**	.195**
Age	.109	.312**	.099	.272**	-.072	-.182**
Sex	-.142*	-.082	-.072	-.126*	-.100	-.164*
Race	.496**	.594**	.436**	.319**	.357**	.168**
Lived with spouse	.314**	.311**	.366**	.207**	.167**	.085
Income/ person (in colonies)	.211**	.248**	.141*	.298**	.152*	-.040
Born in colonies or Portugal	.322**	.327**	.300**	.228**	.295**	.064
Persons/ room in colonies	-.420**	-.484**	-.330**	-.307**	-.331**	-.149*
Government employee in family	.348**	.310**	.304**	.235**	.280**	.219**
Nonretornodo family in Portugal	.270**	.277**	.255**	.077	.252**	.158*
Possessions in colonies	.280**	.378**	.288**	.244**	.135*	-.005
R^2	.478	.556	.428	.385	.338	.267

Note: weighted, standardized.

Table 5.18 Correlations of integration index and its components with aid among retornados

	Int. index	Persons/ room	Possess. index	Income/ person	Life rating	Work rating
Possessions brought	.474**	.457**	.483**	.330**	.309**	.199**
Money brought	.281**	.277**	.252**	.283**	.238**	.026
Adido family member	.456**	.366**	.336**	.300**	.403**	.368**
House loan	.364**	.320**	.319**	.198**	.366**	.162**
IARN employment subsidy	-.288**	-.196**	-.275**	-.207**	-.261**	-.136*
IARN housing	-.822**	-.800**	-.779**	-.564**	-.635**	-.278**
IARN integration subsidy	.051	-.029	.148*	-.012	.071	-.007
CIFRE commercial loan	.122*	.105	.182**	-.070	.143*	.064
Lived with nonretornado family	.473**	.369**	.385**	.271**	.444**	.308**
R^2	.730	.692	.668	.419	.514	.199

Note: weighted, standardized.

Table 5.19 Correlations of aid with premigration characteristics among retornados

	Possessions brought	Money brought	Adido family member	House loan	Lived with nonretornado family
Education	.090	.155*	.192**	.106	.052
Sex	-.016	-.116	-.050	-.018	-.009
Race	.355**	.180**	.283**	.250**	.338**
Age	.137*	.326**	.104	.089	.132*
Lived with spouse	.202**	.168*	.258**	.180**	.183**
Income/person	-.029	.048	-.117	.029	.146*
Possessions in colonies	.120*	.052	-.050	.322**	-.048
Government employee in family	.355**	.071	.629**	.267**	.277**
Nonretornado family in Portugal	.120*	.200**	.365**	.057	.456**
Born in colonies or Portugal	.190**	.161*	.360**	.146*	.387**
Persons/room in colonies	-.275**	-.198**	-.339**	- .040	-.287**
Rural/urban residence in colonies	.303**	.206**	.308**	. 120*	.200**
R^2	.281	.245	.670	.163	.361

Note: weighted, standardized.

Table 5.20 Correlations of premigration characteristics with each other

	Education	Sex	Race	Lived with spouse	Income/ person	Possessions
Sex	-.213**					
Race	.108	-.142*				
Lived with spouse	-.076	-.037	.201**			
Income/ person	.012	-.033	.291**	.109		
Possessions in colonies	.199**	-.070	.244**	.232**	.076	
Government employee in family	.145*	.044	.276**	.216**	-.089	.043
Nonretornado family in Portugal	.076	-.096	.393**	.113	.096	-.035
Born in colonies or Portugal	-.129*	-.037	.521**	.241**	.191**	.042
Persons/ room	-.129*	-.033	-.301**	-.330**	-.371**	-.197**
Rural/ urban residence	.209**	-.056	.226**	.122*	-.089	.079
Age	-.361**	-.074	.210**	.390**	.079	.079
R^2	.335	.154	.445	.253	.239	.134

Note: weighted, standardized.

Table 5.20--continued

	Government employee in family	Nonretornado family in Portugal	Born in colonies or Portugal	Persons/ room	Rural/ urban residence	Age
Nonretornado family in Portugal	.175**					
Born in colonies or Portugal	.252**	.462**				
Persons/ room	-.228**	-.142*	-.149*			
Rural/ urban residence	.203**	.283**	.225**	-.242**		
Age	.101	.064	.302**	-.185**	.087	
R^2	.248	.298	.415	.311	.188	.333

Table 5.21 Correlations of aid variables with each other among retornados

	Possessions brought	Money brought	Adido family member	House loan	IARN employment subsidy	IARN housing	IARN integration subsidy	CIFRE loan	Lived with non-retornado family
Money brought	.196**								
Adido family member	.428**	.143*							
House loan	.260**	.275**	.257**						
IARN employment subsidy	-.193**	-.229**	-.214**	-.316**					
IARN housing	-.454**	-.311**	-.409**	-.410**	-.310**				
IARN integration subsidy	.093	.118	.042	.348**	-.098	-.043			
CIFRE loan	.021	-.064	.042	-.103	.041	-.164*	-.036		
Lived with non-retornado family	.275**	.313**	.478**	.300**	-.288**	-.445**	.032	-.130*	
R^2	.297	.169	.336	.356	.189	.494	.140	.130	.390

Note: weighted, standardized.

In the regression analysis of the integration index, then, the initial independent variables were education, rural or urban residence in the colonies, age, sex, race, living with spouse, income per person, birth in the colonies or Portugal, persons per room, possessions in the colonies, possessions brought, money brought, adido family member, house loan, and living with nonretornado family. I did not include government employee in family as an independent variable because the fact of being a government employee per se was not important, but rather the fact that it guaranteed employment back in Portugal; thus, I included having a family member who was adido (guaranteed government employment) as an independent variable instead, for the former variable would spuriously dilute the importance of the latter. Similarly, I did not include having nonretornado family in Portugal, because the related but more important question was whether retornados lived with this family after their arrival.

Regressing all of the independent variables on each of the others showed multicollinearity not to be a problem. Because the aid variables included in the initial regression equation were related to government policy, I decided to leave them in regardless of their significance. I examined the premigration characteristics, however, through backward elimination procedures, and dropped the one with the lowest T value until the significance of all them was

at least .05. Then I re-added all the variables that had been eliminated one at a time to see if they were significant in the absence of the others.

The final solution in Table 5.22 shows race, persons per room, education, and living or not living with a spouse to be significant predictors of integration when controlling for aid. Among them, these four premigration characteristics, along with aid, account for more than half the variance in degree of integration among retornados in Serra do Mouro. This solution, however, is not appropriate for assessing the importance of the aid variables; much of the variance in the "adido family member" variable, for example, is already accounted for by the premigration characteristics. Because whites and the better educated were more likely to be adido does not mean that being adido did them no good.

Table 5.22 Regression analysis of integration among retornados

Results		Sums of squares	DF	MS	F
Mult. R	.7451				
R^2	.5552	Regression: 37817.75	9	4201.972	21.08
Adj. R^2	.5288	Residual: 30301.64	152	199.353	
Std. er.	14.1192				

Variable	b	BETA	Std. Err. b	F	T
Race	.2704	.2588	.0645	17.556	4.192**
Persons/ room	-.2067	-.1342	.0981	4.442	2.107*
Education	.2140	.2174	.0559	14.681	3.828**
Living with spouse	.1238	.1163	.0628	3.883	1.971*
Possessions brought	.1972	.1967	.0639	9.512	3.086**
Living with nonret. family	.1792	.1793	.0681	6.933	2.631**
House loan	.0860	.0825	.0646	1.774	1.331
Adido family member	.0939	.0925	.0706	1.768	1.330
Money brought	.0363	.0198	.1106	.108	.328
(Constant)	-.57				

Variable	R^2	R^2 change	F when variable added
Race	.2737	.2737	60.30**
Persons/room	.3527	.0790	19.41**
Education	.4116	.0588	15.80**
Living with spouse	.4354	.0238	6.62**
Possessions brought	.4941	.0587	18.11**
Living with nonretornado family	.5431	.0490	16.62**
House loan	.5499	.0068	2.38*
Adido family member	.5548	.0049	1.78
Money brought	.5552	.0003	.11

Note: weighted.

The regression in Table 5.23 is a better indicator of the importance of the various forms of aid. In this equation, I dropped possessions brought because determining who was able to bring what back from the colonies was the most ad hoc of policies, formulated on the spot before embarkation, rather than as part of an overall plan decided after ample time for reflection. What people were able to bring back to a great extent reflected who and where they were. Including this variable here would have artificially underestimated the importance of the other, more long-term forms of aid.

Of the remaining four aid variables, then, having an adido family member and living with nonretornado family are most strongly associated with integration when controlling for the other aid variables, as indicated by their Beta weights. Receiving a loan for a house is also significant, while the amount of money brought is not. The first three types of aid account for about a third of the variance in degree of integration among Serra do Mouro's retornados.

Table 5.23 Regression of aid variables on integration index among retornados

Results		Sums of squares		DF	MS	F
Mult. R	.5881					
R^2	.3459	Regression:	25512.98	4	6378.245	23.00
Adj. R^2	.3309	Residual:	48243.72	174	277.263	
Std. err.	16.6512					

Variable	b	BETA	Std. Err. b	F	T
Living with nonretornado family	.2564	.2560	.0731	12.291	3.508**
Adido family member	.2804	.2757	.0709	15.640	3.955**
House loan	.1869	.1903	.0648	8.312	2.884**
Money brought	.2011	.1065	.1248	2.599	1.611
(Constant)	3.6306				

Variable	R^2	R^2 change	F when variable added
Living with nonretornado family	.2240	.2240	51.10**
Adido family member	.2961	.0720	18.01**
House loan	.3361	.0401	10.56**
Money brought	.3459	.0098	2.60*

Note: weighted.

I noted in the previous chapter that obtaining sufficient information about an entire household in the survey in Serra do Mouro meant interviewing all adult members of the household. I also noted that this raised the question of a possible lack of independence of observations, since respondents came in groups of two or three, and integration was measured partly by household characteristics. However,

the reliability of the integration index was actually slightly higher among heads of household (thus assuring only one representative per household) than among the retornado sample as a whole. Similarly, I repeated the regression analysis reflected in Table 5.22 for heads of household to avoid the possible pitfalls of lack of independence of observations.

This analysis (shown in Table 5.24) ended up with the same variables, with the exception of persons per room, which was not significant. Moreover, the amount of variance accounted for was actually slightly higher than with the whole retornado sample.

Table 5.24 Regression analysis of integration index among retornados--head of family only

Results		Sums of squares	DF	MS	F
Mult. R	.7878				
R^2	.6206	Regression: 23364.55	8	2920.569	14.52
Adj. R^2	.5778	Residual: 14285.52	71	201.205	
Std. Err.	14.1847				

Variable	b	BETA	Std. Err. b	F	T
Race	.2559	.2277	.0934	7.510	2.740**
Education	.2483	.2501	.0820	9.159	3.028**
Living with spouse	.1828	.1458	.0950	3.707	1.924*
Adido family member	.1831	.1709	.0958	3.658	1.911*
Living with nonretornado family	.1903	.1809	.0892	4.552	2.133*
Possessions brought	.1964	.1804	.0941	4.358	2.087*
House loan	.1609	.1570	.0826	3.789	1.948*
Money brought	.0218	.0112	.1598	.019	.136
(Constant)	-24.25283				

Variable	R^2	R^2 change	F when variable added
Race	.2583	.2583	27.164**
Education	.3967	.1384	17.666**
Living with spouse in colonies	.4462	.0495	6.792**
Adido family member	.5322	.0860	13.795**
Living with nonretornado family	.5713	.0390	6.735**
Possessions brought	.5991	.0278	5.064**
House loan	.6205	.0214	4.059**
Money brought	.6206	.0001	.019

Note: weighted.

Summary

The premigration characteristics of the retornados in Serra do Mouro, along with the aid they received from the Portuguese government and nonretornado Portuguese, can in large measure explain their degree of integration. Certain types of people--whites, the better educated, those who were living with their spouses in the colonies, and those with less densely occupied living quarters in the colonies--were more likely than others to receive aid. Even without this aid, these types of people were more likely than others to be successfully integrated. Moreover, those receiving one type of aid stood a good chance of receiving another type. Aid, then, at least among the retornados in Serra do Mouro, seems to have been concentrated among certain groups of people. In any case, the Serra do Mouro data do not support the alternative hypothesis that government policy counteracted the tendency for certain types of retornados to be better integrated than others.

CHAPTER VI
NATIONAL PATTERNS OF INTEGRATION

The focus of this chapter moves away from retornados in Serra do Mouro. It turns toward national data on retornados, which come from the summary reports of the Comissariado para os Desalojados, and from my recording the information on five hundred randomly selected families out of the 187,000 on which IARN has records. It also relies on a study conducted in the district of Vila Real (in northeastern Portugal) by Dr. José Maria Cabral Ferreira of the Regional Planning Commission of the North. This provides a picture of patterns of integration in rural Portugal that can be compared with my findings from Serra do Mouro. All of these data, for a variety of reasons that will be discussed one by one throughout this chapter, are not always directly comparable to those from the survey in Serra do Mouro. But they are comparable enough to permit triangulation or convergence validation.

The first part of this chapter is concerned with the premigration characteristics of retornados in Vila Real and Portugal as a whole that influenced their subsequent integration. The next part deals with the historical and

demographic trends--urban growth and development over rural, services and industry over agriculture, emigration, and a special relationship between colonists and the government--which the patterns of retornado settlement and employment continued.

Premigration Characteristics

IARN's purposes for maintaining files on individual retornado families were entirely different from the purposes of my survey in Serra do Mouro. I constructed and selected many of the questions for the latter so as to be comparable with the information in IARN's files, but I also asked numerous additional questions. Moreover, the information requested on IARN's forms led me to expect information in the files that quite often did not turn up. This is because IARN's workers or individual retornados often filled out only the most critical information or misinterpreted questions. As a result, nothing close to my index of integration can be constructed from the information in IARN's files. Another difference of these data from those in my survey is the time they were collected. I conducted the survey in Serra do Mouro in 1982, about six to seven years after most of the retornados arrived from the colonies. The IARN data, in contrast, represent different lengths of time for different individuals. For some people these files have only the initial form filled out soon after their arrival. For others they have only the

information from the census conducted by the Comissariado para os Desalojados in late 1976 and 1977. Fortunately, for most families they have both sets of information. These files record receipt of unemployment subsidies whenever it occurred until 1977, when the task of handing out unemployment subsidies to retornados devolved upon the government agency that handled it for other Portuguese. By cross-referencing these files with information provided by CIFRE, I was able to determine which of the five hundred families in my sample received CIFRE commercial loans, most of them in 1977.

I should also point out that IARN's files do not represent all retornados in Portugal, but only those who registered with it or who were reached by the Comissariado's census. The bias this introduces is an underrepresentation of people who had relatively little trouble finding jobs and housing after their return and hence did not go to IARN for aid. Because IARN's files represent all people receiving government aid, the importance of this aid in achieving integration may be overestimated. For this reason, the data from the Serra do Mouro survey, though generalizable only to a limited population, may provide a useful check on conclusions about the importance of government aid drawn from the data in the IARN files. Alternatively, the data from the files are not biased in this way if one considers the population to be the retornados who registered with or were contacted by the government.

The dependent variables I will use as measures of integration are type of housing at the time the first IARN form was filled out, whether or not the head of a family was reported as working at the time of the census, and a composite variable indicating whether or not anyone in a given household was ever promised work or reported as working. I also see which premigration characteristics are most associated with receipt of government aid. The dependent variables in the Serra do Mouro survey were interval level; in the IARN data they are nominal level. Moreover, I conceived, constructed, and validated the main dependent variable for the Serra do Mouro survey to fit in with theoretical notions about what integration is; the equivalent variables in the IARN files are but individual aspects--and inexactly measured ones at that--of the broader concept. All of this led me to expect less clear-cut relationships in the IARN data than in the data from Serra do Mouro. But this should not be discouraging if the patterns of association are similar, especially given two such disparate bodies of data.

Such similarities in patterns of association do in fact emerge. Examining housing first, we see in Table 6.1 that people who were born in Portugal were much less likely than those who were not to live in IARN housing after their return and more likely to live with their relatives or on their own. Table 6.2 shows that people not living with a

spouse were more likely than others to go into IARN housing; Table 6.3 shows that older people were better able than younger people to establish themselves in their own houses or apartments. Race and education, in combination, as shown in Table 6.4, explain a lot about whether retornados came to live on their own, with their relatives, or in IARN housing; education made almost no difference for whites, but increased nonwhites' chances of finding their own place to live.

The discriminant analysis shown in Table 6.5 shows that birthplace, race, and education can predict about eighty percent of the time the type of housing a retornado would live in after arriving in Portugal. Variables that did not help discriminate between people in the three types of housing are marital status, sex, birthdate, employer (government or private), and whether or not they received government aid (excluding "safety net" forms of aid). While this combination of variables explains only fifteen percent of the variance, this is more than could have been expected by chance, and the inexactness of the dependent variable should also be taken into account. A family of seven living in one room made available by a relative is in the same category as a family of three having four rooms to itself within a relative's house. The IARN form provided a blank for number of rooms, but some people seem to have interpreted this to mean the total rooms shared by a host

family and a retornado family, and others took it to mean only the rooms used by the retornado family. Moreover, most people did not fill out this blank at all. Thus it is not possible to compute a ratio of rooms per person.

Table 6.1 Housing after return by birthplace

	Birthplace			
	Portugal		Colonies	
	#	%	#	%
Housing				
IARN	33	9.2	39	40.6
Lived with family or given house	228	63.5	41	42.7
Own or rent	98	21.5	16	3.5
Total	359	100.0	96	100.0

$x^2 = 56.25^{**}$ DF = 2 N = 455 G = -.50

Table 6.2 Housing after return by marital status

	Marital status			
	Living with spouse		Not living with spouse	
	#	%	#	%
Housing				
IARN	39	12.1	34	24.3
Lived with family or given house	193	60.1	79	56.4
Own or rent	89	27.7	27	19.3
Total	321	100.0	140	100.0

x^2 = 12.05** DF = 2 N = 461 G = -.28

Table 6.3 Housing after return by age

	Age			
	42 or older		Less than 42	
	#	%	#	%
Housing				
IARN	32	14.0	41	17.8
Lived with family or given house	125	54.8	145	63.0
Own or rent	71	31.1	44	19.1
Total	228	100.0	230	100.0

$x^2 = 8.92^*$ DF = 2 N = 458 G = -.23

Table 6.4 Housing after return by race controlling for education

	Less than high school				High school or more			
	White		Nonwhite		White		Nonwhite	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Housing								
IARN	41	12.4	16	57.1	8	11.9	5	35.7
Lived with family or given house	201	60.7	9	32.1	41	61.2	4	28.6
Own or rent	89	26.9	3	10.7	18	26.9	5	35.7
Total	331	100.0	28	100.0	67	100.0	14	100.0

Less than high shcool:

$x^2 = 38.81^{**}$ DF = 2 N = 359 G = -.66

High school or more:

$x^2 = 6.62^{*}$ DF = 2 N = 81 G = -.14

Summary gammas:

Zero-order: -.49
First-order partial: -.62

Table 6.5 Discriminant analysis of housing after return

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Birthplace (1=Portugal; 2=colonies)	-0.7930	64.661**	64.661**
Race (1=white; 2=nonwhite)	-0.3396	71.432**	6.771**
Education	0.2518	76.682**	5.250*

Centroids of groups in reduced space

IARN	-0.88539
Other	0.16887

Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
0.850	70.382**	3	.388

Prediction Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership: IARN	Predicted group membership: Other
IARN	70	39 55.7%	31 44.3%
Other	367	57 15.5%	310 84.5%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 79.86%

A combination of education and race explains better than either one alone whether people were working or not at the time of the Comissariado's census, as indicated by the

summary gammas in Table 6.6. Better-educated nonwhites were nearly as likely as better-educated whites to be able to find jobs, but less-educated nonwhites were much less likely than less-educated whites to be able to do so. Among both whites and nonwhites, education made people more likely to find jobs. As Tables 6.7 through 6.9 show, men, people living with their spouses, and those employed by the state were also more likely to find jobs than were women, those not living with spouses, and those who had been unemployed or privately employed, respectively. This sample, however, is made up of heads of household as identified on IARN's forms. Since these people were nearly always men if a senior adult male was present, one can draw conclusions not about women in general, but only about women who were heads of household. Also, the independent variables cannot include receipt of government aid (non-"safety net" aid), because receipt of some types of aid--specifically, CIFRE commercial loans--allowed me to count the recipient as employed. In the case of employment, then, I have to examine indirectly the main alternative hypothesis: that government aid counteracted the tendency for people with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others.

The discriminant analysis in Table 6.10 shows that marital status, education, employer, birthplace, and birthdate can distinguish about sixty-four percent of the time

between those who did and did not find jobs. I also initially included race and sex in the analysis, but found that they did not contribute any additional discriminatory power. All of these variables explain only about nine percent of the variance in people's employment status, but again, this is enough to be statistically significant. Again, too, the dependent variable itself does not allow much discrimination; recall that the integration index used in the Serra do Mouro study included income per household member, and a rating of the respondent's work situation on a one through seven scale. In contrast, this measure indicates only whether people were working or not.

Table 6.6 Working after return by race controlling for education

	Less than high school				High school or more			
	Race				Race			
	White		Nonwhite		White		Nonwhite	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Working								
Yes	78	22.5	1	3.2	30	41.7	6	37.5
No	269	77.5	30	96.8	42	58.3	10	62.5
Total	347	100.0	31	100.0	72	100.0	16	100.0

Less than high school:

$x^2 = 5.27^*$ Phi = .130 DF = 1 N = 378 G = .79

High school or more:

$x^2 = 0.00$ Phi = .033 DF = 1 N = 88 G = .09

Summary gammas:

zero-order: .33
first-order partial: .67

Table 6.7 Working after return by marital status

	Marital status			
	Living with spouse		Not living with spouse	
	#	%	#	%
Working				
Yes	102	30.2	19	11.9
No	236	69.8	140	88.1
Total	338	100.0	159	100.0

x^2 = 18.53** Phi = .198 DF = 1 N = 497 G = .52

Table 6.8 Working after return by sex

	Sex			
	Men		Women	
	#	%	#	%
Working				
Yes	113	27.6	8	9.1
No	296	72.4	80	90.9
Total	409	100.0	88	100.0

x^2 = 12.52** Phi = .165 DF = 1 N = 497 G = .58

Table 6.9 Working after return by employer

	Employer			
	State or bank		Other	
	#	%	#	%
Working				
Yes	36	38.3	85	21.1
No	58	61.7	318	78.9
Total	94	100.0	403	100.0

x^2 = 11.33** Phi = .157 N = 497 G = .40

Table 6.10 Discriminant analysis of working after return

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Marital status (1=with spouse; not with)	.516	16.469	16.469**
Education	-.465	30.283	13.813**
Employer (1=state; 2=other)	.367	35.565	5.283*
Birthplace (1=Portugal; 2=colonies)	.417	41.158	5.593*
Birthdate	-.265	43.692	2.534

Centroids of groups in reduced space

Working	-.5113
Not working	.1690

Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
.9134**	41.518	5	.294

Prediction Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership: Working	Predicted group membership: Not working
Working	115	76 66.1%	39 33.9%
Not working	348	130 37.4%	218 62.6%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 63.50%

Distinguishing between the employed and the unemployed is more successful when the units counted are households--in other words, when households with at least one member employed are contrasted with households with no members employed. This analysis is shown in Table 6.11. Again, however, the independent variables are individual characteristics of heads of households; this is because the information on other family members was too incomplete to be useful. In this case, the three variables with the most discriminatory power--former employer (state or other), marital status, and education--are the same as when the employment status of the head of household alone is examined, although in a slightly different order. Sex and race, however, replace birthplace and birthdate as the next most important variables. The latter pair do not contribute any additional discriminatory power. Altogether, these five variables allow discrimination between employed and unemployed households about seventy-one percent of the time, and explain about twenty-one percent of the variance.

TABLE 6.11 Discriminant analysis of household employment

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Employer (1=state; 2=other)	.806	123.235	123.235**
Marital status (1=with spouse; 2=not with)	.248	155.553	32.317**
Education	-.222	167.331	11.778**
Sex (1=male; 2=female)	.187	173.374	6.043*
Race (1=white; 2=nonwhite)	.123	176.790	3.416

Centroids of groups in reduced space

No household member working: .529
Household member working: -.523

Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
0.723	148.834**	5	.526

Prediction Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership: No member working	Predicted group membership: Household member working
No member working	230	201 87.4%	29 12.6%
Household member working	233	107 45.9%	126 54.1%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 70.63

I showed that receiving government aid (other than just food, housing, and unemployment subsidies) was not strongly related to the kind of housing retornados were able to find after arriving in Portugal. I was not able to examine the relationship between employment status and government aid, because I assessed employment status partly through receipt of government aid. We can see, however, which premigration characteristics are most associated with government aid.

First, and most obviously, is employer in the colonies, as shown in Table 6.15. The state deliberately employed those retornados who had been functionaries in the colonies. Beyond this, the better educated, those living with spouses, and men were more likely than others to receive government aid, as shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13. There is no significant difference between the the number of whites and nonwhites receiving government aid, as shown in Table 6.14.

The discriminant analysis in Table 6.16 shows that, even when employer in the colonies is entered last, that variable still accounts for more variance than any of the other premigration characteristics. Again, however, this is not surprising given that the government selected many aid recipients on the basis of their having worked for the state in the colonies. Marital status and education are the only other premigration characteristics that add any

disciminatory power to this equation. Individuals can be grouped correctly about seventy-four percent of the time on the basis of these variables, which together account for about seventeen percent of the variance.

Table 6.12 Government aid by education

	Education			
	Less than high school		High school or more	
	#	%	#	%
Government aid				
Yes	95	25%	38	43%
No	283	75%	50	57%
Total	378	100%	88	100%

$x^2 = 10.53^{**}$ Phi = .156 DF = 1 N = 466 G = -.387

Table 6.13 Government aid by marital status controlling for sex

	Men				Women			
	Marital status				Marital status			
	Living with spouse		Not living with spouse		Living with spouse		Not living with spouse	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Government aid								
Yes	115	35%	14	17%	2	15%	5	7%
No	210	65%	70	83%	11	85%	70	93%
Total	325	100%	84	100%	13	100%	75	100%

Men:

$x^2 = 9.98^{**}$ Phi = .163 DF = 1 N = 409 G = .46

Women:

$x^2 = 0.27$ Phi = .114 DF = 1 N = 88 G = .44

Summary gammas:

Zero-order: .59
First-order partial: .46

Table 6.14 Government aid by race

	Race			
	White		Nonwhite	
	#	%	#	%
Government aid				
Yes	125	28.1	11	21.2
No	320	71.9	41	78.8
Total	445	100.0	52	100.0

x^2 = 0.80 Phi = .048 DF = 1 N = 497 G = .186

Table 6.15 Government aid by employer

	Employer			
	State or bank		Other	
	#	%	#	%
Government aid				
Yes	54	57.4	82	20.3
No	40	42.6	321	79.7
Total	94	100.0	403	100.0

x^2 = 50.93** Phi = .326 DF = 1 N = 497 G = .682

Table 6.16 Discriminant analysis of government aid

	Standardized discriminant function coefficients	Rao's V	Change in Rao's V
Marital status (1= with spouse; 2= not with spouse)	.470	27.106	27.106**
Education	-.207	42.890	15.784**
Birthplace (1=Portugal; 2=colonies)	-.209	45.483	2.594
Sex (1=male; 2=female)	.168	47.724	2.241
Race (1=white; 2=nonwhite)	.162	49.755	2.031
Employer (1=state; 2=other)	.669	92.746	42.992**

Centroids of groups in reduced space

Government aid:	-.644
No government aid:	.260

Wilk's Lambda	x^2	DF	Canonical Correlation
.832	83.956**	6	.409

Prediction Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership: Government aid	Predicted group membership: No government aid
Government aid	133	77 57.9%	56 42.1%
No government aid	330	63 19.1%	267 80.9%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 74.30

Among retornados in Serra do Mouro, the premigration characteristics that were most strongly related to integration were race, persons living per room, education, and marital status. When I considered heads of household only, persons per room was no longer a significant variable. In analyzing the national data from IARN's files, in any case, I could not calculate the number of persons living per room. The dependent variables for the national data, too, were no longer integration per se, but rather type of housing (ignoring size, crowdedness, and perceptions of quality) and employment (ignoring income and job satisfaction). Even so, the significant independent variables were similar to those from the Serra do Mouro survey. Whether retornados across Portugal lived in IARN housing, families' or friends' houses, or houses they owned or rented was best predicted by birthplace (in Portugal or the colonies), race, and education. Birthplace, of course, is highly related to race, as few nonwhite retornados were born in Portugal. The premigration characteristics most related to employment or unemployment were marital status, education, and birthplace. Thus, the two bodies of data--representing different populations and relying on related but different dependent variables--point to similar conclusions. The discriminant analysis of IARN and independent retornados in Serra do Mouro separated the two groups better than does the equivalent analysis of the national

data. In part, this may be because I conducted the Serra do Mouro survey later than IARN collected its national information, such that the people left in IARN housing by that time might have been more pronounced in the premigration characteristics that kept them from being well integrated.

Discerning the relative contribution of government aid is more difficult with the national data, but aid seems not to have significantly affected the kind of housing people were able to obtain. Because of the government's policy of hiring all retornados who could prove they had worked for it in the colonies, of course, government aid definitely affected employment, although marital status and education appear to have been at least as important. Race ceases to be significant only when these other variables are controlled for; more nonwhites than whites came to Portugal without their spouses, and nonwhites with little education were especially unlikely to find employment in Portugal. These data, like the data from the Serra do Mouro survey, do not support the main alternative hypothesis that government aid counteracted the tendency for people with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others.

The study conducted by Dr. José Maria Cabral Ferreira in the Alto Tâmega area of Vila Real in northern Portugal (1977) provides a third set of data. Dr. Cabral

Ferreira stayed in the area for two years, beginning in 1975, in order to study the integration of retornados. Thus he and his team from the Comissão de Planeamento da Região do Norte (Regional Planning Commission of the North) were able to observe and describe integration as it occurred, not after the fact as with my study in Serra do Mouro. In addition to ethnographic work, his information came from the files of the Centros de Apoio aos Transmontanos Retornados do Ultramar (Centers for Aid to the Locals Who Have Returned from the Overseas Colonies), from a comparative analysis of grades and school enrollments of retornado and nonretornado adolescents, from an analysis of the medical consultations requested by retornados at local clinics, and from a census of the retornados living in area hotels under IARN's auspices.

Cabral Ferreira, of course, was not working with my hypotheses, so he does not analyze his data in the same way. Nevertheless, his study contains applicable information on race, education, and family connections as they relate to retornado housing in Portugal, and on the effectiveness of government aid. Table 6.17 shows that retornados living on their own in Alto Tâmega were better educated than those living in IARN housing, and that among the latter, whites were better educated than nonwhites (Cabral Ferreira 1977a, p. 72; 1977b, p. 93). He does not mention blacks among the independent retornados; one can only assume that there were none, or that they were too few to be significant.

Table 6.17 Education by housing and race in Alto Tâmega

	Independent Housing		IARN Housing			
			White		Nonwhite	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Education						
Less than fourth grade	292	7.8	44	17.0	58	31.9
Fourth grade or more	3441	92.2	215	83.0	124	68.1
Total	3733	100.0	259	100.0	182	100.0

Signifcance: Independents vs. IARN whites = .01
Independents vs. IARN nonwhites = .01
IARN whites vs. IARN nonwhites = .01

Table 6.18 shows that nearly four out of five independent retornados in Alto Tâmega had nonretornado family in Portugal. In fact, this number is probably a gross underestimate, because those I counted as not having nonretornado family were actually living in their own or rented houses; it is only that we cannot be certain that they had nonretornado family.[1] In contrast, only a little over one-half of the whites in the IARN hotels, and about one-fourth of the nonwhites, said they had any nonretornado family.

1 I converted these data from a table showing type of housing among independent retornados in Alto Tâmega; Cabral Ferreira (1977a, 1977b) does not mention numbers of indepedent retornados who do and do not have nonretornado family.

Table 6.18 Nonretornado family by housing and race in Alto Tâmega

	Independent Housing		IARN Housing			
			White		Nonwhite	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Nonretornado family in Portugal						
Yes	2722[a]	78.5	83	56.1	15	24.6
No	746[b]	21.5	65	43.9	46	75.4
Total	3468	100.0	148	100.0	61	100.0

Significance: Independents vs. IARN whites = .01
Independents vs. IARN nonwhites = .01
IARN whites vs. IARN nonwhites = .01

a Calculated by summing those who live with family or were given a house.

b Calculated by summing those who own or rent their houses.

Cabral Ferreira's observations on the distribution of CIFRE commercial loans are also of interest here. On the basis of his intimate knowledge of the CIFRE program in Alto Tâmega, he asserts that the analysis of proposed projects was superficial at best and that loans were ultimately given out more on the basis of who a person was than on the merits of his or her proposed project. "From what we were able to observe, the appraisals done by banks concentrated primarily on criteria of solvency (what

guarantees the candidate gave, if he or she had collateral, if he or she had a cosigner, etc.), which seemed completely unreasonable, and which obviously favored those who had means, friends, influence" (1977a, pp. 115-116). This confirms the statements I heard from several people in Serra do Mouro, that the retornados receiving CIFRE loans were those who already had jobs and money, and thus did not need any aid. I know the personal circumstances of only four CIFRE loan recipients, but of these, one was already working for the military when he got his loan, another was working for the bank that made the loan in conjunction with the government, and another was in partnership with a wealthy nonretornado relative. Looking beyond CIFRE loans to all economic aid given by the government (excluding housing, food, and unemployment subsidies), recall from Table 6.12 that on a national level, those receiving the aid tended to have more education than those who did not.

Historical and Demographic Trends

The national patterns of the resettlement of retornados in Portugal and the types of economic activities they became involved in continue certain historical and demographic trends begun largely as a result of government policy under the Salazar-Caetano regime. Although these trends had a certain inertia of their own that undoubtedly would have persisted whatever the postrevolution governments had done, the role of government policy with respect

to the retornados remained consistent with broader policies under Salazar and Caetano. Specifically, both pre- and postrevolution governments fostered the industrial and service sectors at the expense of agriculture, thus also favoring urban over rural growth and development. Partly a result of uneven sectoral and regional development was the massive emigration from rural areas, although another government aim in these movements was to maintain remittances sent back by emigrants as one of the pillars for the national economy to stand on. The pillar began to wobble with the worldwide economic downturn and consequent lack of demand for Portuguese labor in the mid-1970s, but the government nonetheless assisted as many retornados as it could in finding other countries that would accept them. Finally, in order to gain more than nominal control over the colonies and to extract from them the raw materials necessary for Portugal's own development, the government had subsidized and created the conditions for the movement of tens of thousands of whites to the colonies, maintaining a special relationship with many of them after their move. After decolonization, the government's motives changed, but the special relationship remained. My aim in this section, then, is to show how these trends and the government's orientation to them--with respect to retornados--continued after 25 de Abril.

Services and Industry Over Agriculture

The Salazar-Caetano orientation toward sectoral development is evident in the several development plans put forth after World War II. "Essentially, the goals of the growth plans were to develop the Portuguese economy by generating rapid expansion in a limited number of protected industries while ignoring other industrial sectors and especially ignoring agriculture" (Wojno 1982, p. 63). The Third Development Plan (1968-73), for example, forecast an average annual growth rate of seven percent, with growth in tourism projected at twenty percent, in manufacturing at nine percent, and in construction at eight percent. All of these goals were achieved, but the expected growth rate of three percent in agriculture was not. The Fourth Development Plan (1974-79) projected GNP growth at 7.5 percent annually, but with agricultural output expected to increase by only two percent a year (Keefe 1977, p. 316). Table 6.19 shows the declining contribution of agriculture to the GNP compared to industry and services, especially the former.

Early postrevolution governments rejected the Fourth Plan, but kept its most expensive feature, a U.S. $1.2 billion industrial and port complex south of Lisbon at Sines, in the industrial district of Setúbal. Later postrevolutinationals such as Ford for location in this complex.

CIFRE loans, the largest measurable part of the economic aid given to retornados, show how the Comissariado's distribution of resources continued giving low priority to agriculture. As Table 6.20 shows, projects in industry and construction drew over half of CIFRE's funds, leaving about one-third for agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and about a fifth for services.

This may make services look like the neglected sector, but we must also consider the rest of the government's policies toward retornados. The forty-seven thousand jobs and pensions accorded former colonists by the government and the thousands more given by the newly nationalized banks were nearly all in the services sector. Tourism, too, had long received priority in government planning, and it, too, benefited from government policies toward the retornados. Tourism, not surprisingly, fell off dramatically after 25 de Abril, leaving most of the nation's hotels empty, and many facing bankruptcy. Happily for the hotels, thousands of retornados needed places to stay at the same time that the tourists stopped coming, and the government graciously footed the bill, to the tune of 7,800,000 contos in 1975 and 1976. Two million contos of this was on false pretenses--for example, falsified receipts for retornados that were actually living with their families (Diário de Notícias 1977a, p. 2). "The housing of the refugees at IARN's expense, whatever else it

did, resulted in a strong dose of aid to the hotel industry, which in '75 and '76 passed through an extrememly serious crisis" (Diário de Notícias 1977b, p. 11). By the end of 1976, though, the tourists were coming back, and the hotels were calling for the retornados to be removed. They were all gone from the four- and five-star hotels by the end of that year, and from the three-star hotels by March 31, 1977 (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979b, p. 36).

Table 6.19 GNP by sectors of activity

Sectors	1956 % of GNP	1965 % of GNP	1967 % of GNP
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	29.8	21.4	18.4
Industry and Construction	31.7	38.6	40.2
Services	38.5	40.0	41.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: C. Almeida and A. Barreto, Capitalismo E Emigração Em Portugal (Lisbon: Prelo Editora 1976: 39, Table 6).

Table 6.20 CIFRE Loans by Economic Sector

Sector	Amount (contos)	%
Agricultre, Forestry, Fishing	4,269,247	30.6
Industry and construction	7,149,432	51.2
Services	2,532,374	18.2
Total	13,951,053	100.0

Source: Relatório de Actividades, Capitulo I: Comissariado (Lisbon: Comissariado para os Desalojados, 1979 p. 50).

Whatever the government had done, though, retornados were almost certain to have gravitated toward the industrial and especially the services sectors more than toward agriculture. Table 6.21 shows that among retornados across the country, as well as those in rural Alto Tâmega and suburban Serra do Mouro, few had worked in the agricultural sector in the colonies. They left that--at least the labor if not the ownership--to the Africans.

Table 6.21 Employment sector of retornados in the colonies

Sector	National[a]		Alto[b] Tâmega		Serra do Mouro	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agricultural, Forestry, and Fishing	25	6.1	322	9.9	7	6.4
Industry and Construction	108	26.4	629	19.4	18	16.4
Services	276	67.5	2288	70.6	85	77.3
Total	409	100.0	3239	100.0	110	100.0

a National sample.

b Source: Os Retornados da Area do Alto Tâmega e a sua Reintegração social (Porto: Comissão de Planeamento da Região do Norte 1977, pp. 104-105).

Urban Growth and Development Over Rural

Directly associated with the Salazar-Caetano government's favoritism toward industry and services over agriculture was the more rapid growth and development of urban compared to rural areas that it fostered. This was especially true of the Lisbon-Setúbal area, where most of the nation's heavy industry came to be concentrated. Government investment in infrastructural and industrial projects in this area was considerable in the 1960s and early 1970s, including the impressive 25 de Abril bridge (formerly the Salazar bridge) linking Lisbon and Setúbal, a subway system for Lisbon, Europe's second largest shipbuilding

facility in Lisbon, and the continent's largest supertanker repair facility in Setúbal. Some considered the bridge to be a tradeoff for a long-planned irrigation system in the Alentejo (Keefe 1977, p. 368). As I previously noted, the postrevolution governments continued the regional bias of their predecessor with the mammoth port and industrial complex at Sines, in the district of Setúbal south of Lisbon.

Being the seat of government, of course, also gave Lisbon a disproportionate share of government workers. Another indication of the regional imbalance in the service sector is the fact that, between them, Lisbon and Porto-the two largest cities--accounted for some sixty-eight percent of the total commercial activities undertaken in Portugal (Almeida and Barreto 1976, p.155).

All of this has led to much greater population growth in urban than in rural areas. Between 1960 and 1970, in fact, the population of the country as a whole actually declined, with growth occurring only in the Lisbon-Setúbal industrial area in the south, and in the Porto-Aveiro-Braga industrial area to the north (see Table 6.22). When the retornados came to Portugal, then, it should be no surprise that they went mostly to Lisbon, Porto, Aveiro, and Setúbal, in that order. Over half of the retornados that the government was able to keep track of, in fact, settled in these four districts. Lisbon and Setúbal, moreover,

had some of the highest proportions of retornados to previous residents (see Table 6.23). Also, the Comissariado's census left out roughly half of all retornados--those who felt no need to sign up for government aid. It may be that they settled in even higher proportions where the greatest economic opportunities were--that is, in the cities. In any case, as Table 6.21 shows, higher than average growth between 1970 and 1981 occurred only in Setúbal, Lisbon, Faro, Porto, Aveiro, and Braga, owing in no small part to the numbers of retornados. Faro, the only one of these districts that is not in one of the two industrial belts, is by far the busiest tourist district in the country. Its growth, therefore, is probably related to growth in services.

Table 6.22 Population by district and autonomous region

Districts	1970 Population #	1970 Population %	% Change from 1960	1981 Population #	1981 Population %	% Change from 1970
Aveiro	546,457	6.3	4.6	620,762	6.3	13.6
Beja	202,193	2.3	-24.9	186,340	1.9	- 7.8
Braga	617,063	7.1	3.9	700,728	7.2	13.6
Bragança	176,660	2.0	-23.0	181,386	1.9	2.7
Castelo Branco	251,851	2.9	-19.0	232,419	2.4	- 7.7
Coimbra	396,329	4.6	- 8.8	442,965	4.5	11.8
Evora	176,044	2.0	-18.1	179,242	1.8	1.8
Faro	266,621	3.1	-14.7	322,882	3.3	21.1
Guarda	212,191	2.4	-23.2	205,643	2.1	- 3.1
Leiria	382,631	4.4	- 4.2	423,821	4.3	10.8
Lisboa	1,611,887	18.6	14.9	2,040,808	20.8	26.6
Portalegre	145,242	1.7	-21.2	140,609	1.4	- 3.2
Porto	1,314,794	15.2	10.3	1,550,807	15.8	18.0
Santarém	453,344	5.2	- 5.8	452,615	4.6	- 0.2
Setúbal	464,218	5.4	23.4	649,053	6.6	39.8
Viana do Castelo	250,233	2.9	- 9.1	256,516	2.6	2.5
Vila Real	264,508	3.1	-18.0	264,783	2.7	0.1
Viseu	409,733	4.7	-14.0	420,766	4.3	2.7
Açores	291,028	3.4	-11.6	249,547	2.5	-14.3
Madeira	253,220	2.9	- 5.6	256,782	2.6	1.4
Total	8,668,267	100.0	- 2.1	9,788,474	100.0	12.9

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. XII Recenseamento Geral da População, Resultados Preliminares (Lisbon, 1982).

Table 6.23 Relationship between resident population (1970) and retornado population

Districts	Retornado Population #	%	Retornado/ Resident Ratio
Aveiro	28,502	6.2	.052/1
Beja	2,934	0.6	.014/1
Braga	16,012	3.5	.026/1
Bragança	19,957	4.3	.113/1
Castelo Branco	12,702	2.7	.050/1
Coimbra	22,214	4.8	.056/1
Evora	2,566	0.6	.014/1
Faro	20,008	4.3	.075/1
Guarda	18,810	4.1	.089/1
Leiria	17,723	3.8	.046/1
Lisboa	138,014	29.8	.085/1
Portalegre	2,709	0.6	.019/1
Porto	48,938	10.6	.037/1
Santarém	18,313	4.0	.040/1
Setúbal	28,121	6.1	.085/1
Viana do Castelo	8,616	1.9	.034/1
Vila Real	19,691	4.3	.074/1
Viseu	25,382	5.5	.062/1
Açores	4,053	0.9	.014/1
Madeira	8,048	1.7	.032/1
Total	463,315	100.0	.053/1

Source: Comissariado para os Desalojados, Relatório de Actividades, Capitulo I: Comissariado (Lisbon, 1979) p. 161.

The pattern of settlement by retornados was not simply a matter of people going back to where they had come from. As Table 6.24 shows, substantial proportions of people from nearly all districts ended up in Lisbon. Moreover, most retornados who went to live in the rural districts had been born there, whereas those who went to the cities, especially Lisbon, tended to come from somewhere else (see Table 6.25 and Table 6.26). Alto Tâmega, as an example of

rural areas (Table 6.27), and Serra do Mouro, as an example of urban areas (Table 6.28), also bear this pattern out.

Table 6.24 Birthplace by residence

Birthplace	#	Residence: Same district	Lisbon	Other Portugal
Aveiro	26	73.1%	7.7	19.2
Beja	6	0.0%	50.0	50.0
Braga	13	61.5%	15.4	23.1
Bragança	42	40.5%	26.2	33.3
Castelo Branco	24	33.5%	41.7	24.8
Coimbra	20	55.0%	40.0	5.0
Evora	2	50.0%	50.0	0.0
Faro	12	41.7%	50.0	8.3
Guarda	37	51.4%	18.9	29.7
Leiria	18	50.0%	38.9	11.1
Lisboa	36	75.0%	75.0%	25.0
Portalegre	4	75.0%	25.0	0.0
Porto	33	54.5%	15.2	30.3
Santarém	14	50.0%	21.4	28.6
Setúbal	11	63.6%	27.3	9.1
Viana do Castelo	7	71.4%	28.6	0.0
Vila Real	31	38.7%	32.3	29.0
Viseu	26	50.0%	19.2	30.8
Angra do Heroismo	1	100.0%	0.0	0.0
Horta	2	50.0%	0.0	50.0
Ponta Delgada	1	0.0%	100.0	0.0
Funchal	12	83.3%	8.3	8.4
Colonies	110	0.0%	58.2	41.8
Total	488			

Source: National sample.

Table 6.25 Residence by birthplace

Residence	#	Birthplace: Same district	Other Portugal	Colonies
Aveiro	37	51.4%	8.1	40.5
Beja	1	0.0%	0.0	100.0
Braga	14	57.1%	28.6	14.3
Bragança	19	89.5%	0.0	10.5
Castelo Branco	13	61.5%	0.0	38.5
Coimbra	21	52.4%	19.0	28.6
Evora	1	100.0%	0.0	0.0
Faro	14	35.7%	50.0	14.3
Guarda	26	73.1%	11.5	15.4
Leiria	14	64.3%	14.3	21.4
Lisboa	179	15.1%	49.1	35.8
Portalegre	5	60.0%	20.0	20.0
Porto	52	34.6%	51.9	13.5
Santarém	13	53.8%	30.8	15.4
Setúbal	21	33.3%	38.1	28.6
Viana do Castelo	8	62.5%	37.5	0.0
Vila Real	16	75.0%	25.0	0.0
Viseu	20	65.0%	30.0	5.0
Angra do Heroismo	2	50.0%	50.0	0.0
Horta	1	100.0%	0.0	0.0
Ponta Delgada	1	0.0%	100.0	0.0
Funchal	10	100.0%	0.0	0.0
Total	488			

Source: national sample.

Table 6.26 Residence in Lisbon by birthplace

	Residence			
	Lisbon		Other	
	#	%	#	%
Birthplace				
Same as residence	27	15.1	174	56.3
Different from residence	152	84.9	135	43.7
Total	179	100.0	309	100.0

x^2 = 77.83** Phi = .403 DF = 1 N = 488 G = -.76

Source: national sample.

Table 6.27 Birthplaces of retornados in Alto Tâmega

	#	%
Alto Tâmega	2831	76.6
Other Vila Real	155	4.2
Other Continental Portugal	392	10.6
Madeira and Azores	9	0.2
Colonies	296	8.0
Other	11	0.3
Total	3694	100.0

Table 6.28 Birthplaces of retornados in Serra do Mouro

	#	%
Aveiro	3	1.4
Beja	4	2.1
Braga	6	3.1
Bragança	7	3.5
Castelo Branco	6	3.1
Coimbra	3	1.4
Evora	1	0.7
Faro	3	1.4
Guarda	8	4.2
Leiria	1	0.4
Lisboa	18	9.5
Porto	6	3.1
Setúbal	1	0.4
Viana do Castelo	3	1.4
Vila Real	5	2.8
Viseu	5	2.4
Azores and Madeira	8	4.2
Colonies	103	53.4
Other	3	1.4
Total	192	100.0

An outright policy by the post-25 de Abril governments to steer retornado settlement and economic activities toward greater development of urban than rural areas is difficult to point to. CIFRE loans, for example, in proportion both to the retornado population and the pre-25 de Abril population, went more to rural than to urban districts (see Table 6.29). However, looking just at sheer size, 41.2 percent of the loans went to Lisbon, Setúbal, Porto, Aveiro, and Braga--the five industrial districts. Adding in the district of Coimbra, which includes Portugal's third-largest city, along with Faro, the tourist district, and Santarém, bordering on Lisbon, brings the

total proportion to 64.5 percent. Even if the government did not expressly use the loans to bring about greater development of urban than rural areas, it seems at least not to have questioned the development patterns already set in motion by Salazar and Caetano. Certainly it did not use the considerable resources of the CIFRE program to significantly counteract these patterns.

Table 6.29 CIFRE loans by district

District	Total loans (contos)	Contos/ retornado	Contos/ nonretornado resident
Aveiro	771,349	27.1	1.4
Beja	99,507	33.9	0.5
Braga	528,377	33.0	0.9
Brangança	381,655	19.1	2.2
Castelo Branco	272,608	21.5	1.1
Coimbra	990,011	44.6	2.5
Evora	187,705	73.2	1.1
Faro	919,430	46.0	3.4
Guarda	481,170	25.6	2.3
Leiria	682,526	38.5	1.8
Lisboa	2,449,334	17.7	1.5
Portalegre	215,705	79.6	1.5
Porto	1,379,195	28.2	1.0
Santarém	1,337,511	73.0	3.0
Setúbal	624,211	22.2	1.3
Viana do Castelo	508,203	59.0	2.0
Vila Real	489,780	24.9	1.9
Viseu	1,000,996	39.4	2.4
Açores	339,783	83.8	1.2
Madeira	221,997	36.3	1.2
Total	13,951,053	30.1	1.6

Source: Comissariado para os Desalojados, Relatório de Actividades, Capitulo I: Comissariado (Lisbon, 1979) pp. 58-59.

Again we have to look beyond the CIFRE program to get the full picture. As Table 6.30 shows, 38.2 percent of all retornado families with government employees reside in Lisbon. The policy of hiring all former colonists who could prove they had worked for the government obviously drew a good part of them to the nation's capital. The fact that virtually the same proportion of retornado families not including functionaries came to live in Lisbon simply points to the myriad other forces attracting them to Portugal's industrial, political, intellectual, cultural, and commercial center.

Table 6.30 District by government employee in family

District of residence	Government employee in family: Yes #	Yes %	No #	No %
Lisbon	42	38.2	141	36.4
Other	68	61.8	246	63.6
Total	110	100.0	387	100.0

$x^2 = 0.05$ Phi = .015 DF = 1 N = 497 G = .037

Source: national sample.

Emigration

The same forces leading to the growth and development of Portugal's urban areas and the decline of the rural areas under Salazar and Caetano were also responsible for massive emigration. As I previously noted, the population of the country as a whole actually declined between 1960 and 1970, despite one of Europe's highest birth rates (see Table 6.22). As a result, the remittances the emigrants sent back eventually overtook the value of the country's total agricultural output, becoming one of Portugal's main sources of foreign exchange. Entire villages in rural areas became economically dependent on them (Cabral 1978, p. 414). These population movements, like the movements from country to city, were mainly due to intersectoral and interregional imbalances. Besides Portugal's internal conditions, of course, the other side to the equation was the lure of more developed foreign economies. In particular, Portuguese emigrants tended to go to France, because of the greater employment opportunities it offered, its geographical proximity, "its relatively relaxed enforcement of restrictions upon foreign labor, the easy accessibility of work permits for foreign workers, and broad cultural similarities between France and Portugal" (Wojno 1982, p. 78).

With the worldwide economic downturn in 1974 and 1975, however, the need for imported labor in northern European economies fell off sharply. Emigration from Portugal, like

all intra-European migration, also declined, and the labor-importing countries began imposing legal restrictions on further immigration. Thus emigration from Portugal fell from a high of 178,632 in 1970, and 120,019 in 1973, to only 44,918 in 1975 (see Table 6.31). It was into this context--with increased competition for labor at home coupled with Portugal's own response to the worldwide recession, and the additional economic problems set off by the revolution--that hundreds of thousands of retornados arrived.

Table 6.31 Emigration from Portugal: 1960-1975

Year	# Emigrants
1960	35,159
1961	38,715
1962	42,286
1963	46,630
1964	74,673
1965	91,937
1966	110,320
1967	92,684
1968	92,708
1969	153,536
1970	178,632
1971	151,197
1972	104,976
1973	120,019
1974	70,273
1975	44,918
Total	1,448,663

Source: E. Ferreira, Origens e Formas da Emigração (Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1976) p. 76, Table 12, and Secretaria de Estado de Emigração, Boletim Anual (Lisbon, 1975) p. 7, Table 1.2, both presented in Mark Gregory Wojno, Countrymen Return: Migration and Rural Economy in Northern Portugal (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms) p. 82, Table 4.0.

Thousands of former colonists went to other countries--probably South Africa above all others--without ever passing through Portugal, but they were not retornados, and never became the Portuguese government's problem. However, IARN made every effort to help those who did arrive leave again if they wanted to and could arrange it. The Portuguese government, in particular the already existent Secretary of State of Emigration, had ample experience in

aiding emigration. IARN paid for whole families' passages, shipment of their baggage, documentation subsidies (to help pay the cost of red tape), and subsidies of integration or embarkation, meant to help the emigrants in their first days in their country of destination. In 1975 and 1976, it did this for 12,642 retornados, sending them mostly to Brazil, Canada, the U.S., South Africa, and Venezuela (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979b, pp. 21-23). Considering that illegal emigration from Portugal has almost equalled legal emigration in volume since 1960, however, it may be that unknown thousands of additional retornados left the country during this time (Wojno 1982, p. 82).

Certainly more of them wanted to leave. As Table 6.32 shows, several times the number who had left by the time of the Comissariado's census were making plans to leave. The state of the world economy at the time, however, limited their options. Some have said that Portugal picked a bad time to have a revolution, because the economic turmoil it engendered was exacerbated by the worldwide recession. By the same token, it picked a bad time for rapid decolonization, the state of the world economy leaving the bulk of the colonists no place to go but the metropole.

Although it is difficult to assess, several Portuguese told me that the retornados who were able to leave, especially for Brazil, were those who were relatively well off. Moreover, they took their diamonds or dollars with them and away from the limping Portuguese economy.

Table 6.32 Emigration among retornados

	#	%
No plans	408	82.1 [a]
Making plans	67	13.5
Already emigrated	22	4.4
Total	497	100.0

Source: national sample.

a 95% confidence interval = +/- 3.4%.

A Special Relationship with the State

In the time of Salazar and Caetano, the emigration of Portuguese to the colonies fulfilled a number of functions. First, it helped absorb Portugal's unemployed, largely from the agricultural sector. Second, it furthered the extent to which the colonies could become a protected market for Portugal, supplying raw materials more cheaply than could the world market and buying Portuguese products that were in relatively little demand elsewhere. Third, it helped increase the foreign exchange earnings from the colonies that alleviated the metropole's unfavorable balance of trade. Fourth, peopling the colonies with whites meant more effective control of them and more legitimacy to the claim that they were in fact part of Portugal.[2] Fifth,

2 Since the Congress of Berlin of 1885, effective occupation had been a condition of possession of colonies.

more effective control became necessary after World War II, in the face of increasing anticolonialism and support for liberation movements (Ferreira 1974, pp. 47-48).

All of these led the Portuguese government to become actively involved in the settlement of whites in the African colonies, unlike its more passive role in earlier emigration to Brazil. Thus the Portuguese government encouraged workers tending to emigrate to European countries to go to Mozambique and Angola instead. It also did its best to get the thousands of soldiers fighting in the colonial wars to stay on after their tours of duty were up; if they had attended secondary school for five years, they were given two-year courses in "social work" and after graduating were automatically employed in the Settlement Bureau, to be part of "mobile teams for community development." The government also attempted to recruit other European, non-Portuguese for settlement in the colonies.

> While the policy of settling ex-servicemen demonstrate[d] the military and strategic character of Portuguese population policy, the recruitment of non-Portuguese Europeans [made] plain its discriminatory character. Either Lisbon regard[ed] the Africans as incapable of contributing to the growth of the country within the framework of a development plan, and therefore prefer[red] white settlers, or else Portugal regard[ed] the Italian settlers as natural partners who [would] help to maintain white domination over the African territories (Ferreira 1974, p. 53).

The largest government program for settling whites in the colonies was that of the "colonatos" (settlements). Under this plan, the "colonos" (settlers) received land grants and credit from the state. The state tried to make their settlement permanent by providing them with the infrastructral conditions--including communications, energy sources, and irrigation systems--to allow them to make their farms into successful capitalist ventures. It was for this purpose that the state began the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique and the Cunene dam in Angola, estimated in 1974 to cost 9 billion and 5.9 billion escudos, respectively. There were also the costs of settlement per se, which amounted to some 300,000 escudos per family (Ferreira 1974, pp. 53-54).

The Portuguese government, then, had a special relationship with many colonists. It is my contention that this special relationship continued after they became retornados.

One of the first and most obvious places to look for this continuing relationship is the CIFRE loan program. This was a program of major proportions, which was in competition with other major programs at the time, including capital investments in the newly expropriated latifundios of the Alentejo, where absentee landlords had neglected the area's development for decades and where reorganization of farms as cooperatives resulted in short-term drops in production.

In a way these two competing areas for investment represent two sides of the class struggle begun after 25 de Abril. The retornados were nearly all right-wing anti-Communists, accustomed to privileged positions over the black masses of Africa; the rural workers in the Alentejo had been Communists for some time, unified by their landlessness, poverty, and labor that allowed their landlords to live in luxury in Lisbon. Both sides were represented by other players, of course, including on the left the factory workers of Lisbon and Setúbal, and on the right the nation's wealthy families, the Church, and even northern rural villagers who depended for their livelihood on remittances sent by relatives in capitalist countries (see Cabral 1978, p. 414).

International banking also played a role in the relationship between retornados and the state. Between them, the European Economic Community, the European Investment Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Swiss National Bank, and the West German Bundesbank came up with U.S. $1 billion in loans by early 1976 to aid Portugal in its postrevolution economic crisis. The U.S. demurred at that point, "pending a clearer view of possible political developments" (Keefe 1977, pp. 325-326).[3] Later in the

3 The view of political developments was apparently clearer by 1977, when the U.S. agreed to participate in a major IMF loan, with a number of conditions representing "no less than a formula for the reduction of public intervention in the Portuguese economy, and the restoration of the market mechanism, with its implicit conditions of

year, however, the United States seems to have considered the political orientation of retornados worth the risk of giving CIFRE over one billion escudos (U.S. $400 million) as a gift. CIFRE also received about 375 million escudos (U.S. $150 million) from the European Development Bank. The CIFRE program then came to generate eight thousand private enterprises that had not existed before, employing nearly sixty thousand people, most of whom CIFRE thought were retornados (Comissariado para os Desalojados 1979, pp. 19, 52).

Some Portuguese say that the retornados were thus "bought" by the government and the international banks and used as a convenient means of blocking socialistic economic changes. Others simply argue that nonretornados were never given an equal chance to develop their own enterprises. This latter feeling on the part of nonretornados is repeated by Cabral Ferreira:

> Credit for retornados functions insufficiently and unsatisfactorily, but it exists and it functions. It doesn't exist, however, practically speaking, for the others--nonretornados and returned emigrants--or when it exists, in some cases, it is under less favorable conditions. . . . We can verify a latent discontent in the area where we worked on the part of nonretornados, and in one case on the part of a returned emigrant who thought he would stay and start a little business. He complained about the fact that the retornados got all

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dependence on foreign capital for the survival of modern industry. In short, an end to ventures in socialism and the re-establishment of capitalism in Portugal" (Holland 1979, pp. 144-145).

> the money "because they were afraid of them, while from us they only wanted our money and that we hightail it back to Germany" (Cabral Ferreira 1977a, p. 119).

CIFRE was not the only place where retornados' special relationship with the government was manifest. As I have mentioned before, some forty-seven thousand government workers from the colonies received jobs or retirement with incentives in Portugal, putting a tremendous strain on the economy. Judging by my sample of IARN's records, around one-fourth of the retornados it kept track of received some form of government aid that gave them a job--that is, either employment as a functionary or a CIFRE loan (see Table 6.33).

Table 6.33 Retornado recipients of government aid

Government aid[a]	#	%
Yes	136	27.4 [b]
No	361	72.6 [b]
Total	497	100.0

Source: national sample.

a Not including food, housing, or unemployment subsidies.

b 95% confidence interval = +/- 3.9%.

Including all types of government aid brings the number of retornados with a special government relationship up

to around ninety percent (see Table 6.34). There are, of course, tens of thousands of retornados not counted in these numbers, but in any case it appears that at least half of all retornados received some sort of special aid from the government after arriving in Portugal. However much they may have needed this aid, it is little wonder that many nonretornados, with few memories of the state other than armed guards and tax repression, resent this special attention given a group coming in from the outside.

Table 6.34 Retornados having relationship with the government

Relationship with[a] the government	#	%
Yes	438	89.8 [b]
No	50	10.2 [b]
Total	488	100.0

Source: national sample.

a Including food, housing, and unemployment subsidies.

b 95% confidence interval = +/- 2.7%.

Summary

Using dependent variables that are of weaker discriminatory power than those used with the Serra do Mouro survey, the analysis of data drawn from IARN's files on individual retornados points to the same conclusions. Race,

education, birthplace (in Portugal or the colonies), and marital status emerged as the most important premigration characteristics influencing integration. Just as with the Serra do Mouro data, moreover, the national data do not support the main alternative hypothesis that government aid counteracted the tendency for retornados with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others. The same conclusions are corroborated in part by the work of Cabral Ferreira in northern rural Portugal.

Certain demographic and historical trends begun before 25 de Abril also influenced the pattern of retornados' settlement and economic activities. These trends had begun partly as a result of government policy under Salazar and Caetano and continued with respect to retornados--again, partly as a result of government policy. In particular, the pre-25 de Abril government had favored the industrial and services sectors over agriculture, and urban growth and development over rural. It had also actively encouraged emigration as a means of exporting Portugal's excess labor and providing remittances to help the balance of payments. Finally, it had maintained a special relationship with the African colonists, in order to legitimize and strengthen its claim on the territories and to extract raw materials from them more effectively. After 25 de Abril, the aid given by the new governments to the retornados continued all these trends, albeit in modified form according to the exigencies of new circumstances.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

At the core of this dissertation has been one central hypothesis: that certain characteristics of retornados before they ever left the colonies influenced their subsequent level of integration. I have juxtaposed this hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that government policy counteracted the tendency for individuals with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others. A secondary aim of this dissertation has been to show how the retornados' settlement patterns and economic activities in Portugal were conditioned by several historical and demographic trends inherited from Salazar and Caetano. In this chapter, I first evaluate the main hypothesis and the importance of these demographic and historical trends. I then look more in depth at the role of Portuguese government policy with respect to retornados. Finally, I speculate as to the potential implications of this research for future research and for future government policy.

Evaluating the Hypothesis

Central to my main hypothesis is an operationalized definition of integration that permits measurement of the outside group--in this case, retornados--against the host group. I define retornados as integrated when they come to approximate nonretornados in their material circumstances and their evaluations of these circumstances.

I operationalized this definition of integration through a survey among residents of Serra do Mouro, where I compared retornados living on their own, retornados living in IARN housing, and nonretornados. This survey confirmed what previous literature and my own ethnographic work in Serra do Mouro had suggested: retornados who were nonwhite, relatively uneducated, and who were not living with spouses in the colonies stood a smaller chance than others of being well integrated in Portugal. Their chances were further reduced if they had no nonretornado kin to come back to, and if no one in their household had worked for the government in the colonies (because having worked for the government, if they could prove it, guaranteed them a job back in Portugal). These latter two points were what proved to be the most effective aspects of government policy toward retornados; those who were able to live with nonretornado kin after their return, and those who had a household

member who was adido--or guaranteed a government job--were more likely than others to be well integrated. Such people tended to be white, better educated, and married. These and other government policies did little to offset the smaller chances of other groups for attaining circumstances comparable to those of nonretornados.

The strength of the data from the Serra do Mouro survey is that I generated them specifically for assessing the relative circumstances of independent retornados, IARN retornados, and nonretornados. These data allowed the construction of an index of integration that could quantify and establish the significance of differences among groups. Their chief weakness is one of representativeness; the conclusions are generalizable only to Serra do Mouro, which is only one small suburban neighborhood in the Lisbon area. Rural retornados are not represented at all. Moreover, the limited choices of housing may have preselected independent retornados moving into the bairro to be similar to nonretornados in their personal economic circumstances. This latter problem could have been addressed only by a national survey, or at the very least by a district-wide survey, which was beyond my resources.

Other data sources used in this study overcame to some extent the problem of the representativeness of the retornados in the Serra do Mouro data. One source was a survey conducted by Dr. José Maria Cabral Ferreira of the

Regional Planning Commission of the North in the Alto Tâmega area of Vila Real in northern Portugal. Another source was the information I collected on 500 retornado families from IARN's records on 187,000 households. Neither of these sources contained data that were collected to assess my hypothesis, but some information could be used in that way. Cabral Ferreira's data, for example, show that retornados living on their own in Alto Tâmega were better educated than those living in IARN housing, and that among the latter, whites were better educated than nonwhites. His data also show that retornados living on their own were more likely than those living in IARN housing to have non-retornado kin in Portugal. He did not measure other aspects of integration--for example, the number of people living per room, amount of material possessions, income, and evaluations of circumstances. Nevertheless, with this one nominal-level measure, the data from Alto Tâmega point to some of the same conclusions as do the data from Serra do Mouro.

The data from the IARN files contain two dependent variables: type of housing (IARN housing, families' or friends' houses, and their own houses), and employment. Both are nominal-level measures, but again, the conclusions are similar to those from the Serra do Mouro survey. People born in the colonies rather than Portugal, non-whites, and the less educated were less likely than others

to live on their own or with family or friends, and were more likely to live in housing provided by IARN. Married people, the better educated, and those born in Portugal rather than the colonies were more likely than others to be employed in Portugal. Because few nonwhites were born in Portugal, birthplace accounts for more variance than race, and disguises the fact that nonwhites were less likely than whites to find employment. The people more likely than others to receive government aid that involved more than a "safety net"--that is, government jobs and CIFRE commercial loans--were those who had worked for the government in the colonies, the better educated, and men. While the primary reason for the first group's greater chances of receiving government aid, redundantly, was that the government guaranteed them jobs or retirement with incentives, the better educated and men were more likely than the less educated and women to get jobs even without such aid. Thus government aid seems not to have been directed at those who needed it most.

Aside from the inexactness of the measures of integration in the data from the IARN files and the fact that they do not allow comparison of retornados and nonretornados at the national level, another problem is that they do not represent all retornados in Portugal; those who neither registered with IARN on their arrival nor responded to the Comissariado's census are not included. For the most part,

these were probably people who had no need of government aid--that is, those who were better off. A tendency of the data, therefore, is probably to exaggerate the importance of government aid in integration, as a higher proportion of the people that IARN kept track of received such aid than among retornados as a whole. If anything, this biases the data in favor of the alternative hypothesis: that government aid counteracted the tendency for people with certain premigration characteristics to be less integrated than others. The Serra do Mouro survey data, because they represent the entire retornado population of the neighborhood, do not contain such a bias.

The Serra do Mouro data, though, as discussed above and in previous chapters, have their own weaknesses. Even so, the use of multiple sources--the Serra do Mouro survey, ethnographic work in Serra do Mouro, Cabral Ferreira's data from rural northern Portugal, and national data from IARN's archives--have allowed triangulation or convergence validation; wherever possible, I have plugged up the holes in one source with data from another source. Together and separately, these data provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that premigration characteristics of retornados were not important predictors of their subsequent level of integration in Portugal. Moreover, the main alternative hypothesis--that government aid counteracted the tendency for people with certain premigration

characteristics to be less integrated than others--appears to explain less than the hypothesis itself.

The Role of the Historical and Demographic Trends

I investigated the historical and demographic trends influencing retornados' settlement patterns and economic activities largely through government statistics: GNP broken down by sector, CIFRE loans by sector and district, retornado and nonretornado population by district, and national rates of emigration. Where appropriate, too, I used survey data from Serra do Mouro, Cabral Ferreira's data from Alto Tâmega, and data from my sample of IARN's archives on retornado families.

Others have documented the historical and demographic trends referred to; for example, Keefe (1977), Almeida and Barreto (1976), and Wojno (1982) have established the push for development of industry and services at the expense of agriculture and of urban areas at the expense of the rural. Cabral (1978) and Wojno (1982) have discussed the reliance of the Portuguese economy on emigration, and Ferreira (1974) has dealt with the special relationship between colonists and the state. Explicit policies on the part of the governments of Salazar and Caetano encouraged all of these trends. My point is to show how these trends and policies--either implicitly or explicitly--continued with respect to retornados under the postrevolution governments.

In looking at favoritism toward industry and services over agriculture, I showed that CIFRE loans were skewed toward industry and construction. I also showed that the government favored the service sector through its policy of hiring all who had worked for it in the colonies, along with the billions of escudos spent to prop up the hotel industry by paying for retornados to stay in hotels while tourism was down. These three programs--the CIFRE loans, the employment of all former government workers, and the housing of retornados in hotels--were by far the most expensive ones for retornados.

Similarly, the bulk of CIFRE's resources went to urban areas and districts bordering on urban areas. The considerable money funneled into agricultural projects in the district of Santarém, too, may simply have been a way to expand the hegemony of bordering Lisbon and to provide farm products for the city. Also, giving jobs to forty-seven thousand former government workers meant settling a disproortionate number of them in Lisbon, the seat of government. To have countered the tendency for retornados to settle mostly in the cities, though, would have required explicit policy to the contrary of the strongest sort. Instead, the government's essentially "neutral" policy toward channeling resources earmarked for retornados toward urban or rural development facilitated the movement of those resources through the grooves dug out by Salazar; thus more

than half the retornados reached in the Comissariado's census settled in Lisbon, Porto, Aveiro, or Setúbal, the four fastest-growing districts, and four of the only five districts that had grown at all between 1960 and 1970.

In contrast to the case with urban and rural development, in which unstated government policy toward retornados simply allowed the inertia toward greater urban development to continue its course, the government's policy toward the emigration of retornados was explicit, as emigration for Portuguese in general had been under Salazar and Caetano. It ran into an uphill fight, however, against a depressed international economy in which northern European countries had little need for imported labor. The government subsidized as many retornados as possible in their efforts to leave the country, but this number amounted to only 12,642, at least for legal emigration.

Finally, the historic special relationship between colonists and the government continued when they became former colonists back in Portugal. The government had assisted many retornados in settling the colonies, and had spent heavily on defense to protect them from liberation movements. The government also had huge development projects meant to attract white settlers. Once they were back in Portugal, the government gave retornados all sorts of aid never granted to nonretornados, including the massive CIFRE commercial loan program, prefabricated houses, and

special loans for housing. About a fourth of all retornados counted by the Comissariado's census received some sort of aid beyond food, temporary housing, and unemployment subsidies. Counting these other forms of aid, the proportion of retornados having a relationship with the government reaches nine out of ten, or about half if those not counted in the Comissariado's census are also included. All of these, of course, were quite explicit policies.

It seems clear that government policy toward retornados did not seek to counteract these demographic and historical trends inherited from Salazar and Caetano. Indeed, with one exception, the policies of the postrevolution governments toward retornados appear to have consciously continued these trends. The one exception is favoring urban growth and development over rural. The government may not have done this explicity through its retornado policies, but encouraged continuation of the trend nonetheless by not recognizing it and by not taking a position.

Evaluating Government Policy

According to IARN's own definition of integration--that retornados were integrated "once they were in situations comparable to what existed for the general Portuguese population and with access to all legally established benefits, including the possibility of emigration" (Comissão Liquiditária do IARN, 1982)--the government's program seems to have been a success for retornados as a

whole. In Serra do Mouro, independent retornados' material circumstances are comparable to those of nonretornados, and there is no reason to believe that their evaluations of those circumstances, though currently more negative, will not also come to approximate those of nonretornados. Cabral Ferreira, too, speaking of retornados in rural Alto Tâmega, says that "integration is a fact" (1979, p. 175).

Integration is not a fact, however, for certain groups of retornados--notably nonwhites, the less educated, and people who were born in the colonies. Their situations simply become invisible when looking at retornados as a whole. Emptying the IARN buildings makes their plight even less noticeable. Since these groups were underdogs to begin with, it seems unlikely that the government could have helped them become as well integrated as others without an explicit policy to do so.

Also, the government could have seen the considerable resources directed toward retornados as a means of evening out economic development between rural and urban areas, and between agriculture on one hand and industry and services on the other. Instead, as we have seen, the government's policies toward retornados simply continued the general patterns established under Salazar and Caetano. To counter these patterns, again, as well-formed as they were, would have required explicit policy.

Posthoc criticism of reaction to a crisis, however, is too easy. The corruption, fraud, and incompetence under the first incarnation of IARN was lamentable, but understandable under the circumstances. The magnitude of "O Retorno" was overwhelming, but had to be dealt with nonetheless. However, short-term policy is not at issue here, but rather the policy that came about and continued after ample time for consideration. This includes, primarily, the hiring of forty-seven thousand government workers from the colonies, and the granting of 8,350 commercial loans by CIFRE. Neither of these included any special effort to reach nonwhites, the less educated, or people born in the colonies, and neither focused special attention on the development of rural areas or the agricultural sector of the economy.

Considerations in addition to the integration of retornados seem to have been at work in policy formulation. Some have suggested that the government, under international pressure, may have intended these programs for retornados to bolster the center-right in the volatile political climate after 25 de Abril. After all, the retornados were overwhelmingly and extremely anti-Communist. It also seems no coincidence that the U.S., wary of leftist elements in the postrevolution governments, stood back and watched its European allies lend large sums of money to Portugal in early 1976, but later in the year made an outright gift of

four hundred million dollars to the CIFRE program. There was certainly no danger of increasing Communist influence by helping establish eight thousand-odd private businesses run by the most anti-Communist group in Portugal.

Implications for the Future

The primary theoretical contribution of this work has been an attempt to better understand the nature of social and economic integration of an outside group in a modern nation-state and to determine what contributes to that integration. Of the various dimensions of immigrant adaptation discussed by Goldlust and Richmond--political, cultural, internalization of values, identification, social, satisfaction, and economic--I did not include the first two in my operationalized definition of integration. This was because of inadequacies in my measure of the political aspect and because of the inappropriateness of the cultural dimension in the case of retornados. I also eliminated the identification and social aspects--as measured in the Serra do Mouro survey--because factor analysis showed them not to be related enough to the central dimensions of economics and satisfaction. In the end, only these last two dimensions became part of the index of integration.

Clearly, further research is called for to refine this index of integration and hence to understand what integration is. Research on the integration of other groups, or even of retornados, should start from scratch with all of

Goldlust and Richmond's aspects, so we can understand under what conditions they become important indicators, and whether the economic and satisfaction aspects are in fact at the core of integration.

To further investigate the integration of retornados themselves, the best approach, albeit requiring considerable resources, would be to conduct a survey of the entire Portuguese population, with an oversample of retornados. In this way, representativeness--of either retornados or nonretornados--would not be a problem. As part of this study, one could include Portuguese migrants returned from northern Europe as a separate oversampled group, thus providing a basis for comparing the integration of two separate groups into the same host population.

The current study also has a number of implications for government policy. Although the Portuguese government has dissolved IARN and placed retornados needing social services under the care of other government agencies, which deal with retornados just as they do with other Portuguese, there are still some groups of retornados that are not very well integrated. These groups, of course, are nonwhites, less-educated people, people who were born in the colonies (and thus had few resources of their own to draw on in Portugal), and unmarried women. The government should recognize, however late, the special needs of these groups if they are ever to become effectively integrated.

In the realm of speculation, it is not entirely unlikely that a similar exodus of Portuguese could occur from South Africa. Many former colonists went there from Mozambique and Angola shortly before and after the independence of those countries, to join the hundreds of thousands of other Portuguese who were already there; the Portuguese in South Africa may now number close to a million. These people are probably living with different expectations for the future than were the colonists in Mozambique and Angola; most of the latter thought of the colonies as home, while many of the former probably plan an eventual return to Portugal. Even so, the South African government could suddenly and severely restrict the amount of money that could be taken out of the country, especially if violence escalates and a white exodus begins. Those who have not secreted funds in other countries may have to leave with next to nothing. Moreover, should the majority of Portuguese leave, most of them will probably have no place to go but Portugal, since other whites will be seeking refuge in other countries. The lessons of "O Retorno" should not be lost in such an event.

Another, more remotely possible event is the sudden return of a million Portuguese migrant laborers now working in northern Europe. During the last world recession, those countries simply restricted the importation of new workers or provided incentives for them to return to their own

countries. In a deeper recession, though, there is no guarantee that Portuguese and other guestworkers would not be forced out en masse. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, returned migrants are in many ways different from retornados, but many of their problems are the same, and would be especially similar if they all came back at once.

With the end of the colonial era, an event exactly like "O Retorno" is unlikely to happen again in any country on such a scale. But related events are likely to occur. The world has more refugees than ever before, with unique group characteristics, and unique circumstances they must adjust to. It therefore behooves us to understand, as much as possible, the processes through which they can become integrated into the societies they join, and thus to provide a means for governments to forge humane and informed policies.

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APPENDIX A
THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN SERRA DO MOURO

1. (Não pergunta nos prédios do IARN) A sua família é retornada ou não-retornada?

   1. Retornada
   2. Não-retornada
   3. Mistura
   4. Não sabe

   (Don't ask in the IARN buildings) Is your family retornado or nonretornado?

   1. Retornado
   2. Nonretornado
   3. Mixed
   4. Don't know

2. Qual e o seu grau de parentesco em relação ao chefe da família?

   1. Mesmo
   2. Esposo ou esposa
   3. Filho
   4. Pai our mãe
   5. Irmão ou irmã
   6. Outro familiar
   7. Não-familiar
   8. Não sabe

   What is your relation to the head of family?

   1. Self
   2. Spouse
   3. Son or daughter
   4. Parent
   5. Brother or sister
   6. Other family
   7. Non-family
   8. Don't know

3. Qual era o seu grau de parentesco em relação ao chefe da família nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

1.	Mesmo	2.	Esposo ou esposa
3.	Filho	4.	Pai our mãe
5.	Irmão ou irmã	6.	Outro familiar
7.	Não-familiar	8.	Não sabe

What was your relation to the head of family in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

1.	Self	2.	Spouse
3.	Son or daughter	4.	Parent
5.	Brother or sister	6.	Other family
7.	Non-family	8.	Don't know

Temos aqui uma escala entre 0 e 10, em que 0 e a pior condição possível, e 10 e a melhor.

We have here a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 is the worst condition possible, and 10 is the best.

Pior									Melhor	(Não sabe)
Worst									Best	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 10	11

4. Nesta escala entre 0 e 10, como é que classificaria a qualidade da sua vida agora?

   On this scale from 0 to 10, how would you rate the quality of your life now?

5. Na mesma escala entre 0 e 10, como é que classificaria a qualidade da sua vida daqui a cinco anos?

   On the same scale from 0 to 10, how would you rate the quality of your life 5 years from now?

6. Na mesma escala entre 0 e 10, como é que classificaria a qualidade da sua vida nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

   On the same scale from 0 to 10, how would you rate the quality of your life in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

7. Agora, na mesma escala, como é que classificaria a qualidade de vida dos retornados em geral antes do retorno, e antes do 25 de Abril?

   Now, on the same scale, how would you rate the quality of the lives of retornados in general before the return, and before 25 de Abril?

8. E na mesma escala, como é que classificaria a qualidade de vida actual dos retornados em geral, aqui em Portugal?

   And on the same scale, how would you rate the quality of the lives of retornados in general right now, here in Portugal?

9. E na mesma escala, como é que classificaria a qualidade de vida dos nao-retornados em geral antes do 25 de Abril?

   And on the same scale, how would you rate the quality of the lives of non-retornados in general before 25 de Abril?

10. Agora, vamos usar esta escala pela última vez. Como é que classificaria a qualidade de vida actual dos não-retornados em geral em Portugal?

    Now we'll use this scale for the last time. How would you rate the quality of the current lives of nonretornados in general in Portugal?

11. Diria que a ideia de sair de Portugal para sempre é muito agradável, agradável, desagradável, ou muito desagradável?

    1. Muito agradável 2. Agradável
    3. Desagradável 4. Muito desagrável
    5. Não sabe

    Would you say that the idea of leaving Portugal forever was very attractive, attractive, unattractive, or very unattractive?

    1. Very attractive 2. Attractive
    3. Unattractive 4. Very unattractive
    5. Don't know

12. Tem planos para emigrar? (Se sim) Até que ponto estão definidos esses planos? Estão muito mal-definidos, mal-definidos, definidos, ou bem-definidos?

1. Muito mal-definidos
2. Mal-definidos
3. Definidos
4. Bem-definidos
5. Não sabe

Do you have plans to emigrate? (If yes) How well formed are these plans? Are they very unformed, unformed, formed, or well-formed?]

1. Very unformed
2. Unformed
3. Formed
4. Well-formed
5. Don't know

13. Tem filhos? (Se sim) Quantos?

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6
7. 7 ou mais
8. Não tem filhos
9. Não sabe

Do you have children? (If yes) How many?

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6
7. 7 or more
8. Have no children
9. Don't know

14. (Se tem filhos) Como lhe seria se o(s) seu(s) filho(s) saissem de Portugal para sempre para melhoracassem a(s) sua(s) situaçao(ões), e o/a senhor(a) permanecesse aqui? Seria muito agradável, agradável, desagradável, ou muito desagradável?

1. Muito agradável
2. Agradável
3. Desagradável
4. Muito desagrável
5. Não sabe

(If have children) How would it be if your child(ren) were to leave Portugal forever in order to improve their lives, and you were to stay here? Would it be very attractive, attractive, unattractive, or very unattractive?

1. Very attractive
2. Attractive
3. Unattractive
4. Very unattractive
5. Don't know

15. Pense nas três pessoas fora da sua família com quem passa mais tempo livre. Dessas tres pessoas, quantas são retornadas?

1. 1 2. 2 3. 3 4. Zero
5. Não sabe

Think of the three people outside your family with whom you spend the most free time. Of these three people, how many are retornados?

1. 1 2. 2 3. 3 4. Zero
5. Don't know

16. Há diferenças importantes na maneira de ser dos retornados e os não-retornados? (Se sim) Quais são essas diferenças?

Are there important differences between the ways of retornados and non-retornados? (If yes) What are these differences?

17. O IARN e o Comissariado para os Desalojados eram organizações para apoiar na integração dos retornados. Pensa que o IARN e o Comissariado para os Desalojados deveriam ter feito alguma coisa diferente no programa para os retornados? (Se sim) O que é que pensa que deveriam ter feito? Há mais?

IARN and the Commissariado para os Desalojados were organizations to aid in the integration of retornados. Do you think that IARN and the Commissariado para os Desalojados ought to have done something different in the program for retornados? (If yes) What do you think they should have done? Anything else?

As seguintes declarações sobre os retornados tem sido feitas por algumas pessoas. Com estas declarações, concorda muito, concorda, discorda, ou discorda muito?

1. Concorda muito
2. Concorda
3. Discorda
4. Discorda muito
5. Não sabe

The following statements about retornados have been made by some people. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of these statements?

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don't know

18. Os empréstimos comerciais do governo aos retornados foram para os que já tinham trabalho e dinheiro, e não precisavam de apoio.

    The government's commercial loans for retornados went to those who already had jobs and money, and didn't need any aid.

19. Retornados são melhores trabalhadores do que os outros Portuguêses.

    Retornados are better workers than other Portuguese.

20. Os retornados que estão a viver bem trabalharam muito e merecem uma vida boa.

    Retornados that are living well have worked hard and deserve the good life.

21. O facto de que alguns retornados não estão bem de vida não é culpa deles, já que não tiveram oportunidade de melhorarem as suas situações.

    The fact that some retornados are not living well isn't their fault, since they haven't had the opportunity to better themselves.

22. Os retornados tem recibido apoio do governo que os não retornados nunca receberam, e isto não está certo.

    Retornados have received aid from the government that nonretornados have never gotten, and this isn't right.

23. A maioria do dinheiro do IARN foi desperdicado, e os retornados nunca o viram.

Most of IARN's money was wasted, and the retornados never saw it.

24. Os retornados que têm vidas ben-organizadas devem-nas aos programas do IARN.

The retornados that have stable lives owe them to IARN's programs.

25. Já que os não retornados são mais fechados do que os retornados, os retornados tem tido dificuldades na adaptação a vida em Portagal.

Because non-retornados are more closed than retornados, retornados have had difficulty adjusting to life in Portugal.

26. Por causa das imensas dificuldades de integração dos retornados, o IARN fez o melhor programa que se poderia esperar.

Because of the immense difficulties of integrating the retornados, IARN had the best program that could have been expected.

27. A razão porque alguns retornados continuam por conta do estado é que não querem trabalhar, porque têm dudo de graça: alojamento, alimentação, e subsídios de desemprego.

The reason that some retornados continue to live off the state is that they don't wan to work, because they get everything free: lodging, food, and unemployment subsidies.

28. O alojamento e a alimentação para os retornados vão ser cortados este ano. Isto não deve acontecer, porque os retornados ficarão sem lugar para viver.

Housing and food for retornados will be cut off this year. This should not happen, because the retornados will be without places to live.

29. Pessoas de cor não querem trabalhar tanto como os outros retornados.

Blacks aren't as willing to work as other retornados.

30. Pessoas de cor não tiveram oportunidades iguais aos outros retornados de melhorarem as suas situações.

Blacks haven't had as many opportunities as other retornados to better themselves.

31. Qual é a sua situação de emprego?

1. Emprego permanente
2. Emprego temporário
3. Estudante
4. Doméstica
5. Proprietário
6. Reformado, aposentado, ou incapacitado
7. Desempregado
8. Outra

What is your work situation?

1. Permanently employed
2. Temporarily employed
3. Student
4. Housewife
5. Property owner
6. Retired, pensioned, or incapacitated
7. Unemployed
8. Other

32. Qual era a sua situação de emprego nas colónias quando saiu/antes do 25 de Abril?

1. Emprego permanente
2. Emprego temporário
3. Estudante
4. Doméstica
5. Proprietário
6. Reformado, aposentado, ou incapacitado
7. Desempregado
8. Outra

What was your work situation in the colonies before you left/before 25 de Abril?

1. Permanently employed
2. Temporarily employed
3. Student
4. Housewife
5. Property owner
6. Retired, pensioned, or incapacitated
7. Unemployed
8. Other

33. Qual é a profissão para a qual está habilitado?

What profession are you trained for?

34. Qual a profissão que exerceu nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

What profession did you exercise in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

35. (Se tem emprego) Qual a profissão que está a exercer agora?

(If employed now) What profession are you exercising now?

36. (Se tem emprego) Trabalha por outra pessoa, pelo estado, ou por conta própria?

1. Outra pessoa 2. Estado
3. Conta própria 4. Não sabe/outro _____

(If employed now) Do you work for someone else, for the state, or are you self-employed?

1. Other person 2. State
3. Self-employed 4. Don't know/other _____

37. (Se trabalhava nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril) Nas colónias/ antes do 25 de Abril, trabalhava por outra pessoa, pelo estado, ou por conta própria?

1. Outra pessoa 2. Estado
3. Conta própria 4. Não sabe/outro _____

(If employed in the colonies/before 25 de Abril) In the colonies/before 25 de Abril, did you work for someone else, for the state, or were you self-employed?

1. Other person 2. State
3. Self-employed 4. Don't know/other _____

38. (Se e retornado que trabalhava pelo estado) Foi adido? (Se não) Porquê não?

(If retornado who worked for the state) Were you adido [guaranteed employment by the government in Portugal]? (If no) Why not?

39. Agora, temos outra escala de 1 a 7, em que 1 e a pior situação de emprego e 7 e a melhor situação. Nesta escala de 1 a 7, como e que classificaria a sua actual situação de emprego?

Now we have another scale from 1 to 7, in which 1 is the worst employment situation and 7 is the best situation. On this scale from 1 to 7, how would you rate your current work situation?

Pior situação						Melhor situação	Não sabe
Worst situation						Best situation	Don't know
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

40. Na mesma escala, como é que classificaria a sua situação de emprego nas colonias/antes do 25 de Abril?

On the same scale, how would you rate your work situation in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

41. Qual e o seu regime de habitação?

1. Casa própria
2. Casa alugada
3. IARN
4. Outra _____

Do you own or rent your home?

1. Own
2. Rent
3. IARN
4. Other _____

42. (Se e própria) Teve um empréstimo para a compra da casa? (Se sim) De que entidade?

(If own) Did you receive a loan to buy your house? (If yes) From what institution?

43. Quando e que mudou para Serra do Mouro?

1. Antes de 1975
2. 1975-76
3. 1977-78
4. 1979-80
5. 1981-82
6. Não sabe

When did you move to Serra do Mouro?

1. Before 1975
2. 1975-76
3. 1977-78
4. 1979-80
5. 1981-82
6. Don't know

44. Qual é o número de divisões da sua casa, excluindo a cozinha e a casa de banho?

How many rooms do you have in your house, not counting the kitchen and the bathroom?

45. Qual era o número de divisões da sua casa nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril, excluindo a cozinha e a casa de banho?

How many rooms did you have in your house in the colonies/ before 25 de Abril, not counting the kitchen and the bathroom?

46. Agora, pense numa escala de 1 a 7, em que 1 é a pior situação de habitação, e 7 é a melhor situação. Nesta escala de 1 a 7, como é que classificaria a sua actual situação de habitição?

Now, think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the worst housing situation, and 7 is the best situation. On this scale, how would you rate your current housing situation?

Pior situaçao					Melhor situaçao	Nao sabe
Worst situation					Best situation	Don't know
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

47. Na mesma escala, como é que classificaria a sua situação de habitação nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

On the same scale, how would you rate your housing situation in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

48. (Se e nao-retornado) Ja viveu fora do país? (Se sim) Onde? Quando?

(If non-retornado) Have you ever lived outside of the country? (If yes) Where? When?

49. (Se e retornado) Quando é que foi para as colonias?

1. Nasceu la
2. 1930 ou antes
3. 1931-1940
4. 1941-1950
5. 1951-1960
6. 1961-1970
7. 1971 ou depois
8. Não sabe

(If retornado) When did you first move to the colonies?

1. Born there
2. 1930 or before
3. 1931-1940
4. 1941-1950
5. 1951-1960
6. 1961-1970
7. 1971 or after
8. Don't know

50. (Se é retornado que não nasceu la) Porque é que foi?

(If retornado who wasn't born there) Why did you go?

51. (Se é retornado) Quando é que chegou das colonias?

1. Antes do 25 de Abril
2. 26 de Abril de 1974 até 31 de Augusto de 1974
3. 1 de Setembro de 1974 até 30 de Novembro de 1976
4. 1 de Dezembro de 1976 até 31 de Julho de 1977
5. Depois de 31 de Julho de 1977
6. Não sabe

(If retornado) When did you arrive from the colonies?

1. Before 25 de Abril
2. April 26, 1974 to August 31, 1974
3. September 1, 1974 to November 30, 1976
4. December 1, 1976 to July 31, 1977
5. After July 31, 1977
6. Don't know

52. (Se é retornado) Em qual colónia e distrito é que vivia quando saiu?

(If retornado) In what colony and district did you live when you left?

(Se e retornado) Trouxe alguma coisa das colónias além de roupa? (Se sim) Quantos dos seguintes artigos é que trouxe das colónias?

(If retornado) Did you bring anything from the colonies other than clothing? (If yes) How many of the following articles did you bring from the colonies?

53. Carro

    Car

54. Máquina de lavar roupa

    Clothes washer

55. Frigorífico

    Refrigerator

56. Fogão

    Range

57. Cama

    Bed

58. Sofá grande

    Sofa

59. Sofá pequeno

    Stuffed chair

60. Mesa de jantar de madeira

    Wooden dining table

61. (Se trouxe alguma coisa) Como é que conseguiu trazer essas coisas?

    (If brought anything) How did you arrange to bring these things?

Quantos dos seguintes artigos é que tinha nas colonias/antes do 25 de Abril?

How many of the following articles did you have in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

62. Carro

    Car

63. Máquina de lavar roupa

    Clothes washer

64. Frigorífico

    Refrigerator

65. Fogão

    Range

66. Cama

    Bed

67. Sofá grande

    Sofa

68. Sofá pequeno

    Stuffed chair

69. Mesa de jantar de madeira

    Wooden dining table

Quantos do seguintes artigos é que tem agora?

How many of the following articles do you have now?

70. Carro

    Car

71. Máquina de lavar roupa

    Clothes washer

72. Frigorífico

    Refrigerator

73. Fogão

    Range

74. Cama

    Bed

75. Sofá grande

    Sofa

76. Sofá pequeno

    Stuffed chair

77. Mesa de jantar de madeira

    Wooden dining table

(Se é retornado) Já recebeu algum apoio do estado? (Se sim) Até quando é que recebeu os seguintes?

1.	1975	2.	1976
3.	1977	4.	1978
5.	1979	6.	1980
7.	1981	8.	Apoio parou em 1982
9.	Até agora	10.	Nunca
11.	Não sabe		

(If retornado) Did you ever receive any aid from the state? (If yes) Until when did you receive the following?

1.	1975	2.	1976
3.	1977	4.	1978
5.	1979	6.	1980
7.	1981	8.	Ended in 1982
9.	Until now	10.	Never
11.	Don't know		

78. Subsídio de desemprego

    Unemployment subsidy

79. Abono de família

    Aid for dependent family

80. Alimentação

    Food

81. Alojamento

    Housing

82. (Se é retornado que recebeu apoio) Já recebeu um subsídio de integração? (Se sim) Quanto foi?

    (If retornado who received aid) Did you ever receive an integration subsidy? (If yes) For how much?

83. (Se é retornado que recebeu apoio do IARN) Já recebeu outro tipo de apoio do IARN? (Se sim) Quais?

    (If retornado who received aid from IARN) Did you ever receive any other form of aid from IARN? (If yes) What?

84. (Se é retornado) Já pediu um emprestimo do CIFRE? (Se sim) Para quê? Quanto é que pediu?

(If retornado) Did you ever request a CIFRE loan? (If yes) For what? How much did you request?

85. (Se pediu emprestimo do CIFRE) Recebeu o dinheiro? (Se sim) Quanto?

(If requested CIFRE loan) Did you receive the money? (If yes) How much?

86. Quais são as fontes de rendimento de todos em sua casa? Qual é o rendimento de cada um? Qual é o seu grau de parentesco em relação as pessoas que ganham esse dinheiro?

What are the sources of income of everyone in your household? What is the income from each one? What is your relation to the people who earn this income?

87. Quais eram as fontes de rendimento de todos em sua casa nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril? Qual era o rendimento de cada um? Qual era o seu grau de parentesco em relação as pessoas que ganhavam esse dinheiro?

What were the sources of income of everyone in your household in the colonies/before 25 de Abril? What was the income from each one? What was your relation to the people who earned this income?

88. (Se e retornado) Tinha família não-retornada aqui em Portugal quando chegou das colónias? (Se sim) De quais graus de parentesco?

(If retornado) Did you have any non-retornado family here in Portugal when you arrived from the colonies? (If yes) What relation were they?

89. (Se é retornado que tinha família não-retornada) O/a senhor/a ja viveu com família não-retornada desde o retorno? (Se sim) Por quanto tempo?

1. Não viveu com família
2. 6 meses ou menos
3. 7 meses-1 ano
4. 13 meses-2 anos
5. 25 meses-3 anos
6. 37 meses-4 anos
7. 49 meses-5 anos
8. Mais de 5 anos
9. Não sabe

(If retornado who had non-retornado family) Have you ever lived with non-retornado family since your arrival from the colonies? (If yes) For how long?

1. Didn't live with family
2. 6 months or less
3. 7 months-1 year
4. 13 months-2 years
5. 25 months-3 years
6. 37 months-4 years
7. 49 months-5 years
8. More than 5 years
9. Don't know

90. (Se é retornado que viveu com família não-retornada) Onde é que vivia com esses membros da sua família? (Distrito)

(If retornado who lived with non-retornado family) Where did you live with these members of your family? (District)

91. (Se é retornado que tinha família não-retornada) Já recebeu algum apoio ou empréstimo da sua família não-retornada? (Se sim) Qual tipo de apoio era? Havia mais?

(If retornado who had non-retornado family) Did you ever receive any aid or loan from your non-retornado family? (If yes) What form of aid was it? Was there anything else?

92. (Se é retornado) Já recebeu outra forma de apoio ou empréstimo de qualquer fonte desde o retorno? (Se sim) Qual tipo de apoio era? Havia mais?

(If retornado) Did you ever receive another forma of aid or loan from any other source since your arrival from the colonies? (If yes) What form of aid was it? Was there anything else?

93. Quantas pessoas com 18 anos ou mais vivem aqui nesta casa?

How many people 18 or over live here in this house?

94. Quantas pessoas com menos de 18 anos vivem nesta casa?

How many people under 18 live in this house?

95. Quantas pessoas com 18 anos ou mais viviam na sua casa nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

How many people 18 or over lived in your house in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

96. Quantas pessoas com menos de 18 anos viviam na sua casa nas colónias/antes do 25 de Abril?

How many people under 18 lived in your house in the colonies/before 25 de Abril?

97. É natural de que país e distrito?

What country and district were you born in?

98. Quando é que nasceu?

When were you born?

99. (Se é retornado que nasceu em Portugal) Qual era o seu trabalho em Portugal antes de ir para as colónias?

(If retornado who was born in Portugal) What was your job in Portugal before going to the colonies?

100. (Se tinha tal trabalho) Quanto é que ganhava?

(If had such work) How much did you earn?

101. Qual o nível de instrução que atingiu?

1. Analfabeto
2. Apenas sabe ler ou escrever
3. Primário
4. Preparatório
5. Liceal ou equivalente
6. Técnico profissional
7. Superior
8. Não sabe

What level of instruction have you attained?

1. Illiterate
2. Barely read or write
3. Elementary
4. Preparatory
5. High school or equivalent
6. Tecnical/professional
7. College
8. Don't know

102. Completou esse nivel?

1. Sim 2. Não 3. Não sabe

Have you completed this level?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know

103. Agora está a frequentar alguma escola? (Se sim) Quê nivel?

1. Primário
2. Preparatório
3. Liceal ou equivalente
4. Técnico profissional
5. Superior
6. Não frquenta
7. Não sabe

Are you attending school now? (If yes) What level?

1. Elementary
2. Preparatory
3. High school or equivalent
4. Tecnical/professional
5. College
6. Not attending
7. Don't know

104. Qual é o seu estado civil?

1. Solteiro 2. Casado 3. Separado
4. Divorciado 5. Viuvo 6. Não sabe

What is your marital status?

1. Single 2. Married 3. Separated
4. Divorced 5. Widowed 6. Don't know

105. Pertence a algum partido político? (Se sim) Qual?

Do you belong to any political party? (If yes) Which?

106. Pertence a alguma igreja ou religião? (Se sim) Qual?

Do you belong to any church or religion? (If yes) Which?

107. Pertence a algumas outras organizações ou associações? (Se sim) Quais?

Do you belong to any other organizations or associations? (If yes) Which?

108. (Se nasceu no estrangeiro) Qual é a sua nacionalidade?

(If born outside of Portugal) What is your nationality?

109. (Se é retornado) Quanto dinheiro é que o seu agregado familiar deixou nos bancos das colónias?

(If retornado) How much money did your household leave in banks in the colonies?

110. (Se é retornado) Do dinheiro que o seu agregado familiar trouxe, quanto é que trocou por escudos portugueses? (Se trocou algum) Como é que conseguiu trocar esse dinheiro?

(If retornado) Of the money your household brought, how much did you exchange for Portuguese escudos? (If exchanged some) How did you arrange to exchange this money?

111. (Se é retornado) Quanto dinheiro é que o seu agregado familiar já tinha em bancos no estrangeiro ou em Portugal quando chegou?

(If retornado) How much money did your household have in foreign or Portuguese banks when you arrived?

112. (Se é nao-retornado) Quanto dinheiro é que o seu agregado familiar tinha no banco antes do 25 de Abril?

(If non-retornado) How much money did your household have in the bank before 25 de Abril?

113. Quanto dinheiro é que o seu agregado familiar tem no banco agora?

How much money does your household have in the bank now?

114. Sexo

1. Masculino 2. Feminino

Sex

1. Male 2. Female

115. Raça

1. Branca 2. Negra 3. Mista
4. Indiana 5. Asiática 6. Outra

Race

1. White 2. Black 3. Mixed
4. Indian 5. Oriental 6. Other

APPENDIX B
AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES: ESCUDOS TO DOLLARS

Year	Rate
1971	27.3
1972	26.8
1973	25.7
1974	24.5
1975	27.2
1976	31.4
1977	39.7
1978	45.9
1979	49.6
1980	52.9
1981	65.1
1982	88.9
1983	131.8

Source: Banco Português do Atlántico

Note: One conto = one thousand escudos

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lynn Hoefgen was born on November 26, 1953, in Wichita, Kansas, where he lived for eleven years. After that he moved with his family to Topeka, Kansas, where he stayed until the end of high school.

At that time he went to Lawrence to attend the University of Kansas, where he received a BA in anthropology in May of 1975.

In the fall of that year he began graduate school at the anthropology department at the University of Florida, receiving an MA in June of 1977, then doing doctoral coursework through 1978. During most of his time at the University of Florida he served as a teaching assistant in various anthropology courses.

In 1979 he moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, with Ruth Harvey, who became his wife, and with their daughter, Rachel Hoefgen-Harvey. In Massachusetts he first worked as a research associate at Social Systems Analysts, Inc., an anthropology-oriented research firm involved mostly in the private sector. He then took a job with Cambridge Reports, Inc., in the beginning of 1981, which primarily involved survey research.

The Gulbenkian Foundation then offered him a fellowship to conduct doctoral research in Portugal, where he and his family moved at the end of 1981. While there he taught an undergraduate course in anthropological theory at the University of Maryland's Lisbon campus. When he completed the fieldwork at the end of 1982, he and his family moved back to Cambridge.

Cambridge Reports, Inc., then offered him his old job back, and within a few months promoted him to director of analysis. His employers promoted him again, this time to vice president, in May of 1984.

Meanwhile, in November of 1983, he and his wife had their second daughter, Moriah Hoefgen-Harvey.

At present, the four of them continue to live in Cambridge, and he continues to work at Cambridge Reports, Inc.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

H. Russell Bernard, Chairman
Professor of Anthropology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Allan F. Burns
Associate Professor of Anthropology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Paul Magnarella
Professor of Anthropology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Charles Wagley
Graduate Research Professor of
Anthropology (Emeritus)

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Charles H. Wood

Charles Wood
Associate Professor of Sociology

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 1985

Dean, Graduate School